2.24.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Uzi owns an Israeli restaurant in New York.  He sells the usual Middle Eastern fare.  On the table there are two menus: one in English and one in Hebrew.  The prices on the Hebrew menu are cheaper than those on the English menu.  Uzi claims that he is giving the other Israelis a discount.  One of his American customers who read both menus claims that he is cheating non-Hebrew-speaking customers.  

Is it right for Uzi to run a restaurant with two prices for the same falafel?

Answer

[a] There is a basic Jewish legal principle called Ona’ah that is usually translated as fraud (Bava Metzia 51a ff).  It says that a person must charge fair prices and not trick someone into paying more.

[b] A customer has an obligation to know market conditions before starting to bargain – but the seller cannot trick a customer into believing that this price is the market condition.  In other words, a person can charge whatever he wants, and if the customer pays the price, the customer loses.  But if the seller tells the customer, “This is what everyone is charging, go look,” the seller has violated Ona’ah and the deal is not valid.  

[c] Charging two different prices is not valid unless (1) the conditions of two markets are different, (2) a customer is a discount or volume buyer, or (3) the cost or nature of the goods has changed.   

[d] Therefore, charging two different prices in Hebrew and English is wrong, unless the nature of Israeli buyers and American buyers is such that they have different cost expectations in their markets. (A complicated issue – but because this is the same store and not two stores, the answer to this is “wrong.”)

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 39-40

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.10.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Roger goes into the store.  He tries on jacket after jacket, pair of pants after pair of pants.  He finds exactly what he wants.  Then he goes home and uses the internet to find the same stuff for less.  He did not steal anything from the store.  

Did he do something wrong?

 

Answer

The Jewish answer is YES!!!

[a] Something has been stolen.  The Talmud defines doing such things as Ona’at Dibbur, verbal fraud.  In the Talmud the question is: “Can you walk into a store and ask the price of something you have no intention of buying?” (Bava Metzia 58b)

[b] That case is hard for us to understand, because it was set in a bazaar world where every deal involved bargaining, and not in the shopping mall.  The bottom-line idea here, however, is that when you look like you are going to buy and then you walk out without buying you steal esteem and hope from the store owner, who thinks he or she is doing something wrong.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 25-26

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

2.3.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Someone tried to sell a kidney online.  In America and many other countries, selling organs is against the law.  The belief is that all organs should be donated and then given out in an order created by the medical community based on need and likelihood of survival.  The doctors say that they fear that rich people will begin forcing people to sell them organs.  Others argue that it limits their freedom to be able to do with their organs what they want.

Should selling organs be a matter of personal choice?

Answer

There are two issues surrounding this question.  First is the permissibility of donating organs and second in the issue of selling them.

[a] With respect to the principle of donating organs, Jewish law permits it with a few conditions.  The Torah, in Leviticus 13:5, tells us v’Hai ba-Hem, “You should live by the Mitzvot.”  The rabbis learn from this verse that the supreme value of Jewish life is that mitzvot are to perpetuate human survival.  The journal Medical Ethics and Judaism tells us that there is no objection to organs being donated for the purpose of saving a life.  The burial of the complete body would be set aside for this principle.  The Comprehensive Guide to Medical Halakhah by Rabbi Abraham S. Abraham says that as long as the donor does not suffer permanent harm, organ donation is a most “meritorious act.”  

[b] This Comprehensive Guide to Medical Halakhah by Rabbi Abraham S. Abraham also gives us some guidance as to the second part of the question.  It is there where he writes, “a person who during his lifetime sells one of his kidneys for transplantation into a seriously ill patient because of poverty or debts nevertheless performs the mitzvah of saving a life,” as Rabbi Abraham says in the name of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach.  Yet Rabbi Abraham laments a state of affairs in which someone is resorting to such measures for financial survival. 

[c] It seems to me the practice of selling body parts should be frowned upon for, the linchpin of the arguments is that the body belongs to us and we can do with it what we want to.  Judaism does not support that idea.  The body is a holy vessel that is given to us by God, and because of its holiness it is not ours to make profit from the way we make profit from CDs or baseball cards.  Organ donation is a great mitzvah, and the organs should go to the ones who would benefit from this mitzvah, not to those whose wallets are the thickest.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 23-24

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.27.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

The Jews of Kovno knew that the Nazis were about to slaughter many of them and take the rest away to death camps.  One man went to Rabbi Oshry and told him that because he had been part of the resistance, the Nazis would not just kill him, but would torture him and put his family to death before his eyes.  He asked permission to commit suicide and so provide himself (and possibly his family through his absence) with an easier death.

Answer

[a] Normally Jews are forbidden to commit suicide. The simple explanation is that our bodies belong to God, and we do not have permission to abuse them.  The textual proof comes from Genesis 9:5: “For your life blood, too, I will hold you responsible.”  In the Talmud, Bava Kamma 91b, the rabbis make it clear that this refers to suicide and that is forbidden.  

[b] The one example of a permissible suicide is King Saul (I Samuel 31:3-5, explained in Genesis Rabbah 34.13), about whom the rabbis say, “He died to preserve the dignity of the King of Israel.”  Some rabbis accept this choice.  Rabbi Oshry, who faced this choice, said this case is an exception that resembles the case of King Saul (and is not available to ordinary people).

[c] Oshry also states that suicide, when it is Kiddush ha-Shem – defending God’s honor and not giving in to pagan forces – is a mitzvah.  Not allowing the Nazis to win was such a moment. 

[d] Oshry concludes that suicide is permissiable in this case, but said that his t’shuvah (answer) could not be published, lest anyone else in the ghetto read it and imagine that their situation was severe enough to justify suicide.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 21-22

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.20.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Jodie and Mary were born as Siamese twins.  If they are left unseparated, they will most likely both die.  If they are separated, one of the babies, Mary, will definitely die, and one, Jodie, will probably live.  The parents are opposed to the operation because they are not willing to be responsible for the death of one of their daughters.  They are willing to stand by, do nothing, and hope for a miracle.  The British courts are thinking about ordering the operation (against the parents will).

Should a court order an operation that will save Jodie’s life?

Answer

In the case of twins who need to be separated for one of them to live, the parents, devout Roman Catholics, say only God should determine how long the children will live.  Most Jewish authorities in Great Britain argued that the court should force the operation.

[a] There is a Jewish legal principle called “ha-Rodef,” the pursuer.  If person A is chasing person B in order to kill him or her, an outsider can kill A in order to save B’s life, if that is the only way to protect B.  The rabbis used this principle in the case of abortion, saying that if a mother’s life is at risk, the fetus is considered to be “a pursuer.’  This means that the fetus must be terminated if that is the only way of assuring the mother’s health.  The same principle applies to the weaker of the twins here.

[b] Berel Berkovits of the Federation of Synagogues, an Orthodox body, said there are two ways to look at the case.  “Is it one person or two?”  he said of the twins.  “You might argue that it’s one organism, in which case separating one from the other is like an amputation to save a life.”  That course of action is certainly permissible.  If the twins are two separate organisms. Each could be considered a pursuer of the other, since each, in effect, would kill the other if they are not separated.  

[c] Rabbi Charles Middleburgh of the Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues said, “One of the things that Judaism teaches is that the saving of life is paramount.  Because it is possible to save Jodie by separating her from her sister, Jewish tradition recommends that option.”

[d] Rabbi Chaim Rapoport, the chief rabbi’s spokesman on medical ethics, explained why he disagreed with the parents’ desire to let nature take its course.  “Judaism rejects passivity and noninterference with nature.  Jewish law supports the life-saving operation.”

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 16-18

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.13.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

It is a mitzvah to light Shabbat and holiday candles.  In other words, it is something a Jewish “supposed” to do.  Sarah is a freshman at a state university.  Her mother gave her candlesticks as part of her “Jewish college” kit.  On many university campuses it is against the dorm rules to have an open flame (like a candle) in a dorm room.

Should Sara light her candles and break the dorm rules or follow the rules and not light candles?

Answer

If your college dorm forbids the lighting of candles in your room, what should you do?

[a] Maimonides makes it clear that it is a mitzvah to light candles on Shabbat and on holidays. (Laws of Shabbat 5:3)

[b] The Talmud makes it clear that Shabbat and other mitzvot can be violated when a life is at stake.  Performing the mitzvot is not supposed to be dangerous.  Pikuah Nefesh is the name of this principle, and it can be learned in chapter 8 of Yoma.  It is based on Leviticus 18:5, where the Torah says, “These are mitzvot – live by them.”  The rabbis underline this passage in the Talmud and add, “Live by them – do not die by them.’

[c] There is another rabbinic principle called Dina d’Malkhuta Dina,that more or less means the law of the land is the law.  This means that you have to follow local laws unless they directly lead to the violation of Jewish laws (Nedarim 28a; Gittin 10b; BK 113a; BB54b and 55a) 

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 14-15

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.6.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Sean is standing in line to buy tickets to a concert he really wants to see.  He is set to buy four tickets.  There is a rule that no one can buy more than six tickets.  A man comes up and down the line and offers to pay Sean $100 if he buys two extra tickets for him. Should Sean do it?  This case comes from a column in the New York Times written by Randy Coehn called “The Ethicist.”  

Answer

I was having dinner with friends of mine, rabbis, and they had opposite answers to this question.

[a] The first said, “He is allowed six tickets.  He buys six tickets.  He has broken no law.  If he makes some money, good.”

[b] Rabbi Number Two said, “It is wrong. First, he is breaking the rule of Dina d/Malkhuta Dina, the law of the land is the law.  The limits on the number of tickets you could buy were set up to prevent scalpers.  Scalpers resell tickets to people at high prices.  If this person is a scalper (and the $100 says he well may be), you are helping him break the law.  Helping another person break the law (even if you make money) is a violation of the principle of lifnai ever, ‘you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind,’”

If he was just a person who wanted tickets without standing in line, he was stealing the time of people who stood in line.  Stealing time is also a violation of the “You shall not steal” commandment.

Using no texts but just logic, Randy Cohen said that it was wrong to buy the tickets.  Whether you go with Rabbi no. 1, who says you are within the law, or Rabbi No. 2, who says you are breaking the values of the law, is a matter for your own conscience.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 12-13

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

4.22.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Martin Luther King Jr. became famous when he intentionally broke certain laws in a non-violent way.  He used the method of sitting down in the middle of the street and being arrested in protest.  He was calling attention to the lack of civil rights in America and to Jim Crow laws that discriminated against blacks in the South.  This was known as civil disobedience.  Was Martin Luther King Jr. right to knowingly break the law? 

Is it ever right to refuse to obey the law as an act of civil disobedience?  Can you break a law to achieve a higher ideal?

Answer

[a] There are numerous examples in the Bible where individuals were civilly disobedient and seem to be praised for their actions.  The midwives in Egypt refused to listen to Pharaoh’s decree to kill Jewish babies because they feared God (Exodus 1:15-19).  When King Saul ordered his guards to kill the Jewish priests in the city of Nov, they refused (I Samuel 22;16-17).  When the prophet Daniel was forbidden to pray, he ignored that order by the king and prayed anyway, which is why he was thrown into the famous lion’s den (Daniel 6:7-14). 

[b] The Torah itself seems to anticipate the “classic” act of civil disobedience, protesting a war, by allowing a soldier to return home if he is “weak of heart” (Deuteronomy 20:5-8).  According to some commentaries on the Mishnah (Sotah 8:5-6), this refers to a “conscientious objector,” someone who objects to the idea of war itself.  His protest is allowed, and he is not forced to fight.  These examples seem to clearly point to a Jewish acceptance, or even requirement, of opposition toward immoral or improper government decisions.  

[c] However, there is an opposing Jewish principle called Dina D’Malchuta Dina, which applies especially outside the land of Israel.  It means “the law of the land is the law,” and it maintains that Jews must follow the local government and its edicts.  This ensures a strong central authority, which inevitably protects Jews.  It is for this reason that the Mishnah (Pirkei Avot 3:6) says that Jews should pray for the welfare of the government.  Thus, it seems that while a Jew may, on occasion, be civilly disobedient, he or she may not disobey the laws of any legitimate government to the point that they may endanger that regime.  Of course, if the government is ruthless or immoral, or enact anti-Torah laws, then certainly civil disobedience could be considered as a way to protest.  

[d]  Maimonides (Hilchot Melachim 3:9) says that a Jew must refuse to obey even a king who forbids following the Torah.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 120-121

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

4.15.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

When his parents were discussing how much Judaism opposes the killing of human beings, especially the killing of innocent people, Elliot asked them: “If that is so, then how can Judaism ever allow any war to take place since it involves killing people?”  Try as they may, Elliot’s parents could not give Elliot a satisfying answer to his question.

Does Judaism allow any type of war or only specific types?  If Jews are opposed to killing, how can Judaism ever allow for war?

Answer

[a] It is true that killing another human being is one of the most serious sins in the Torah.  If it will help him stay alive, a Jew is required to commit every sin in the Torah – except for murder, sexual impropriety, and idol worship (Sanhedrin 74a).  Jewish law did allow for the death penalty, but a court was called “bloddy” if it put more than one person to death every 70 years (Makkot 7a)!  So how does Judaism allow war, since killing is such an integral part of it?

[b] The Torah recognizes that sometimes war is a necessary evil, even though people may be killed.  If the Torah totally opposed war, the nations of the world might take advantage of the “pacifist” Jews.  Nations might feel free to attack, capture, subjugate and/or kill Jews, use their land and natural resources at will, thus depriving the Jewish people of their lifestyle, their values, and their freedom to worship God.  In order to prevent such a situation from occurring (both on an individual basis as well as nationally), the Torah allows individuals to kill in self-defense when their lives are threatened (Exodus 22:1).  In addition, the Torah provides for a Jewish army in order to maintain the Jewish people’s independence and way of life (Deuteronomy 220.   Even the most traditionally “pacifist” country, Switzerland maintains a standing army for the same reasons.  However, we will see that a Jewish war comes only as a last resort, and with many conditions. 

[c] From the story of the very first Jew, we can see the establishment of the pattern of the Jewish attitude toward war.  Abraham was a peace-loving man who invited every stranger to dine with him in his tent (Sotah 10b).  Yet when it was absolutely necessary, this man of peace resorted to battle.  When his nephew Lot was captured by the enemy in the midst of a thirteen-year world war, Abraham and his men immediately defeated the four kings who were their enemies and ended the war in order to free Lot.  However, they refused to take any spoils (Genesis 14:14-24).  Thus, Abraham never sought war, but when forced to fight, he did so and was victorious.

[d]  In Jewish law, only three types of wars are permitted (Maimonides, Hilchot Melachim 5:1).  One war is to fight and destroy the nation of Amalek, whose avowed purpose is to destroy all Jews and Judaism.  The second is to destroy the Seven nations who lived in the Land of Israel and represented a lifestyle antithetical to Judaism (these nations no longer exist today).  The third is a war for self-defense.  Wars for other purposes are forbidden, except under special circumstances.  Even when fighting a “Legitimate” war, actual battle and killing are considered a last resort (Maimonides, Hilchot Melachim 6:7).

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 117-119

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

4.8.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Each day, on their way to school, Danny and his friends pass a truly ugly, deformed man, who sits on the street and sells pens and pencils.  He has a deformed face, one deformed arm and no legs.  Danny is really “turned off” by the sight of this man, and always looks away in order not to stare at this deformed person.  However, Danny’s friends say that Danny should not react to the ugliness in this manner, and should look at the man in order not to embarrass him.  

How should a person react to physical differences between people?  Surely these are personal kinds of determinations, but there is a part of each of us that sees some things as beautiful and some things as ugly.  Does it make a difference if one of the “things” is another human being?

Answer

[a] It is natural to react to anyone who is different, and sometimes we are jolted by people who have disabilities.  The rabbis understood this natural reaction, and the Shulchan Aruch codified a proper Jewish reaction based on the Talmud (Brachot 58a).  Rabbi Joseph Karo writes (Shulchan Aruch, Orech Hayyim 225:9) that upon seeing a person with disabilities, including someone who is extremely pockmarked or missing a limb, a Jew  is supposed to recite the blessing ”Blessed is the God who makes different types of creations.”  The reasoning behind such a blessing is the acknowledgement that all creatures, no matter how different, are still God’s creations.  

[b] While the Shulchan Aruch rules that we make a blessing in reaction to seeing this person with disabilities, its writer adds a crucial addendum (225:8):  We should only make a blessing the first time we see a person with disabilities.  After that, the blessing is not recited.  Why is this so?  It is clear that after the first time, the reaction is not felt as strongly.  With God’s help, we begin to see past the exterior of a person and examine his or her personality.  With this, the jolt of a reaction fades.  We begin to define the person by inner, and not outer, qualities.  Even if we never get to know the person, the blessing helps center us in terms of how we should look at the human being in front of us.  This is why, when watching films about ugly things, we are not as shocked by the ugliness after a while.

Returning to our original question, it is proper to react to the man’s disability, and even to recite a blessing, but only the first time.   After the effort has been made to get to know the person and recognize that God created him, just as the Eternal created other human beings, the repulsion should fade.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 112-114

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver