Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Ralph Rosenfeld bought a red 1986 Camaro from a local police auction.  He bought the car “as is” and started having car trouble.  It stalled too often.  The car had been impounded from a drug dealer and was being sold off by the police.  Ralph took the car to his mechanic who did some work and found that $17,000 hidden in the fuel tank was messing up the engine’s gas flow.  The mechanic was a lawful guy and he called the police.  They confiscated the money as part of that which should be taken from the drug dealer’s ill-gotten gains.  Ralph is suing the police, arguing that the $17,000 was part of the “as is” condition of the car. 

What happens to the money?

Answer

[a] In the Talmud there is a case almost exactly like this one. (Jerusalem Talmud, B.M. 2.5)  The students of Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach buy him a donkey as a gift.  He is old and the donkey will help him earn a living.  They buy the donkey, the saddle, the blanket, and everything on it in a precise formula from an Arab merchant. Shimon finds a jewel on the animal as he is grooming it.  He demands that his students return it.  They insist that it is legally his.  He persists that it be returned.  When they bring it back, the Arab responds, “God bless the God of Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach.”

[b] The idea in this story is that while he could “legally” keep the jewel, it was not the right thing to do.  Likewise in our case, while “as is” means that he could insist on keeping the ill gotten drug money, doing so would not be “the right thing to do.”  This is a perfect case where law and right are not exactly the same.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs.74-75  

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

David writes, “After school I work in a convenience store.  Part of my job is selling cigarettes to customers.  Recently I studied a Jewish law called “Lifnei Iver,” putting a stumbling block before the blind. (Lev. 19:14)  My teacher said that one of the meanings of this law was that Jews should not help people hurt themselves or hurt others.  Helping them in that way was another kind of ‘stumbling block.’  I know that cigarettes are harmful.  I know that by selling them I am helping customers hurt themselves and others.  I also know that I cannot keep my job if I refuse to sell them.  Do I have to look for a new job?”

Is it wrong to take a job where selling cigarettes is part of your responsibilities?

Answer

[a] The Torah says “Do not put a stumbling block before the blind.” (Lev. 19:14)  Rashi explains, “This law refers to a person who is blind to the consequences of his/her actions, not just to the one who is suffering from physical blindness.”

[b] In the Talmud, (Pesachim 22a) Rabbi Natan said, “One cannot offer a cup of wine to a Nazir (one who has taken an oath not to drink) nor offer a limb from a live animal to one who is a Noahide (one committed to follow the seven commandments God gave Noah including not eating limbs cut from living animals.)  These violate the commandment of lifnei iver (putting a stumbling block before the blind).”  This would be like offering a drink to an alcoholic in recovery.

[c] In Moed Katan 17a, another Talmudic passage, we are told that a father cannot strike an adult child because this might tempt the son to hit him back.  If an adult son hits his father, the penalty is death. (Exodus 21:15)  Starting a chain reaction that might lead to a serious crime is considered “putting a stumbling block before the blind.”

[d] Three different opinions are taught in the Shulchan Aruch: (1) “One may never help a person commit a sin.”  (Maimonides teaches this opinion but most Ashkenazic authorities reject it).  2) The rabbis added a prohibition to the Torah that one cannot help a person in sinning, even if s/he can get the same help elsewhere.  (RaN). (3) “It is permissible to help a person commit a sin if others will do so if you do not.”  In other words, some opinions quoted in the Shulchan Aruch would let you sell the cigarettes (because they can be bought everywhere) and some would forbid it.  

Based on these interpretations, a clerk in a store may sell cigarettes.  Buying cigarettes for someone would be a different issue.

Taken from “Enabling a Jew to Sin: The Parameters,” Rabbi Michael Broyde & Rabbi David Hertzberg, The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society. Spring 1990)

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 66-67  

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

The Los Angeles Times reported that when a suspected drunk driver hit a disabled car that plowed into four people standing on the roadside, Jadine Russell, a 55-year-old mother of five and a devout Jehovah’s Witness, was injured.  She died several hours later after refusing a blood transfusion that might have saved her life.  “No blood!” she stated at least ten times to rescue workers and emergency-room physicians.  She was so adamant in her beliefs that she even roused herself from unconsciousness and tried to pull out an intravenous line.  In a trial that began Wednesday, jurors are being asked to decide if convicted drunk driver Keith Cook was soley responsible for Russell’s death and therefore guilty of murder, or if the woman’s religious beliefs brought about her demise.  “This is a fascinating case,” said Lauire Levenson, associate dean at Loyola Law School.  “Did the defendant kill her, or did she kill herself?”

Should a Jewish doctor have to listen to Jadine Russell’s request and not give her a blood transfusion, or should that doctor follow Jewish values and “choose life”?

Answer

[a] The heart of this question is the relationship between personal autonomy (individual freedom) and religious values (God says you should do this).  Rabbi Zev Schostak, in his article, “Is There Patient Autonomy in Halacha?” (Jewish Medical Ethics, Vol.II, No.2, May 1995), teaches that the right for a patient to decide what is done to her or to his body is a major foundation of medical ethics.  Yet at the same time there are other important considerations.  

[b] In Jewish law, protecting life is more important than personal freedom.  “Although there are those who wish it to be so, self-determination is not universally recognized as the paramount human value, [the sanctity of life] as an absolute value overrides considerations of personal freedom.” (Bleich, J.D. The Moral Obligations of the Physician In Rabbinic Tradition).  While a patient’s right to decide his or her treatment exists in Jewish law, refusing a blood transfusion would not be included within this right.

[c] It seems that the key verse that gives the physician the obligation to put forth her or his best efforts is the verse in Leviticus that tells us “Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow, I am the Lord” (19:16).  This prohibition gives us the commandment that we cannot stand idly by while someone is dying; we must do what we can to save him or her. (Talmud, Sanhedrin 73a)

[d] Rabbi Moshe Tendler and Fred Rosner, M.D., address the very question of Jehovah’s Witnesses in their book Practical Medical Halacha.  They first advise the Jewish doctor not to take the patient.  If the doctor does accept the patient, “the physician should assure the patient in advance that if at all possible he will use blood substitutes.” (p. 164)  Yet, although the wishes of a patient are of great importance, they are secondary to the will of God and Rabbi Tendler says that, if a transfusion is the only thing that will save the person, it must be administered.

[e] The only other consideration is the legal ramification of such an action.  Going against a patient’s wishes could result in professional discipline.  Although a deeper legal discussion is necessary, it seems that there are plenty of other doctors in the world and saving a life, as the Tur quotes at the end of its explanation of the principle of Lo Ta’amod al Dam Re’echa (do not stand idly by while someone is dying), is like enabling a whole world to exist. (Tur, Choshen Mishpat, 426)

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 63–65

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A Jewish man receives a box of Christmas cards in the mail from a Christian orphanage.  They ask him to either pay $10.00 or send the cards back in the mail.  He thinks it is unfair that he must spend money either way to get rid of the box of Christmas cards he never wanted.  The law says he is under no obligation to return them or pay the money, because they were unsolicited.  One of his friends says sending them back is the right thing to do (otherwise it is stealing).  Another friend argues that sending them back only allows someone else to be stuck in the same situation.

What should the man do?  Would it change if he got Chanukah candles from a Jewish organization?

Answer

[a] It seems that there are two issues at work in this case: tzedakah and ownership.  If the person wants to give money to the orphanage, it is certainly his right, and he should be applauded for doing so.  The same would apply in the case of the Chanukah candles.  If he wants to support the institution, he is welcome to do so, yet in the case of Chanukah candles, they should belong to you in order to perform the mitzvah.  In both cases, if the person wants to use the product, I would encourage him to send money.

[b] Separate from this being tzedakah, this is an unsolicited offer from the orphanage.  In his book Ethics of Business Finance and Charity According to Jewish Law, translated by Eliyahu Touger (Vol.3, Ch.2), Rabbi Ezra Basri points out the fact that there is a fundamental idea in the Talmud with regard to a business transaction.  It states that local custom has binding authority.  As described, according to American law, there is absolutely no obligation to either pay the ten dollars or to send it back.  Therefore this is not a legal obligation and the person has no obligation to pay anything.  This is no different whether it is a Christian charity or a Jewish one.   

[c] Additionally, there is another possible principle at work.  It is taught that one’s domain cannot acquire for him without his knowledge.  (If someone throws something into your yard, it is not automatically yours because it is now on your property.  It is only yours if you want it.)  The mail can also be seen as one’s domain, and “a person who does not desire to acquire an article does not acquire it because it is in his domain.” It still seems that the man has every right to throw out this false acquisition.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 61-62

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Melissa is feeling bad.  Even though it is Shabbat she goes to Dr. Rabinowitz, knocks on the door and asks for help. He brings her into his home office, examines her and tells her what treatments she needs.  Next week Melissa is really surprised to find a bill from the good doctor in the mail.  She complains.  “It was Shabbat. He’s Jewish.  He can’t take money for work done on Shabbat.”  

Can a Jewish doctor charge for emergency medical treatment administered on Shabbat?

Answer

[a] Judaism believes in “doctoring” and not just in faith healing. (Ex. 21:19, Deut. 22:2)

[b] The Torah teaches that one should not work on Shabbat. (Ex. 20:9-10)

[c] One may “break” Shabbat and “do work” in order to save a life.  The act of saving a life is called Pikuach Nefesh, and we learn in Yoma 8:6/35b, 85b, based on Leviticus 18:5, that Pikuach Nefesh suspends the Shabbat rules. (Shulchan Arukh, Orekh Chayyim 329:3)  This means a doctor may “work” on Shabbat when a life is even slightly, possibly at risk.

[d] One should not pay a worker for work done on Shabbat.  It is, however, possible to hire a person for a week, a month or a year, and have Shabbat work included in that larger payment (B.M. 58a, Mishnah Torah, Shabbat 6:25)

[e] Rabbi Yaakov Weil and Rabbi Yisrael Bruna write (Responsa Maharai Bruna #114) that a midwife can be paid for a delivery on Shabbat because it is part of a larger framework of care before and after.  Rabbi Chaim Modai of Smyrna writes that the same is true for doctors but suggests that this should also include aftercare so that the payment is not just for Shabbat.

[f] The discussion continues with some rabbis on each side, but the bottom line seems to be this.  Doctors can work on shabbat when the health of their patients seem to be at risk.  They may charge for this work, but it is better that they be paid in the context of a longer relationship.  If a fee includes a follow-up visit, the conditions of Jewish law are satisfied without conflict.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 59-60

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A man was using a bulldozer to stockpile gravel.  He took a break and left the cab unlocked and the key in the ignition.  When he returned, the bulldozer was missing. He discovered that while he was gone the bulldozer had been set in motion and had crashed into the side of someone’s house.  The person whose house had been damaged filed suit against the operator who had left the keys in the bulldozer and asked that he pay for the destruction done to the home.  

Who should pay to fix the house when we can’t find the person who actually drove the bulldozer into it? 

Answer

In American law it is called “an attractive nuisance.”  In Hebrew we call it “the case of the pit.”  It comes from the Torah.  The Torah, Exodus 21:33-34, says,: “If one person digs a pit and does not cover it and an ox or donkey falls into it, the one who opened the pit is responsible for paying for the damage.”

In the Talmud the rabbis make it clear that anytime you leave something that could cause damage and you do not protect people from it, you are responsible for the damages.  In this case, leaving the key in the bulldozer was like leaving the pit uncovered.  Therefore, even though he was not driving, the driver needs to accept responsibility.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 57-58

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A fire broke out in a town and spread rapidly.  Everyone ran out of fear.  One Jew stayed long enough to save a really valuable book whose owners had abandoned it.  After the fire, the owners wanted their book back (and were willing to pay a reward).  The man who risked his life to save the book claims that the book is now his because it would have been burned up without his efforts.  

Who gets the book?

Answer

[a] The answer to this case is based on a Jewish legal principle called “Hefker.”  It means “abandonment.”  The idea is this: When a person loses something, until when does it have to be returned?  The answer: Until it is “Hefker.”  When is that?  When the original owner gives up hope of ever recovering it.  In other words, when it is abandoned.  There are rules about how long that takes, but in general, if the object can be identified, “a year and a day,” and if the object cannot be identified (If it has no distinguishing, describable attributes, like a twenty-dollar bill) immediately.

[b] This is not such a crazy idea, because it is just like the laws of salvage at sea.  Once a ship or a cargo is abandoned, it is available for salvage.

[c] In this case, since the owner of the book abandoned it and had no intention of recovering it, it is considered “Hefker” and available for acquisition by the person who rushed into the fire. 

[d] The Talmud has a similar case.  In Bava Kamma 155a we learn about this situation.  One person is carrying a cask of wine along a road; another is carrying a cask of honey.  Honey is worth more than wine.  The honey cask breaks and starts to leak.  The person carrying it gives up hope of bringing it to market.  The second man then pours out his wine and uses his cask to catch the dripping honey.

[e] The Talmud rules that the man saving the honey gets only as much honey as would cover his effort – because he saved what was not really ownerless, and because it was not really on the edge of destruction. Much of it could be recovered if the owner returned with another barrel.  

[f] But in the case of the fire, the book was about to be completely destroyed, the owner had given up hope, and therefore the man who rescued it gets possession.

That was the answer given by Rabbi Meir ben Barukh of Rottenburg.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 50-51

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Isaac Goldstein owns Rocky’s Pawn Shop in Dallas, Texas, and sells a lot of guns.  J. David Bleich is a leading Orthodox legal scholar who wrote a public letter to Mr. Goldstein telling him it was wrong to sell guns.  He wrote, “A sticker on the door of your shop reads ‘Guns Don’t Cause Crime Any More Than Flies Cause Garbage.’”  Then he added, “Yes, Mr. Goldstein, flies do not cause garbage, but garbage does attract flies.  Guns may or may not cause crime, but crimes of violence cannot be committed without tools of violence.  Self-restraint in the sale of weapons is a small enough price to pay for even marginal enhancement of public safety.”  

Should a rabbi send a letter to a newspaper telling a Jew not to sell guns in his store?

Answer

There are two issues at stake here.  (1) What does Judaism have to say about selling guns? (2) Assuming that selling guns is a bad thing, is it ok to publicly embarrass someone in order to get him to stop?

[a]  In his public letter Rabbi Bleich quotes Maimonides (Hilkhot Rotzeah 12:12, paraphrasing Avodah Zarah 15b): “It is forbidden to sell heathens weapons of war.  Nor is it permitted to sharpen their spears, or to sell them knives, manacles, iron chains, bears, lions or any object which can endanger the public; but it is permitted to sell them shields which are only for defense.”  While there is a need to discuss the meaning of “heathen,” the basic goal of keeping society as a whole safe is clear.

[b] Rabbi Bleich continues to quote Maimonides, “By selling arms to a heathen one strengthens the hands of an evil-doer and causes him to transgress.  Anyone who strengthens the hands of a person who is blind (meaning that s/he does not see the path of truth because of the desire of his/her heart) is also violating the commandment, ‘You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind’ (Leviticus 19:14).  This makes, in Jewish terms, the person who sells the gun an accessory before the fact.”

[c] In Judaism, safety is a religious concern.  The Bible requires that a roof be properly gated in order to prevent people from falling off of it (Deuteronomy 22:8). This commandment is understood by the Talmud as a general directive to remove any safety hazard (Bava Kamma 15b, Shulchan Arukh HM 427:8).  Contemporary rabbinic authorities include in this commandment an employer’s responsibility to ensure occupational safety (Piskei Uziel 47) and an injunction against reckless driving (Minchat Yitzhak 8:148).  Someone who refuses to remove a safety hazard can be punished by excommunication (YD 334:7).  In general, safety regulations are treated with far greater stringency than any other section of halakhah (YD 116:7).

[d] Rabbi Bleich concludes: “Although halakhah is extremely concerned about safety, it does not prohibit the ownership of guns.  However, recognizing that a gun is a dangerous object, halakhah (like many current gun control laws) requires that owners and vendors of guns take all possible precautions to prevent their guns from causing any harm.”

[e] Therefore, there is a strong Jewish foundation for gun-control, though laws about owning a dangerous dog tell us (a) it is forbidden (Bava Kamma 79a), (b) unless there is a clear danger to the owner or his/her property (HM 409:3), (c) but then the responsibility to keep the public from harm falls on the owner in a big way (Shabbat 63b, Hullin 7b, Terumot HaDeshen 2:105).  This may give permission to own guns, but not to sell them, and puts a huge mandate on gun safety.

[f] We have spoken before about the mitzvah of tokekhekh (rebuke). (Lev.19:17)  It requires a person to tell another person when he is doing something wrong.  While embarrassment of another person is usually forbidden, (BM 59a) one is allowed to do so in order to prevent harm to person or property. (Yevamot 65b) 

Therefore, Rabbi Bleich’s actions are consistent with his understanding of Jewish law and seem to be appropriate.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 47-49

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Mr. Klein is in a hurry.  He was late and frustrated.  He circled the block once and could find no place to park.  He pulled up to a red (no parking) curb, got out of the car, and told his daughter Shana to follow. Shana told him, “Dad, this is a no-parking area.”  He said, “Big deal.  If the police come they will give me a $30 ticket.  I can afford the ticket.  I can’t afford to spend another twenty minutes finding a parking space.  We are late.”  She said, “But Dad, it is against the law.”  He answered, “The law says, ‘If you get caught, you get a ticket.’”  

Was Dad right that it was okay to park illegally if you are willing to pay the ticket if you get caught, or is Shana right that you should never break the law? 

Answer

[a] In the Talmud, Rabbi Samuel teaches a basic principle, “Dina d’Malkhuta Dina,” the law of the land is the law.  This means that unless following the law of your government leads to a violation or Torah law, you have to follow it – just as if it were Torah (Bava Kama 113a, Bava Batra 54b, Nedarim 28a, Gittin 10b).

[b] Most examples in Jewish law that use this principle involve taxes.  In the Talmud we are told that you can even take a false oath involving taxes – something that is against Jewish law – but you can only do so if (1) a wicked government is demanding unfair taxes, or (2) (as used to happen) the government sold the right to collect taxes to an individual who was being unfair in what they demanded.  Even if taxes are high, if they are fair, they must be honestly paid. (Nedarim 28a)

[c] If a store is breaking the law (by not paying taxes, etc.), you are not allowed to shop there, even if you are getting a good deal. (Rabbi J.B. Soleveitchik, D’var Avraham Vol 1. p.14) 

[d] One is not allowed to hide criminals and help them escape punishment if they are guilty (Rashi, Tosefot, and Maharsha to Niddah 61a).

[e] Based on all of these rulings, and using the principle of Dina d’Malkhuta Dina, the father cannot park wherever he wants for three reasons:

1. It is breaking the law on purpose – and that is against the principle of Dina d’Malkhuta Dina.
2. He is stealing or making life dangerous for others.  Meters are designed to make parking fair.  No-parking zones are designed to make traffic safe.  When you park where you want, you are taking something from someone else.

[f] He is “putting a stumbling block before the blind” by teaching his child that it is ok to break the law when you decide.  This means that the child may break other laws based on the father’s example.  Based on this example, I can break the government’s laws, my parents’ laws, or God’s laws, as long as I am willing to pay the fine.  This destroys all sense of authority and order.  Not a good idea.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 41-43

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Uzi owns an Israeli restaurant in New York.  He sells the usual Middle Eastern fare.  On the table there are two menus: one in English and one in Hebrew.  The prices on the Hebrew menu are cheaper than those on the English menu.  Uzi claims that he is giving the other Israelis a discount.  One of his American customers who read both menus claims that he is cheating non-Hebrew-speaking customers.  

Is it right for Uzi to run a restaurant with two prices for the same falafel?

Answer

[a] There is a basic Jewish legal principle called Ona’ah that is usually translated as fraud (Bava Metzia 51a ff).  It says that a person must charge fair prices and not trick someone into paying more.

[b] A customer has an obligation to know market conditions before starting to bargain – but the seller cannot trick a customer into believing that this price is the market condition.  In other words, a person can charge whatever he wants, and if the customer pays the price, the customer loses.  But if the seller tells the customer, “This is what everyone is charging, go look,” the seller has violated Ona’ah and the deal is not valid.  

[c] Charging two different prices is not valid unless (1) the conditions of two markets are different, (2) a customer is a discount or volume buyer, or (3) the cost or nature of the goods has changed.   

[d] Therefore, charging two different prices in Hebrew and English is wrong, unless the nature of Israeli buyers and American buyers is such that they have different cost expectations in their markets. (A complicated issue – but because this is the same store and not two stores, the answer to this is “wrong.”)

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 39-40

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver