4.28.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Ralph Rosenfeld bought a red 1986 Camaro from a local police auction.  He bought the car “as is” and started having car trouble.  It stalled too often.  The car had been impounded from a drug dealer and was being sold off by the police.  Ralph took the car to his mechanic who did some work and found that $17,000 hidden in the fuel tank was messing up the engine’s gas flow.  The mechanic was a lawful guy and he called the police.  They confiscated the money as part of that which should be taken from the drug dealer’s ill-gotten gains.  Ralph is suing the police, arguing that the $17,000 was part of the “as is” condition of the car. 

What happens to the money?

Answer

[a] In the Talmud there is a case almost exactly like this one. (Jerusalem Talmud, B.M. 2.5)  The students of Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach buy him a donkey as a gift.  He is old and the donkey will help him earn a living.  They buy the donkey, the saddle, the blanket, and everything on it in a precise formula from an Arab merchant. Shimon finds a jewel on the animal as he is grooming it.  He demands that his students return it.  They insist that it is legally his.  He persists that it be returned.  When they bring it back, the Arab responds, “God bless the God of Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach.”

[b] The idea in this story is that while he could “legally” keep the jewel, it was not the right thing to do.  Likewise in our case, while “as is” means that he could insist on keeping the ill gotten drug money, doing so would not be “the right thing to do.”  This is a perfect case where law and right are not exactly the same.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs.74-75  

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

4.21.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

David writes, “After school I work in a convenience store.  Part of my job is selling cigarettes to customers.  Recently I studied a Jewish law called “Lifnei Iver,” putting a stumbling block before the blind. (Lev. 19:14)  My teacher said that one of the meanings of this law was that Jews should not help people hurt themselves or hurt others.  Helping them in that way was another kind of ‘stumbling block.’  I know that cigarettes are harmful.  I know that by selling them I am helping customers hurt themselves and others.  I also know that I cannot keep my job if I refuse to sell them.  Do I have to look for a new job?”

Is it wrong to take a job where selling cigarettes is part of your responsibilities?

Answer

[a] The Torah says “Do not put a stumbling block before the blind.” (Lev. 19:14)  Rashi explains, “This law refers to a person who is blind to the consequences of his/her actions, not just to the one who is suffering from physical blindness.”

[b] In the Talmud, (Pesachim 22a) Rabbi Natan said, “One cannot offer a cup of wine to a Nazir (one who has taken an oath not to drink) nor offer a limb from a live animal to one who is a Noahide (one committed to follow the seven commandments God gave Noah including not eating limbs cut from living animals.)  These violate the commandment of lifnei iver (putting a stumbling block before the blind).”  This would be like offering a drink to an alcoholic in recovery.

[c] In Moed Katan 17a, another Talmudic passage, we are told that a father cannot strike an adult child because this might tempt the son to hit him back.  If an adult son hits his father, the penalty is death. (Exodus 21:15)  Starting a chain reaction that might lead to a serious crime is considered “putting a stumbling block before the blind.”

[d] Three different opinions are taught in the Shulchan Aruch: (1) “One may never help a person commit a sin.”  (Maimonides teaches this opinion but most Ashkenazic authorities reject it).  2) The rabbis added a prohibition to the Torah that one cannot help a person in sinning, even if s/he can get the same help elsewhere.  (RaN). (3) “It is permissible to help a person commit a sin if others will do so if you do not.”  In other words, some opinions quoted in the Shulchan Aruch would let you sell the cigarettes (because they can be bought everywhere) and some would forbid it.  

Based on these interpretations, a clerk in a store may sell cigarettes.  Buying cigarettes for someone would be a different issue.

Taken from Enabling a Jew to Sin: The Parameters,” Rabbi Michael Broyde & Rabbi David Hertzberg, The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society. Spring 1990)

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 66-67  

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

4.14.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

The Los Angeles Times reported that when a suspected drunk driver hit a disabled car that plowed into four people standing on the roadside, Jadine Russell, a 55-year-old mother of five and a devout Jehovah’s Witness, was injured.  She died several hours later after refusing a blood transfusion that might have saved her life.  “No blood!” she stated at least ten times to rescue workers and emergency-room physicians.  She was so adamant in her beliefs that she even roused herself from unconsciousness and tried to pull out an intravenous line.  In a trial that began Wednesday, jurors are being asked to decide if convicted drunk driver Keith Cook was soley responsible for Russell’s death and therefore guilty of murder, or if the woman’s religious beliefs brought about her demise.  “This is a fascinating case,” said Lauire Levenson, associate dean at Loyola Law School.  “Did the defendant kill her, or did she kill herself?”

Should a Jewish doctor have to listen to Jadine Russell’s request and not give her a blood transfusion, or should that doctor follow Jewish values and “choose life”?

Answer

[a] The heart of this question is the relationship between personal autonomy (individual freedom) and religious values (God says you should do this).  Rabbi Zev Schostak, in his article, “Is There Patient Autonomy in Halacha?” (Jewish Medical Ethics, Vol.II, No.2, May 1995), teaches that the right for a patient to decide what is done to her or to his body is a major foundation of medical ethics.  Yet at the same time there are other important considerations.  

[b] In Jewish law, protecting life is more important than personal freedom.  “Although there are those who wish it to be so, self-determination is not universally recognized as the paramount human value, [the sanctity of life] as an absolute value overrides considerations of personal freedom.” (Bleich, J.D. The Moral Obligations of the Physician In Rabbinic Tradition).  While a patient’s right to decide his or her treatment exists in Jewish law, refusing a blood transfusion would not be included within this right.

[c] It seems that the key verse that gives the physician the obligation to put forth her or his best efforts is the verse in Leviticus that tells us “Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow, I am the Lord” (19:16).  This prohibition gives us the commandment that we cannot stand idly by while someone is dying; we must do what we can to save him or her. (Talmud, Sanhedrin 73a)

[d] Rabbi Moshe Tendler and Fred Rosner, M.D., address the very question of Jehovah’s Witnesses in their book Practical Medical Halacha.  They first advise the Jewish doctor not to take the patient.  If the doctor does accept the patient, “the physician should assure the patient in advance that if at all possible he will use blood substitutes.” (p. 164)  Yet, although the wishes of a patient are of great importance, they are secondary to the will of God and Rabbi Tendler says that, if a transfusion is the only thing that will save the person, it must be administered.

[e] The only other consideration is the legal ramification of such an action.  Going against a patient’s wishes could result in professional discipline.  Although a deeper legal discussion is necessary, it seems that there are plenty of other doctors in the world and saving a life, as the Tur quotes at the end of its explanation of the principle of Lo Ta’amod al Dam Re’echa (do not stand idly by while someone is dying), is like enabling a whole world to exist. (Tur, Choshen Mishpat, 426)

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 63–65

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

4.7.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A Jewish man receives a box of Christmas cards in the mail from a Christian orphanage.  They ask him to either pay $10.00 or send the cards back in the mail.  He thinks it is unfair that he must spend money either way to get rid of the box of Christmas cards he never wanted.  The law says he is under no obligation to return them or pay the money, because they were unsolicited.  One of his friends says sending them back is the right thing to do (otherwise it is stealing).  Another friend argues that sending them back only allows someone else to be stuck in the same situation.

What should the man do?  Would it change if he got Chanukah candles from a Jewish organization?

Answer

[a] It seems that there are two issues at work in this case: tzedakah and ownership.  If the person wants to give money to the orphanage, it is certainly his right, and he should be applauded for doing so.  The same would apply in the case of the Chanukah candles.  If he wants to support the institution, he is welcome to do so, yet in the case of Chanukah candles, they should belong to you in order to perform the mitzvah.  In both cases, if the person wants to use the product, I would encourage him to send money.

[b] Separate from this being tzedakah, this is an unsolicited offer from the orphanage.  In his book Ethics of Business Finance and Charity According to Jewish Law, translated by Eliyahu Touger (Vol.3, Ch.2), Rabbi Ezra Basri points out the fact that there is a fundamental idea in the Talmud with regard to a business transaction.  It states that local custom has binding authority.  As described, according to American law, there is absolutely no obligation to either pay the ten dollars or to send it back.  Therefore this is not a legal obligation and the person has no obligation to pay anything.  This is no different whether it is a Christian charity or a Jewish one.   

[c] Additionally, there is another possible principle at work.  It is taught that one’s domain cannot acquire for him without his knowledge.  (If someone throws something into your yard, it is not automatically yours because it is now on your property.  It is only yours if you want it.)  The mail can also be seen as one’s domain, and “a person who does not desire to acquire an article does not acquire it because it is in his domain.” It still seems that the man has every right to throw out this false acquisition.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 61-62

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

3.31.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Melissa is feeling bad.  Even though it is Shabbat she goes to Dr. Rabinowitz, knocks on the door and asks for help. He brings her into his home office, examines her and tells her what treatments she needs.  Next week Melissa is really surprised to find a bill from the good doctor in the mail.  She complains.  “It was Shabbat. He’s Jewish.  He can’t take money for work done on Shabbat.”  

Can a Jewish doctor charge for emergency medical treatment administered on Shabbat?

Answer

[a] Judaism believes in “doctoring” and not just in faith healing. (Ex. 21:19, Deut. 22:2)

[b] The Torah teaches that one should not work on Shabbat. (Ex. 20:9-10)

[c] One may “break” Shabbat and “do work” in order to save a life.  The act of saving a life is called Pikuach Nefesh, and we learn in Yoma 8:6/35b, 85b, based on Leviticus 18:5, that Pikuach Nefesh suspends the Shabbat rules. (Shulchan Arukh, Orekh Chayyim 329:3)  This means a doctor may “work” on Shabbat when a life is even slightly, possibly at risk.

[d] One should not pay a worker for work done on Shabbat.  It is, however, possible to hire a person for a week, a month or a year, and have Shabbat work included in that larger payment (B.M. 58a, Mishnah Torah, Shabbat 6:25)

[e] Rabbi Yaakov Weil and Rabbi Yisrael Bruna write (Responsa Maharai Bruna #114) that a midwife can be paid for a delivery on Shabbat because it is part of a larger framework of care before and after.  Rabbi Chaim Modai of Smyrna writes that the same is true for doctors but suggests that this should also include aftercare so that the payment is not just for Shabbat.

[f] The discussion continues with some rabbis on each side, but the bottom line seems to be this.  Doctors can work on shabbat when the health of their patients seem to be at risk.  They may charge for this work, but it is better that they be paid in the context of a longer relationship.  If a fee includes a follow-up visit, the conditions of Jewish law are satisfied without conflict.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 59-60

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

3.24.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A man was using a bulldozer to stockpile gravel.  He took a break and left the cab unlocked and the key in the ignition.  When he returned, the bulldozer was missing. He discovered that while he was gone the bulldozer had been set in motion and had crashed into the side of someone’s house.  The person whose house had been damaged filed suit against the operator who had left the keys in the bulldozer and asked that he pay for the destruction done to the home.  

Who should pay to fix the house when we can’t find the person who actually drove the bulldozer into it? 

Answer

In American law it is called “an attractive nuisance.”  In Hebrew we call it “the case of the pit.”  It comes from the Torah.  The Torah, Exodus 21:33-34, says,: “If one person digs a pit and does not cover it and an ox or donkey falls into it, the one who opened the pit is responsible for paying for the damage.”

In the Talmud the rabbis make it clear that anytime you leave something that could cause damage and you do not protect people from it, you are responsible for the damages.  In this case, leaving the key in the bulldozer was like leaving the pit uncovered.  Therefore, even though he was not driving, the driver needs to accept responsibility.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 57-58

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

3.17.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A fire broke out in a town and spread rapidly.  Everyone ran out of fear.  One Jew stayed long enough to save a really valuable book whose owners had abandoned it.  After the fire, the owners wanted their book back (and were willing to pay a reward).  The man who risked his life to save the book claims that the book is now his because it would have been burned up without his efforts.  

Who gets the book?

Answer

[a] The answer to this case is based on a Jewish legal principle called “Hefker.”  It means “abandonment.”  The idea is this: When a person loses something, until when does it have to be returned?  The answer: Until it is “Hefker.”  When is that?  When the original owner gives up hope of ever recovering it.  In other words, when it is abandoned.  There are rules about how long that takes, but in general, if the object can be identified, “a year and a day,” and if the object cannot be identified (If it has no distinguishing, describable attributes, like a twenty-dollar bill) immediately.

[b] This is not such a crazy idea, because it is just like the laws of salvage at sea.  Once a ship or a cargo is abandoned, it is available for salvage.

[c] In this case, since the owner of the book abandoned it and had no intention of recovering it, it is considered “Hefker” and available for acquisition by the person who rushed into the fire. 

[d] The Talmud has a similar case.  In Bava Kamma 155a we learn about this situation.  One person is carrying a cask of wine along a road; another is carrying a cask of honey.  Honey is worth more than wine.  The honey cask breaks and starts to leak.  The person carrying it gives up hope of bringing it to market.  The second man then pours out his wine and uses his cask to catch the dripping honey.

[e] The Talmud rules that the man saving the honey gets only as much honey as would cover his effort – because he saved what was not really ownerless, and because it was not really on the edge of destruction. Much of it could be recovered if the owner returned with another barrel.  

[f] But in the case of the fire, the book was about to be completely destroyed, the owner had given up hope, and therefore the man who rescued it gets possession.

That was the answer given by Rabbi Meir ben Barukh of Rottenburg.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 50-51

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

3.10.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Isaac Goldstein owns Rocky’s Pawn Shop in Dallas, Texas, and sells a lot of guns.  J. David Bleich is a leading Orthodox legal scholar who wrote a public letter to Mr. Goldstein telling him it was wrong to sell guns.  He wrote, “A sticker on the door of your shop reads ‘Guns Don’t Cause Crime Any More Than Flies Cause Garbage.’”  Then he added, “Yes, Mr. Goldstein, flies do not cause garbage, but garbage does attract flies.  Guns may or may not cause crime, but crimes of violence cannot be committed without tools of violence.  Self-restraint in the sale of weapons is a small enough price to pay for even marginal enhancement of public safety.”  

Should a rabbi send a letter to a newspaper telling a Jew not to sell guns in his store?

Answer

There are two issues at stake here.  (1) What does Judaism have to say about selling guns? (2) Assuming that selling guns is a bad thing, is it ok to publicly embarrass someone in order to get him to stop?

[a]  In his public letter Rabbi Bleich quotes Maimonides (Hilkhot Rotzeah 12:12, paraphrasing Avodah Zarah 15b): “It is forbidden to sell heathens weapons of war.  Nor is it permitted to sharpen their spears, or to sell them knives, manacles, iron chains, bears, lions or any object which can endanger the public; but it is permitted to sell them shields which are only for defense.”  While there is a need to discuss the meaning of “heathen,” the basic goal of keeping society as a whole safe is clear.

[b] Rabbi Bleich continues to quote Maimonides, “By selling arms to a heathen one strengthens the hands of an evil-doer and causes him to transgress.  Anyone who strengthens the hands of a person who is blind (meaning that s/he does not see the path of truth because of the desire of his/her heart) is also violating the commandment, ‘You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind’ (Leviticus 19:14).  This makes, in Jewish terms, the person who sells the gun an accessory before the fact.”

[c] In Judaism, safety is a religious concern.  The Bible requires that a roof be properly gated in order to prevent people from falling off of it (Deuteronomy 22:8). This commandment is understood by the Talmud as a general directive to remove any safety hazard (Bava Kamma 15b, Shulchan Arukh HM 427:8).  Contemporary rabbinic authorities include in this commandment an employer’s responsibility to ensure occupational safety (Piskei Uziel 47) and an injunction against reckless driving (Minchat Yitzhak 8:148).  Someone who refuses to remove a safety hazard can be punished by excommunication (YD 334:7).  In general, safety regulations are treated with far greater stringency than any other section of halakhah (YD 116:7).

[d] Rabbi Bleich concludes: “Although halakhah is extremely concerned about safety, it does not prohibit the ownership of guns.  However, recognizing that a gun is a dangerous object, halakhah (like many current gun control laws) requires that owners and vendors of guns take all possible precautions to prevent their guns from causing any harm.”

[e] Therefore, there is a strong Jewish foundation for gun-control, though laws about owning a dangerous dog tell us (a) it is forbidden (Bava Kamma 79a), (b) unless there is a clear danger to the owner or his/her property (HM 409:3), (c) but then the responsibility to keep the public from harm falls on the owner in a big way (Shabbat 63b, Hullin 7b, Terumot HaDeshen 2:105).  This may give permission to own guns, but not to sell them, and puts a huge mandate on gun safety.

[f] We have spoken before about the mitzvah of tokekhekh (rebuke). (Lev.19:17)  It requires a person to tell another person when he is doing something wrong.  While embarrassment of another person is usually forbidden, (BM 59a) one is allowed to do so in order to prevent harm to person or property. (Yevamot 65b) 

Therefore, Rabbi Bleich’s actions are consistent with his understanding of Jewish law and seem to be appropriate.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 47-49

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

3.3.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Mr. Klein is in a hurry.  He was late and frustrated.  He circled the block once and could find no place to park.  He pulled up to a red (no parking) curb, got out of the car, and told his daughter Shana to follow. Shana told him, “Dad, this is a no-parking area.”  He said, “Big deal.  If the police come they will give me a $30 ticket.  I can afford the ticket.  I can’t afford to spend another twenty minutes finding a parking space.  We are late.”  She said, “But Dad, it is against the law.”  He answered, “The law says, ‘If you get caught, you get a ticket.’”  

Was Dad right that it was okay to park illegally if you are willing to pay the ticket if you get caught, or is Shana right that you should never break the law? 

Answer

[a] In the Talmud, Rabbi Samuel teaches a basic principle, “Dina d’Malkhuta Dina,” the law of the land is the law.  This means that unless following the law of your government leads to a violation or Torah law, you have to follow it – just as if it were Torah (Bava Kama 113a, Bava Batra 54b, Nedarim 28a, Gittin 10b).

[b] Most examples in Jewish law that use this principle involve taxes.  In the Talmud we are told that you can even take a false oath involving taxes – something that is against Jewish law – but you can only do so if (1) a wicked government is demanding unfair taxes, or (2) (as used to happen) the government sold the right to collect taxes to an individual who was being unfair in what they demanded.  Even if taxes are high, if they are fair, they must be honestly paid. (Nedarim 28a)

[c] If a store is breaking the law (by not paying taxes, etc.), you are not allowed to shop there, even if you are getting a good deal. (Rabbi J.B. Soleveitchik, D’var Avraham Vol 1. p.14) 

[d] One is not allowed to hide criminals and help them escape punishment if they are guilty (Rashi, Tosefot, and Maharsha to Niddah 61a).

[e] Based on all of these rulings, and using the principle of Dina d’Malkhuta Dina, the father cannot park wherever he wants for three reasons:

  1. It is breaking the law on purpose – and that is against the principle of Dina d’Malkhuta Dina.
  2. He is stealing or making life dangerous for others.  Meters are designed to make parking fair.  No-parking zones are designed to make traffic safe.  When you park where you want, you are taking something from someone else.

[f] He is “putting a stumbling block before the blind” by teaching his child that it is ok to break the law when you decide.  This means that the child may break other laws based on the father’s example.  Based on this example, I can break the government’s laws, my parents’ laws, or God’s laws, as long as I am willing to pay the fine.  This destroys all sense of authority and order.  Not a good idea.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 41-43

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.24.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Uzi owns an Israeli restaurant in New York.  He sells the usual Middle Eastern fare.  On the table there are two menus: one in English and one in Hebrew.  The prices on the Hebrew menu are cheaper than those on the English menu.  Uzi claims that he is giving the other Israelis a discount.  One of his American customers who read both menus claims that he is cheating non-Hebrew-speaking customers.  

Is it right for Uzi to run a restaurant with two prices for the same falafel?

Answer

[a] There is a basic Jewish legal principle called Ona’ah that is usually translated as fraud (Bava Metzia 51a ff).  It says that a person must charge fair prices and not trick someone into paying more.

[b] A customer has an obligation to know market conditions before starting to bargain – but the seller cannot trick a customer into believing that this price is the market condition.  In other words, a person can charge whatever he wants, and if the customer pays the price, the customer loses.  But if the seller tells the customer, “This is what everyone is charging, go look,” the seller has violated Ona’ah and the deal is not valid.  

[c] Charging two different prices is not valid unless (1) the conditions of two markets are different, (2) a customer is a discount or volume buyer, or (3) the cost or nature of the goods has changed.   

[d] Therefore, charging two different prices in Hebrew and English is wrong, unless the nature of Israeli buyers and American buyers is such that they have different cost expectations in their markets. (A complicated issue – but because this is the same store and not two stores, the answer to this is “wrong.”)

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 39-40

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.24.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Uzi owns an Israeli restaurant in New York.  He sells the usual Middle Eastern fare.  On the table there are two menus: one in English and one in Hebrew.  The prices on the Hebrew menu are cheaper than those on the English menu.  Uzi claims that he is giving the other Israelis a discount.  One of his American customers who read both menus claims that he is cheating non-Hebrew-speaking customers.  

Is it right for Uzi to run a restaurant with two prices for the same falafel?

Answer

[a] There is a basic Jewish legal principle called Ona’ah that is usually translated as fraud (Bava Metzia 51a ff).  It says that a person must charge fair prices and not trick someone into paying more.

[b] A customer has an obligation to know market conditions before starting to bargain – but the seller cannot trick a customer into believing that this price is the market condition.  In other words, a person can charge whatever he wants, and if the customer pays the price, the customer loses.  But if the seller tells the customer, “This is what everyone is charging, go look,” the seller has violated Ona’ah and the deal is not valid.  

[c] Charging two different prices is not valid unless (1) the conditions of two markets are different, (2) a customer is a discount or volume buyer, or (3) the cost or nature of the goods has changed.   

[d] Therefore, charging two different prices in Hebrew and English is wrong, unless the nature of Israeli buyers and American buyers is such that they have different cost expectations in their markets. (A complicated issue – but because this is the same store and not two stores, the answer to this is “wrong.”)

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 39-40

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.10.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Roger goes into the store.  He tries on jacket after jacket, pair of pants after pair of pants.  He finds exactly what he wants.  Then he goes home and uses the internet to find the same stuff for less.  He did not steal anything from the store.  

Did he do something wrong?

 

Answer

The Jewish answer is YES!!!

[a] Something has been stolen.  The Talmud defines doing such things as Ona’at Dibbur, verbal fraud.  In the Talmud the question is: “Can you walk into a store and ask the price of something you have no intention of buying?” (Bava Metzia 58b)

[b] That case is hard for us to understand, because it was set in a bazaar world where every deal involved bargaining, and not in the shopping mall.  The bottom-line idea here, however, is that when you look like you are going to buy and then you walk out without buying you steal esteem and hope from the store owner, who thinks he or she is doing something wrong.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 25-26

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

2.3.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Someone tried to sell a kidney online.  In America and many other countries, selling organs is against the law.  The belief is that all organs should be donated and then given out in an order created by the medical community based on need and likelihood of survival.  The doctors say that they fear that rich people will begin forcing people to sell them organs.  Others argue that it limits their freedom to be able to do with their organs what they want.

Should selling organs be a matter of personal choice?

Answer

There are two issues surrounding this question.  First is the permissibility of donating organs and second in the issue of selling them.

[a] With respect to the principle of donating organs, Jewish law permits it with a few conditions.  The Torah, in Leviticus 13:5, tells us v’Hai ba-Hem, “You should live by the Mitzvot.”  The rabbis learn from this verse that the supreme value of Jewish life is that mitzvot are to perpetuate human survival.  The journal Medical Ethics and Judaism tells us that there is no objection to organs being donated for the purpose of saving a life.  The burial of the complete body would be set aside for this principle.  The Comprehensive Guide to Medical Halakhah by Rabbi Abraham S. Abraham says that as long as the donor does not suffer permanent harm, organ donation is a most “meritorious act.”  

[b] This Comprehensive Guide to Medical Halakhah by Rabbi Abraham S. Abraham also gives us some guidance as to the second part of the question.  It is there where he writes, “a person who during his lifetime sells one of his kidneys for transplantation into a seriously ill patient because of poverty or debts nevertheless performs the mitzvah of saving a life,” as Rabbi Abraham says in the name of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach.  Yet Rabbi Abraham laments a state of affairs in which someone is resorting to such measures for financial survival. 

[c] It seems to me the practice of selling body parts should be frowned upon for, the linchpin of the arguments is that the body belongs to us and we can do with it what we want to.  Judaism does not support that idea.  The body is a holy vessel that is given to us by God, and because of its holiness it is not ours to make profit from the way we make profit from CDs or baseball cards.  Organ donation is a great mitzvah, and the organs should go to the ones who would benefit from this mitzvah, not to those whose wallets are the thickest.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 23-24

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.27.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

The Jews of Kovno knew that the Nazis were about to slaughter many of them and take the rest away to death camps.  One man went to Rabbi Oshry and told him that because he had been part of the resistance, the Nazis would not just kill him, but would torture him and put his family to death before his eyes.  He asked permission to commit suicide and so provide himself (and possibly his family through his absence) with an easier death.

Answer

[a] Normally Jews are forbidden to commit suicide. The simple explanation is that our bodies belong to God, and we do not have permission to abuse them.  The textual proof comes from Genesis 9:5: “For your life blood, too, I will hold you responsible.”  In the Talmud, Bava Kamma 91b, the rabbis make it clear that this refers to suicide and that is forbidden.  

[b] The one example of a permissible suicide is King Saul (I Samuel 31:3-5, explained in Genesis Rabbah 34.13), about whom the rabbis say, “He died to preserve the dignity of the King of Israel.”  Some rabbis accept this choice.  Rabbi Oshry, who faced this choice, said this case is an exception that resembles the case of King Saul (and is not available to ordinary people).

[c] Oshry also states that suicide, when it is Kiddush ha-Shem – defending God’s honor and not giving in to pagan forces – is a mitzvah.  Not allowing the Nazis to win was such a moment. 

[d] Oshry concludes that suicide is permissiable in this case, but said that his t’shuvah (answer) could not be published, lest anyone else in the ghetto read it and imagine that their situation was severe enough to justify suicide.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 21-22

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.20.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Jodie and Mary were born as Siamese twins.  If they are left unseparated, they will most likely both die.  If they are separated, one of the babies, Mary, will definitely die, and one, Jodie, will probably live.  The parents are opposed to the operation because they are not willing to be responsible for the death of one of their daughters.  They are willing to stand by, do nothing, and hope for a miracle.  The British courts are thinking about ordering the operation (against the parents will).

Should a court order an operation that will save Jodie’s life?

Answer

In the case of twins who need to be separated for one of them to live, the parents, devout Roman Catholics, say only God should determine how long the children will live.  Most Jewish authorities in Great Britain argued that the court should force the operation.

[a] There is a Jewish legal principle called “ha-Rodef,” the pursuer.  If person A is chasing person B in order to kill him or her, an outsider can kill A in order to save B’s life, if that is the only way to protect B.  The rabbis used this principle in the case of abortion, saying that if a mother’s life is at risk, the fetus is considered to be “a pursuer.’  This means that the fetus must be terminated if that is the only way of assuring the mother’s health.  The same principle applies to the weaker of the twins here.

[b] Berel Berkovits of the Federation of Synagogues, an Orthodox body, said there are two ways to look at the case.  “Is it one person or two?”  he said of the twins.  “You might argue that it’s one organism, in which case separating one from the other is like an amputation to save a life.”  That course of action is certainly permissible.  If the twins are two separate organisms. Each could be considered a pursuer of the other, since each, in effect, would kill the other if they are not separated.  

[c] Rabbi Charles Middleburgh of the Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues said, “One of the things that Judaism teaches is that the saving of life is paramount.  Because it is possible to save Jodie by separating her from her sister, Jewish tradition recommends that option.”

[d] Rabbi Chaim Rapoport, the chief rabbi’s spokesman on medical ethics, explained why he disagreed with the parents’ desire to let nature take its course.  “Judaism rejects passivity and noninterference with nature.  Jewish law supports the life-saving operation.”

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 16-18

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.13.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

It is a mitzvah to light Shabbat and holiday candles.  In other words, it is something a Jewish “supposed” to do.  Sarah is a freshman at a state university.  Her mother gave her candlesticks as part of her “Jewish college” kit.  On many university campuses it is against the dorm rules to have an open flame (like a candle) in a dorm room.

Should Sara light her candles and break the dorm rules or follow the rules and not light candles?

Answer

If your college dorm forbids the lighting of candles in your room, what should you do?

[a] Maimonides makes it clear that it is a mitzvah to light candles on Shabbat and on holidays. (Laws of Shabbat 5:3)

[b] The Talmud makes it clear that Shabbat and other mitzvot can be violated when a life is at stake.  Performing the mitzvot is not supposed to be dangerous.  Pikuah Nefesh is the name of this principle, and it can be learned in chapter 8 of Yoma.  It is based on Leviticus 18:5, where the Torah says, “These are mitzvot – live by them.”  The rabbis underline this passage in the Talmud and add, “Live by them – do not die by them.’

[c] There is another rabbinic principle called Dina d’Malkhuta Dina,that more or less means the law of the land is the law.  This means that you have to follow local laws unless they directly lead to the violation of Jewish laws (Nedarim 28a; Gittin 10b; BK 113a; BB54b and 55a) 

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 14-15

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.6.22


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Sean is standing in line to buy tickets to a concert he really wants to see.  He is set to buy four tickets.  There is a rule that no one can buy more than six tickets.  A man comes up and down the line and offers to pay Sean $100 if he buys two extra tickets for him. Should Sean do it?  This case comes from a column in the New York Times written by Randy Coehn called “The Ethicist.”  

Answer

I was having dinner with friends of mine, rabbis, and they had opposite answers to this question.

[a] The first said, “He is allowed six tickets.  He buys six tickets.  He has broken no law.  If he makes some money, good.”

[b] Rabbi Number Two said, “It is wrong. First, he is breaking the rule of Dina d/Malkhuta Dina, the law of the land is the law.  The limits on the number of tickets you could buy were set up to prevent scalpers.  Scalpers resell tickets to people at high prices.  If this person is a scalper (and the $100 says he well may be), you are helping him break the law.  Helping another person break the law (even if you make money) is a violation of the principle of lifnai ever, ‘you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind,’”

If he was just a person who wanted tickets without standing in line, he was stealing the time of people who stood in line.  Stealing time is also a violation of the “You shall not steal” commandment.

Using no texts but just logic, Randy Cohen said that it was wrong to buy the tickets.  Whether you go with Rabbi no. 1, who says you are within the law, or Rabbi No. 2, who says you are breaking the values of the law, is a matter for your own conscience.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 3”, pgs. 12-13

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

4.22.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Martin Luther King Jr. became famous when he intentionally broke certain laws in a non-violent way.  He used the method of sitting down in the middle of the street and being arrested in protest.  He was calling attention to the lack of civil rights in America and to Jim Crow laws that discriminated against blacks in the South.  This was known as civil disobedience.  Was Martin Luther King Jr. right to knowingly break the law? 

Is it ever right to refuse to obey the law as an act of civil disobedience?  Can you break a law to achieve a higher ideal?

Answer

[a] There are numerous examples in the Bible where individuals were civilly disobedient and seem to be praised for their actions.  The midwives in Egypt refused to listen to Pharaoh’s decree to kill Jewish babies because they feared God (Exodus 1:15-19).  When King Saul ordered his guards to kill the Jewish priests in the city of Nov, they refused (I Samuel 22;16-17).  When the prophet Daniel was forbidden to pray, he ignored that order by the king and prayed anyway, which is why he was thrown into the famous lion’s den (Daniel 6:7-14). 

[b] The Torah itself seems to anticipate the “classic” act of civil disobedience, protesting a war, by allowing a soldier to return home if he is “weak of heart” (Deuteronomy 20:5-8).  According to some commentaries on the Mishnah (Sotah 8:5-6), this refers to a “conscientious objector,” someone who objects to the idea of war itself.  His protest is allowed, and he is not forced to fight.  These examples seem to clearly point to a Jewish acceptance, or even requirement, of opposition toward immoral or improper government decisions.  

[c] However, there is an opposing Jewish principle called Dina D’Malchuta Dina, which applies especially outside the land of Israel.  It means “the law of the land is the law,” and it maintains that Jews must follow the local government and its edicts.  This ensures a strong central authority, which inevitably protects Jews.  It is for this reason that the Mishnah (Pirkei Avot 3:6) says that Jews should pray for the welfare of the government.  Thus, it seems that while a Jew may, on occasion, be civilly disobedient, he or she may not disobey the laws of any legitimate government to the point that they may endanger that regime.  Of course, if the government is ruthless or immoral, or enact anti-Torah laws, then certainly civil disobedience could be considered as a way to protest.  

[d]  Maimonides (Hilchot Melachim 3:9) says that a Jew must refuse to obey even a king who forbids following the Torah.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 120-121

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

4.15.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

When his parents were discussing how much Judaism opposes the killing of human beings, especially the killing of innocent people, Elliot asked them: “If that is so, then how can Judaism ever allow any war to take place since it involves killing people?”  Try as they may, Elliot’s parents could not give Elliot a satisfying answer to his question.

Does Judaism allow any type of war or only specific types?  If Jews are opposed to killing, how can Judaism ever allow for war?

Answer

[a] It is true that killing another human being is one of the most serious sins in the Torah.  If it will help him stay alive, a Jew is required to commit every sin in the Torah – except for murder, sexual impropriety, and idol worship (Sanhedrin 74a).  Jewish law did allow for the death penalty, but a court was called “bloddy” if it put more than one person to death every 70 years (Makkot 7a)!  So how does Judaism allow war, since killing is such an integral part of it?

[b] The Torah recognizes that sometimes war is a necessary evil, even though people may be killed.  If the Torah totally opposed war, the nations of the world might take advantage of the “pacifist” Jews.  Nations might feel free to attack, capture, subjugate and/or kill Jews, use their land and natural resources at will, thus depriving the Jewish people of their lifestyle, their values, and their freedom to worship God.  In order to prevent such a situation from occurring (both on an individual basis as well as nationally), the Torah allows individuals to kill in self-defense when their lives are threatened (Exodus 22:1).  In addition, the Torah provides for a Jewish army in order to maintain the Jewish people’s independence and way of life (Deuteronomy 220.   Even the most traditionally “pacifist” country, Switzerland maintains a standing army for the same reasons.  However, we will see that a Jewish war comes only as a last resort, and with many conditions. 

[c] From the story of the very first Jew, we can see the establishment of the pattern of the Jewish attitude toward war.  Abraham was a peace-loving man who invited every stranger to dine with him in his tent (Sotah 10b).  Yet when it was absolutely necessary, this man of peace resorted to battle.  When his nephew Lot was captured by the enemy in the midst of a thirteen-year world war, Abraham and his men immediately defeated the four kings who were their enemies and ended the war in order to free Lot.  However, they refused to take any spoils (Genesis 14:14-24).  Thus, Abraham never sought war, but when forced to fight, he did so and was victorious.

[d]  In Jewish law, only three types of wars are permitted (Maimonides, Hilchot Melachim 5:1).  One war is to fight and destroy the nation of Amalek, whose avowed purpose is to destroy all Jews and Judaism.  The second is to destroy the Seven nations who lived in the Land of Israel and represented a lifestyle antithetical to Judaism (these nations no longer exist today).  The third is a war for self-defense.  Wars for other purposes are forbidden, except under special circumstances.  Even when fighting a “Legitimate” war, actual battle and killing are considered a last resort (Maimonides, Hilchot Melachim 6:7).

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 117-119

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

4.8.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Each day, on their way to school, Danny and his friends pass a truly ugly, deformed man, who sits on the street and sells pens and pencils.  He has a deformed face, one deformed arm and no legs.  Danny is really “turned off” by the sight of this man, and always looks away in order not to stare at this deformed person.  However, Danny’s friends say that Danny should not react to the ugliness in this manner, and should look at the man in order not to embarrass him.  

How should a person react to physical differences between people?  Surely these are personal kinds of determinations, but there is a part of each of us that sees some things as beautiful and some things as ugly.  Does it make a difference if one of the “things” is another human being?

Answer

[a] It is natural to react to anyone who is different, and sometimes we are jolted by people who have disabilities.  The rabbis understood this natural reaction, and the Shulchan Aruch codified a proper Jewish reaction based on the Talmud (Brachot 58a).  Rabbi Joseph Karo writes (Shulchan Aruch, Orech Hayyim 225:9) that upon seeing a person with disabilities, including someone who is extremely pockmarked or missing a limb, a Jew  is supposed to recite the blessing ”Blessed is the God who makes different types of creations.”  The reasoning behind such a blessing is the acknowledgement that all creatures, no matter how different, are still God’s creations.  

[b] While the Shulchan Aruch rules that we make a blessing in reaction to seeing this person with disabilities, its writer adds a crucial addendum (225:8):  We should only make a blessing the first time we see a person with disabilities.  After that, the blessing is not recited.  Why is this so?  It is clear that after the first time, the reaction is not felt as strongly.  With God’s help, we begin to see past the exterior of a person and examine his or her personality.  With this, the jolt of a reaction fades.  We begin to define the person by inner, and not outer, qualities.  Even if we never get to know the person, the blessing helps center us in terms of how we should look at the human being in front of us.  This is why, when watching films about ugly things, we are not as shocked by the ugliness after a while.

Returning to our original question, it is proper to react to the man’s disability, and even to recite a blessing, but only the first time.   After the effort has been made to get to know the person and recognize that God created him, just as the Eternal created other human beings, the repulsion should fade.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 112-114

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

4.1.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

All the 13-year-old girls in the class are going to the movies together on Sunday, and they plan to say that they are 11 years old in order to receive the cheaper children’s rate.  Jill knows that this is wrong and does not want to lie, but if she does not go along with this idea, she knows that her friends will shun her and she will not be “in’ with the group.

Should a person give in to peer pressure and do something that he or she knows is wrong?  What if it is in order to maintain a friendship?

Answer

[a] We know that we should always do what is right.  The Torah tells us what is proper (mitzvot) and that we are supposed to imitate God’s good ways (Deuteronomy 13:5) “…you should serve the Eternal and cling to God.”  Specifically, we are prohibited from lying (Leviticus 19:11).  It is the only sin in the Torah from which we are specifically commanded to run away: “…keep far from a lie” (Exodus 23:7).

[b] But Judaism also understands and is sensitive to the powerful pull of peer pressure from one’s friends.  For example, in the Korach rebellion, 250 people from the tribe of Reuben team-up with Korach, who is from the tribe of Levi (Numbers 16:1-2) to rebel against Moses.  Rashi (commentary on Numbers 16:1) explains how the Reubenites linked up with Korach: they were camped right next door.  Ultimately, it was Korach’s peer pressure that brought the 250 neighbors into the rebellion.

[c] In a similar fashion, when Lot’s shepherds fought with Abraham’s, the patriarch ordered both Lot and his herders to leave (Genesis 13:7-9).  One explanation of why Abraham took such drastic action is that he was worried about the peer pressure that Lot’s shepherds would push on his own men.  Abraham understood that human beings are strongly influenced by the people with whom they spend  time.  Abraham chose to distance himself and his followers from the negative influence of Lot’s helpers.

[d] In perhaps the most explicit Jewish acknowledgment of the power of peer pressure, Maimonides (Hilchot Deot 6:1) agrees with Abraham that peer pressure is nearly impossible to overcome.  He states that “It is in the very nature of people to be influenced by their peers, both in the way they think and the way they act.”  Therefore, rather than fight peer pressure, Maimonides tells us to make sure to spend time with good people who will pressure us to behave better, not worse, than our natural inclinations.  In fact, Maimonides continues and says that if one cannot find good people to hang around, one should leave his/her city or even his/her country.  If you cannot afford it, choose to live alone in the mountains rather than continue surrounding yourself with people who will negatively affect you.  Thus, according to Maimonides, there is no effective way to combat the pull of peer pressure.

[e] Returning to our question, there are two parts to the answer.  First, Jill should not lie.  Secondly, we are aware of the dangers of peer pressure from people who do not push us to be better than our natural inclination, so it seems that Jill should try not to hang out with this group of friends.  It is not worth maintaining friendships with people who lead you down dishonest and unholy paths.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 109-111

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

3.25.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

There are two types of Passover “afikomen games.’  In many homes, the leader of the seder hides the afikomen and the children search for it.  In some seders, however, the leader keeps the precious matzah next to him or her, and the children try to “steal” it without being noticed.

As Shira and David, the Weinstein children, grew older, they began to question the practice each Pesach of ”stealing” the afikomen.  While they enjoyed the presents, they also took very seriously the concepts that their parents and Hebrew School teachers had taught them about honesty.  How could it be that Judaism advocates stealing the afikomen, even if it is only a game?  They proposed to abolish this time-honored Pesach custom when they went to their cousin’s seder, where there would be small children.  The adults did not want to throw out the old custom.  

How can we permit “stealing” the afikomen, thereby teaching children that it is permissible to steal?

Answer

[a] Some opinions (M’orai Ohr) say that it is praiseworthy to desist from this custom precisely for the objection raised.

Most disagree and find that “stealing” the afikomen is all right.

[b] The Talmud (Pesachim 109a) gives us the overriding reason why this custom is encouraged: in order to keep the children awake.  Since being at the seder and telling the Passover story is the only mitzvah in the Torah in which children (minors, not at the age of bar or bat mitzvah) must participate (Exodus 13:8), it is crucial that the children remain awake as long as possible.  The most effective method of accomplishing this is by playing the “game” of taking the afikomen, later to be traded in for valuable prizes.

[c] No child falls asleep from boredom as long as the afikomen ransom has not been arranged.  Maimonides (Hilchot Chametz u-Matzah 7:3) codifies this practice by stating that “the matzah is grabbed from one another.”

But although we understand the underlying reason for this practice, the Weinstein children seem to have a point, and the question remains: how can Judaism condone such a practice?  We know that in Judaism the ends never justify the means.  What, then, is the deeper meaning of this custom, and what is its legitimacy?

[d] Rabbi Pinchas HaLevi Horowitz (Germany 1730-1805) suggested a novel and interesting approach:  We know that God promised Abraham that the Jews would leave Egypt with great wealth (Genesis 15:14).  This is repeated in the Torah when God commands the people to ask the Egyptians for gold and silver (Exodus 3:21-22)  But when did this “asking” take place?  If it had happened before the great plague of the First Born on the night of the seder, then the Egyptians would not have been too keen on giving their valuable possessions.  It could not have happened the next morning, as everyone was rushed to leave Egypt.  There was not even time for the bread to bake properly, and that is why we have matzah.  So, the taking of the Egyptian riches must have occurred during the night of the seder, when only the children were allowed out of the house. God had specifically commanded that “No person may go out of his door until the morning” (Exodus 12:22.  During that night, the adults could not go out, but the children could.  It was, therefore, the children who took the gold and silver of Egypt, fulfilling God’s promise.  Thus, the practice today may be considered a reenactment of what occurred in Egypt on that fateful night.

And lest anyone believe that this is actually stealing, the Talmud (Sanhedrin 91a) discusses this question.  Alexander the Great asked about this “borrowed” Egyptian gold and silver that was never returned.  The people answered that when they were paid the ages of 210 years of slave labor (many more times the amount of the gold and silver), they would gladly give back the riches.  Thus, it was not stealing at all, but rather a meager payment for their work.  Nechama Leibowitz (Studies in Shemot, Parshat Bo) explains that the Torah (lishol mai-im) does not connote the act of borrowing, but, rather, receiving a gift (from the Egyptian people) that is not intended to be returned.  Therefore, it was not stealing at all. 

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 25-27

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

3.18.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Ever since she was a little girl, Rhonda strongly believed in the concept of peace-not only between nations, but between individual people as well.  She could never stand it when her parents argued.  Then one day, she noticed that her younger sister Joy was taking her favorite clothes.  Joy had never been the same size as Rhonda; but now that she was, things fit.  Joy was wearing Rhonda’s clothes to school, to dances and elsewhere, and she had never asked her sister.  Rhonda knew that if she mentioned anything to Joy, it would start a fight.  Being the peace-lover that she was, Rhonda avoided starting a fight, even though she knew that Joy was in the wrong.  But in order to get her clothes back, there would have to be a big confrontation.  

Is it proper to give up on an important idea, position or possession in order to keep peace and avoid confrontation?  The question is applicable to physical things and in conversations that we have.  What do Jewish sources say about how far we go to avoid confrontation, or do they say so at all?

Answer

[a] The concept of establishing and maintaining peace is one of the most fundamental ideas in Judaism.  One of the three pillars upon which the world is built is peace (Pirke Avot 1:18).  Peace is as important as all of God’s creations (Midrash Bamidbar Rabbah 11:7), and it is said that “God makes peace and creates everything” (morning service, Yotzer Or).  Peace is the only mitzvah after which one is commanded to run, as it says, “Seek peace and pursue it” (Psalm 34:15).

[b] What happens when the concept of peace comes into conflict with other important Jewish values seeming to call for conflict or confrontation?  Even then, Judaism seems to call for peace.  Although truth is another of the three pillars upon which the world is built, it is generally more important to keep peace than to keep truth.  Even God “lied” in order to keep the peace between Abraham and Sarah (Midrash Bamidbar Rabbah 11:7).  The same midrash states that even if the Jews were to worship idols, they would not be severely punished if they were at peace with each other.  This can be proven by the Torah story in which the builders of the Tower of Babel rebel against God (Genesis 11) but are not punished with death, since they are united (Genesis 11:1).  On the other hand, Noah’s generation is wiped out because of violence and conflict among people.  

Therefore, it seems that a person is obligated to give up almost everything in order to achieve peace.  This is true in a family, in a town, or in the entire Jewish nation.  Of course, if “giving in” for the sake of peace will only lead to further conflict (because the other party sees that you are always giving in) then it should not be done, since it will not lead to peace.  That is the reason that the Torah allows war. If the Jews were known for always giving in, their enemies would continually conquer and destroy them.  In addition, there are always, the “exceptions” for which one never gives up anything in Judaism.  These include the sins of murder, sexual impropriety, and idol worship.  However, peace supersedes almost everything else.  Therefore, if it will achieve real peace with joy, Rhonda should “give up” her clothes.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 107-108

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

3.11.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Joey and Dave have been good friends for years.  As they grow up, they find that they disagree fundamentally on many important issues such as the importance of preserving old-growth forests at the expense of jobs, beliefs in life-after-death, and simple things like saving versus spending money.  

How do two people remain good friends if they fundamentally disagree on many important issues?  To answer this question, we must investigate the underlying concepts of friendship in Judaism.

Answer

[a] The Mishnah (Pirkei Avot 5:160 tells us that any friendship based upon only one factor cannot possibly endure.  If that one factor disappears, nothing is left.  A friendship based on multiple factors, though, will endure forever.  As an example, in the Mishnah we get a description of the ultimate friendship – that of Jonathan and David.  These two individuals undoubtedly had many vehement disagreements.  After all, it was Jonathan’s father, King Saul, who viewed David as his archenemy and even tried to kill him.  Through it all, David and Jonathan’s friendship endured.  They must have had fundamental disagreements regarding their feelings about Saul, yet they stuck it out being friends.

[b] On the other hand, if two people have different fundamental value systems and out looks, it is very difficult to remain friends.  This is true when the differences affect lifestyle, important choices and different day-to-day living patterns.  Beit Shammai and Beith Hillel disagreed on many aspects of Jewish law in the pages of the Talmud, but this did not prevent their sons and daughters from marrying each other (Yevamot 14b) because their fundamental life choices, value systems and world-views were essentially the same.  Like marriage, part of friendship is disagreeing in a respectful manner and coming to some sort of compromise whenever possible.  However, if two spouses disagree about everything in their lives, the marriage will not survive.

[c] The Talmud states (Pesachim 113b) that every friendship involves hate.

[d]  The Hebrew word for friend, haver, is also the word used for a learning partner.  (Today, the Aramaic form of this word is used to describe the Jewish learning process – hevruta).  This implies that all friendships are, in part, a learning experience.  Two people learn from each other by exchanging ideas and disagreeing, making sure it is done in a respectful manner.  This type of friendship is crucial in any person’s development and is encouraged in Judaism.  Rabina says that he learned more from his friends than he did from his teachers (Makkot 10a).  Rabbi Eliezer says that the most important aspect of life to ”cling to” is friendship (Avot 3:9).  When Honi (the Jewish Rip van Winkle) awoke after 70 years of sleep to find that all his friends had died, he wished to die rather than go on living (Taanit 23a).

[e] Returning to our question, if Joey and Dave have some basic values in common, then their friendship can endure and even thrive, since disagreements are healthy in a good relationship.  However, if they disagree on every issue without any mutuality, then they cannot remain true friends.  Always maintaining the dignity of the other person in a disagreement helps insure that we will spend life with the good havrutot  – friends and learning partners.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 102-104

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.25.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A mugger steals money from and inflicts bodily harm on someone you care about.  They have to spend a week in the hospital.  When the mugger is caught and brought to court, you sit in the courtroom each day watching this mugger on trial.  You feel rage, anger, and hatred toward this person.  Traditional Christian thought teaches that a person should “turn the other cheek” and love this person.

Is it permitted to hate someone who has wronged you?

Answer

[a] Many of the Jewish sources seem to indicate that we should not hate anyone.  In the Torah (Leviticus 19:17) it says that one may not hate one’s brother in his heart.  But this raises a question: can you do it openly?  A verse in the book of Ovadia (1:12), one of the minor prophets, says that a person may not rejoice at the fall of one’s enemy.  This implies that hate for one’s enemy (or joy at his or her downfall) is forbidden.

[b] Hatred is such a detestable emotion that it is said that the Second Temple was destroyed because of needless hatred among Jews (Yoma 9b).  In fact, this one sin is equated to the three big sins in Judaism: sexual impropriety, murder, and idol worship (since the First Temple was destroyed becuaseof these sins).  According to Hillel, when asked by a non-Jew to describe the essence of Judaism, he explained what is hateful to you should not be done to anyone else (Shabbat 31a). The Sefer haChinuch calls the emotion of hatred the ugliest emotion of the human race.  Based on all these sources, we may conclude that hatred in Judaism is never permitted.

[c] But the famous verse from Ecclesiastics (3:8) tells us there is “a time to hate.”  What do we do with that?!  When is that time?  The Midrash (Kohelet Rabbah 3:10) explains that one may indeed hate an enemy at a time of war.  But didn’t we learn (codified later in the Mishnah, Pirkei Avot 4:19) that one may not be joyous at the fall of one’s enemy?  The answer given is that at the time of an enemy’s death, a person may not be happy, since even the enemy was created in the image of God.  However, afterwards one may indeed be happy that the enemy has fallen.  Thus, it is permitted to hate someone who is an enemy of the Jews and who reportedly killed or harmed Jews simply because they are Jewish.  But it is improper to hate others, even sinners (See the Chazon Ish’s commentary on Maimonides, Hilchot Shechita 2:16).

If the mugger is punished for what he did to you and your family, you certainly may be happy that he is receiving his just retribution.  But unless he chronically harms people, it would not be permitted to continually hate this person.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 95-96

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.18.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A doctor is very close to finding the cure for all types of cancer.  However, experiments on non-human animals have proven ineffective.  The only way to try out and perfect his new serum is to experiment on healthy human beings.  Until the serum works at 100% rate, about 55 people will be needed to suffer the pain of the imperfect serum and then die.

Is it ever proper to knowingly and willingly kill a few individuals in order to find a cure for a disease and save the lives of millions of people?

Answer

[a] The Mishna, the earliest Rabbinic law book, says: “Whoever saves one life, it is as if he has saved the entire world” (Sanhedrin 4:5).  This sets up a response to someone who might be thinking about using homeless people or prisoners for cancer experiments.  Jewish values say that all lives are equal.

[b] Judaism believes that it is not up to people to decide the value of any life over another.  We cannot say that the life of a homeless person or that of a prisoner has less value than anyone else’s life.  The Talmud (Sanhedrin 74a) expresses this concept with the question: “Who says that your blood is redder than his blood?” This comes in response to the case of someone telling a person to kill or be killed himself.  You may not kill to save your own ‘red blood,’ because it is worth no more than your fellows.  Each person is deemed as an equal to any other, and it is for this reason that only one human being was originally created (Sanhedrin 37a) – so that no one could say that “my ancestors are better than yours.” Only God is the true judge.

[c] Regarding the questions of killing a few in order to save the lives of many, we know that any act of murder is one of the most serious offenses in the Torah (Exodus 20:13):  “You shall not murder.”  It is forbidden to knowingly kill one person to save the life of thousands or even millions.

[d] In addition, Judaism does NOT believe that the ends justify the means.  Thus, if one can do a great mitzvah, but only by committing a sin in the process, a Jew is not permitted to do such a mitzvah.  It is for this reason, for example, that a stolen lulav is not usable for the mitzvah of shaking the four spices on Sukkot (Sukkah 30a).  Maimonides (Hilchot Issurei Mizbayach 8:9) says that God detests any gift which comes about through the commission of sin.  Based on these ideas, it would be clearly forbidden to kill even one person, even a sinner, in order to develop a cure and save many more lives.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 93-94

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.11.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Jamie knows that it is wrong to speak about other people, especially in a negative sense.  But her friend Julie constantly talks about people and “badmouths” other girls in their class. Julie doesn’t really pay attention when Jamie talks about others, but she never really does anything to stop Julie from saying these things either.

Answer

Is it improper to hear someone speak badly about another person?  Must you do something to stop them from speaking negatively about others?

[a] In Judaism, Lashon Ha-Ra (speaking badly about another person) is a sin, even if what is said is true.  It is not only clearly forbidden in the Torah: “You shall not gossip among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), but is considered worse than idol worship (Midrash, Yalkut Shimoni, Tehillim 3:621).  We know this from comparing two stories in the Torah.  On the one hand, when the Jews sinned by creating and worshipping the Golden Calf, they were not severely punished.  However, when the spies came back and badmouthed the land of Israel, having lost faith in God, the entire nation was punished by not being able to enter the Promised Land.  The next generation would inherit the Land of Milk and Honey instead. 

[b] Lashon Ha-Ra is also equated with the three “worst” sins in Judaism: murder, idol worship and sexual immorality, combined (Maimonides, Hilchot Deot &;3).  The power of speech makes people God-like.  When we use it for good purposes, we are like the Creator of the universe, as Pirkei Avot 5:1 reminds us: “By ten sayings was the world created…”  God created the world through the spoken word, and by utilizing the spoken word we can create a meaningful life.  As it says in Psalms 34:13-14: “Who is the person that desires life and loves many days, that he/she sees God?  Keep your tongue from evil and your lips from guile…”

[c] Are all of the above sources about the speaker?  What about the listener?  The Torah gives us a clue: When Miriam speaks badly about her brother Moses, it says that “Miriam and Aaron spoke…” (Numbers 12:1), but the verb itself is singular.  Although the words were physically spoken by Miriam, the verse implies that Aaron also said the words.  Why?  In order to teach us that one who hears evil words (as Aaron did) is also guilty and as punishable as the one who actually spoke the words (as Miriam did).  While it is true that the speaker receives a far worse punishment (as in the case of Miriam and Aaron), one who listens to Lashon Ha-Ra is punished nevertheless.

[d] If no one would listen, then no one could speak any Lashon Ha-Ra.  Thus, Jamie should not remain quiet when Julie speaks Lashon Ha-Ra.  Rather, she should either ask Julie to stop speaking about others, or she should walk away. 

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 90-92

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.4.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Great-Grandma Sara is 91 years old.  She is suffering from a debilitating illness, and the doctors have said that she will never recover.  The cost of her hospital stay is $10,000 per month and it is draining her life savings, which would have been her family’s inheritance.  She is of sound mind and is in constant, but not overwhelming, pain.  Because of the great medical expense and because of her inheritance, she asks her family to petition the hospital to “pull the plug” and remove her from the machines that are keeping her alive.  

Answer

Are conversations about money for end-stage medical treatments valid under Jewish law?  May a dying person weigh between providing an inheritance for his or her children and paying the medical bills?  May he or she then decide that paying for medical care is not worth the expense and request that the doctors pull the plug?

[a] In general, Judaism believes that it is not up to a person to decide to end his or her life, since that life does not belong to the person at all, but rather to God (Maimonides, Hilchot Rotzeach 1:4).  This is also one of the reasons that we are commanded to keep ourselves as healthy as possible and out of danger (Deuteronomy 15:9 & 15), and are forbidden to harm ourselves (Bava Kama 90b).  Since our bodies are merely “on loan” to us from God, we must treat them as any borrowed object should be treated: with the greatest care not to be damaged or destroyed.

[b] Specific to the concept of life, Judaism not only believes that each life is equal to the entire world – i.e. an infinite worth (Sanhedrin 37a) – but also that every minute of life is infinite and is equal to the entire world.  Therefore, the man who aided King Saul to die just a few minutes early (at Saul’s request), is condemned in the Bible as a murderer (I Samuel 1:9-16).  In general, one is not permitted to violate Shabbat except when there is the possibility of saving a life.  However, if a dying person (collapsed under the rubble, for example) could be kept alive for just a few more hours, through the violation of Shabbat (i.e. removing the rubble), then a Jew is not only permitted, but is obligated to violate Shabbat for this purpose (Shulchan Aruch, Orech Hayyim 329:3-5).  This shows that even a few hours of life have the value of an entire life.  Thus, shortening any life, even by a few hours, is tantamount to destroying an entire life.

[c] It is said that when Rabbi Chananya ben Tradyon was being burned at the hands of the Romans, his students begged him to open his mouth, so that he would die more quickly.  He refused, however, since that would have shortened his life by a few moments (Avoda Zara, 18a).

[d] Thus, Great-Grandma Sara, or any other person, is forbidden to end her life “early,” even to relieve suffering (Maimonides, Hilchot Rotzeach, 2:7).  Certainly, any financial consideration, no matter how substantial, cannot possibly be equated with even a moment of life.  Only God, not people, may determine the moment of death (Pesachim 54b).

However, when one is already close to death, it is not necessary to intervene and maintain his-her life.

[e] There is one story in the Talmud (Ketubot 104a) which relates what happened on the day that Rabbi Judah was dying.  The Rabbis decreed a public fast and offered prayers for heavenly mercy so that Rabbi Judah would not die.  Rabbi Judah’s maid saw how he suffered … she ascended to the roof and prayed for him to die.  The Rabbis continued their prayers for heavenly mercy, and the maid took a jar and threw it down from the roof to the ground.  When the Rabbis heard the sound of the jar shattering, they stopped praying for a moment and the soul of Rabbi Judah departed.  

[f] Rabbenu Nissim (commentary to Nedarim 40a), said that sometimes one must request mercy on behalf of the ill so that he might die, as in the case of a patient who is terminal and who is in great pain.  

[g] It happened that a woman who had aged considerably appeared before Rabbi Yose ben Halafta.  She said, ‘Rabbi, I am much too old.  Life has become a burden for me.  I can no longer taste food or drink.  I wish to die.’  Rabbi Yose asked her, ‘To what do you ascribe your longevity?’  She answered that it was her habit to pray in the synagogue every morning, and despite occasional, more pressing needs she never had missed a service.  Rabbi Yose advised her to refrain from attending services for three consecutive days.  She heeded his advice and on the third day she took ill and died (Yalkut Shimoni, Proverbs 943).

In general, we are allowed to do nothing that will cause death, but can allow someone who is in pain to die naturally.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 84-86

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.28.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

After ecologists showed that cutting down the old growth forests in the northwest United States is harmful to the area’s ecology, a movement has developed to force the wood companies to stop cutting these trees.  However, this would result in the loss of hundreds of jobs and affect thousands of people.  

Answer

Should trees be preserved for ecological reasons if it means the loss of hundreds of jobs?  Consider the following:

[a] Judaism places a high value upon ecological concerns.  Even before the term ecology was invented, Judaism reflected an environmental consciousness.  In the Torah, when Adam is first commanded regarding his relationship with the earth, he is told to “work it and to preserve it” (Genesis 2:15).  Additionally, the Torah prohibits planting or building within 1000 cubits of the city limits (Numbers 35:2), and Rashi explains (based on Bava Metzia 24b) that the reason for this ordinance is to maintain the physical beauty of the city.  The Mishnah (Bava Batra 2:8) discusses and forbids air pollution, and the Shulchan Aruch (Chosen Mishpat 412:5) forbids certain types of water pollution.

[b] While permitting the Israelites to cut down trees (Deuteronomy 20:19-20), God commands that one may not cut down a fruit tree merely for its wood.  If one did cut down a fruit tree, it would fall in the list of transgressions that have to do with being a baal tashchit, someone who destroys and creates needless destruction in the world.  (Maimonides, Hilchot Melachim 6:8).  If however, it is necessary and serves a purpose, then “the earth’s destruction” is permitted in Judaism.  So, for example, Maimonides rules that one may cut down a fruit tree that is doing damage to other trees (and of course use it for wood or paper).

[c] One issue related to our above case involves the damage that cutting down such trees can do to the planet.  If it could be shown that cutting down trees poses a direct danger to human existence on earth, then this concern would supercede all others, and it would be forbidden to cut down the trees (Deuteronomy 4:9-15).

[d] Regarding the specific question about the trees versus the negative effects on workers, the main issue is whether maintaining jobs is considered a legitimate human need.  Although not referring to our circumstances directly, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 155:220 rules that even when trees should not be cut down, the workers are entitled to monetary compensation if they are deprived from work as a result, because they were legitimately working before the ecological problem was detected or discovered.  This seems to imply that when ecology prevents the logging of certain woodlands, the workers are entitled to compensation for the loss of their jobs.

[e] Jewish sensitivity to long-range environmental problems is spelled out in a midrash (Kohelet Rabbah 7:20).  The midrash says that at the beginning of Creation, God put Adam in the garden and showed him all the vegetables and animals that were created.  He asked Adam to note how beautiful and good they are, and how they were all put on earth for people.  But then God warned Adam, telling him to be careful not to damage these creations, because this could ultimately cause the world to be destroyed.  Once it is destroyed, says God, the damage is irreparable. 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 68-70

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.21.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Recently, fox hunting has come under attack in England, and there is a proposal to ban it.  In the United States, many hunters take pride in this sport and defend their right to hunt foxes.  

Answer

Is hunting a legitimate and moral pursuit in Judaism?

[a] It is important to remember that Judaism stresses sensitivity to animals.  On the one hand, the first commandment given to Adam, is to rule over the fish, birds and animals, signifying that human beings can use animals for their own needs (Genesis 1:28).  This implies that we are permitted to hunt animals.  Later on, after the Flood, this relationship is spelled out even more clearly, as God tells man (Genesis 9:2) that animals will fear human beings, and that all creatures have been given over into people’s hands for their needs.  On the other hand, people may not needlessly hurt animals.  As Jews, we are commanded to help unload an animal whose burden is too heavy, even if it belongs to an enemy (Exodus 23:5).  In addition, the Torah spells out a great sensitivity to the “feelings” of animals (Deuteronomy 22:10, 25:4, Leviticus 22:28).  

[b] Consistent with Judaism’s view regarding the use of the earth and its vegetation by man, God has only permitted man to use animals if the need is legitimate, if no unnecessary pain is inflicted and if nothing unnecessary is wasted.  Therefore, for example, a Jew is permitted to eat meat (since the need is legitimate) and kill animals for food (since it is necessary for eating meat), but only through shechita (ritual slaughter), since that inflicts the least amount of pain in killing an animal (Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 451).

[c] In the Talmud, Rabbi Shimon (Avodah Zara 18b) castigates anyone who takes part in something called kangiyon.  Rashi’s comments explain that this activity is hunting animals, using dogs, purely for pleasure.  This sounds very close to fox hunting.  Therefore, we see that Judaism indeed frowns upon hunting for pleasure, and does not consider it a legitimate human need.  Even when the Mishnah uses the term normally translated as hunting – metzudah – it clearly refers to trapping with nets only, without hurting the animal.  Indeed, this reference only permits trapping animals for food, and not for pleasure.  Many centuries later, Rav Yehudah Landau codified this general Jewish attitude in his Responsa Noda B’Yehudah (Yorah Deah 10) and clearly forbade Jews to hunt for pleasure.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 71-72

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.14.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Imagine that a terrorist armed with a bomb manages somehow to elude Israeli security and enters the Knesset with all 120 members present.  He says that he really only wants to kill the Prime Minister (in another room).  There is virtually no chance of overpowering the terrorist before he can detonate the bomb.  If the Israelis give him the Prime Minister, he will let the rest go.  If not, he will blow up the entire Knesset building including the Prime Minister and the other 119 members.  May one take the law into one’s own hands?  What if it is to react violently to personal anti-semitism – does that change anything? 

Answer

Should the Knesset members give up the Prime Minister to the terrorist or die themselves, along with the Prime Minister?  On the surface, it seems like a simple decision: saving 119 lives is certainly better preferable to losing 120 lives.  However, the Jewish value on life makes the decision much less clear.

[a] We are aware that it is written (Sanhedrin 37a) that “he who saves one life, it is as if he has saved an entire world.”  Thus, each life has the value of a world – each life has infinite value.  If one life has the value of infinity, then 120 lives also have the value of infinity (since any number multiplied by infinity is still infinity).  Therefore, based on the math and the general concept, it is not clear that 120 lives are more valuable than one life.

[b] Another Talmudic passage (Sanhedrin 74a) presents the case of a terrorist who puts a gun to your head, and orders you to kill another person or be killed.  One may not kill another person in that instance, even to save one’s own life.  The Talmud asks, “Who says that your blood is redder than his blood?” suggesting that no person can judge whose life is more valuable than whose.  By extension, we may ask, “Who says that any two or five people are more valuable than any one person?”

[c] It is for these reasons that Maimonides (Hilchot Yisodai ha-Torah 5:5) brings down our case, and rules that the Knesset Members would not be allowed to save their lives by giving the terrorist “just” the Prime Minister to be killed.  A person may not do anything to bring about the death of another human being.  The fact that terrorists will kill is their problem, and they will suffer for it, but any law-abiding Jew is forbidden to assist in killing.  Maimonides does bring one caveat, however.  If the Prime Minister (or the specific person being requested) is guilty of sins requiring his death, then (and only then) he may be handed over to the terrorists.  Short of that, nothing should be done, even if it means the death of everyone.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 60-62

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Note from Rabbi Faudem:  Other Rabbis say, if someone is singled out [by the terrorists], that is enough for the group to turn him over [to the terrorists] – and the group would not necessarily be guilty of sins requiring death (Talmud Yerushalmi, Terumot 8:4).

 

1.7.21


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Michael, a law abiding citizen, is walking in the city with his girlfriend and proudly wearing a Magen David around his neck.  Suddenly, a large man starts mocking Michael and his girlfriend because they are Jewish.  Speaking right at them, he utters phrases like “Hitler was right,” and “Make the Jews into lampshades.”  Michael has the urge to hit the man, even if he may be hurt in the fight.  He does not want the man to “get away” with such attacks against Jews.  On the other hand, Michael knows that starting a fight is against the law.  He also knows that there is a police station a block and a half away where he could file a complaint.

Answer

Is it justified, as a Jew, to ever physically stop someone from doing something illegal?  When the attack is verbal and anti-Semitic, does that change anything?

[a] Based on a casual glance at the stories in the Torah, we cannot draw any conclusions based on the evidence.  On the one hand, Simeon and Levi, who destroyed the city of Shechem following the kidnapping and rape of their sister Dinah, were strongly castigated by their father, Jacob (Genesis 34:30).  On the other hand, when idol worshippers perpetrated a great sin causing a plague that left 24,000 dead, Pinchas took the law into his own hands and killed them on the spot.  When he did so, he stopped the plague and was praised for his actions (Numbers 25:10-13).  What, then, is the correct reaction?

[b] When it comes to one’s property, there is a disagreement whether one can seize it back when it has been stolen.  The law codes (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 4) follow Rav Nachman’s opinion in the Talmud (Bava Kamma 27b) that one can seize property that has been stolen (especially when retrieval through lawful means is impossible), although Rabbi Yehudah disagrees.  But this case is not similar to our question.

[c] Based on the story of Pinchas, Maimonides codified the times when it is permitted to take the law into one’s own hands (Hilchot Issurei Biah 12:4-5).  There are four specific conditions which must be adhered to in reacting violently to hurt or destroy the guilty party: 1) It must be a public desecration of God’s name (usually before at least ten Jews); 2) It must take place in the heat of the moment, as an immediate reaction to the act, and not premeditated; 3) One may not consult or ask a Jewish legal authority for permission to commit such an act; 4) If the person who acts outside the law is injured or killed, relatives may not take legal action against the other party.  Therefore, returning to our case, it may indeed be proper or permissible to fight or use physical force against the anti-Semite if the above conditions are adhered to.  

[d] However, in general, the Jewish legal principle Dina D’Malchuta Dina covers this situation.  Dina D’Malchuta Dina means “The Law of the Land” is the law.  Unless (a) he would be at risk, or (b) unless that was a direct and significant danger to other people that would override the limits of local law, Michael would not be allowed to respond at that time.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 58-59

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

12.24.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A shootout between a mugger and a policeman results in the officer being wounded.  He is wheeled into the ER, and needs an operation to stop the internal bleeding.  His fellow police officers and his family are with him at the hospital; everyone is pushing for the officer to be treated right away.  Five minutes later, the criminal who shot him is also brought to the ER, having been shot by the policeman.  He is in much greater need of an operation.  The doctor on duty orders two operating rooms, but only one is available.

Answer

Should the doctor give the operating room to the criminal, who needs the operation more and whose life is in greater danger, or to the policeman, who is not a criminal and whose family is present, encouraging the doctor to treat him right away? 

[a] Of course, there is a general mitzvah to save the life of as many people as possible.  Even if the person is not an upstanding individual, he or she is created “in the image of God” – b’tzelem Elohim.  However, in our case, when only one operating room is available, the doctor must choose whom to save.  

Common sense tells us to save the policeman since 1) he is the more moral person and 2) he will continue to save lives if he survives, while the criminal might continue to hurt others.  But common sense and logic are not always the guiding principles when it comes to defining Jewish laws and values.

[b] Even though it is clear to us that the man is the perpetrator of a crime, no person or doctor may act as a judge and pronounce the person guilty prior to a legal trial.  This basic concept familiar to us as “innocent until proven guilty” is based on a verse in the Torah (Numbers 35:12) which states that punishment cannot be administered until after a trial.  Maimonides (Hilchot Rotzeach 1:5) says that no punishment may be administered by witnesses (even if they are judges by profession) at the scene of a crime, until a person has gone through the entire legal process.  Would the doctor, by choosing the policeman, already be pronouncing judgment on the alleged criminal?

[c] The Talmud (Sanhedrin 74a) teaches that a person is not permitted to say, or even to believe that one person’s “blood is redder than another’s.”  This means no human being is capable of judging who is more valuable than whom.  We cannot truly see inside a person to evaluate all of the conditions that led to particular behaviors.  Only God can do this.  Therefore, the doctor cannot decide who gets the operation room on past behavior or higher morality.  

[d] The Talmud discusses a case like ours (Sanhedrin 32b).  Two identical boats are traveling in opposite directions, trying to cross a narrow channel, which has room for only one boat.  The first option should be to compromise.  Failing that, the boat that is closer, that arrived first, goes first.  In our case, where compromise is impossible, the policeman should therefore be taken to the operating room because he arrived first.  However, the case of the boats is predicated on the situation where the needs are identical, but in our case the needs are not identical.  

[e] The person in greater danger of losing life always takes precedence, based on the dictum (Ketubot 12b), “a sure thing versus a possible thing – a sure thing is preferred.”  (Here the “sure thing” is the need for the operation in order to survive.)   Therefore, although intuitively we may WANT to save the policeman, the criminal should get the operating room, since both his need and his danger are greater.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2,” pgs. 55-57

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

12.17.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

https://www.hillel-detroit.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#edit_timestampCase

Mr. Kamen was the vice president of his synagogue, in charge of collecting tzedakah for community members in financial need.  One popular member, Mr. Kahn, was about to pay for his daughter’s wedding, but unbeknownst to his friends, he had just fallen on hard financial times.  Mr. Kahn secretly appealed to Mr. Kamen for help in making a modest wedding, and Mr. Kamen agreed to make an appeal without mentioning names.  When Mrs. Kamen overheard this, she begged her husband to publicly mention Mr. Kahn’s name in the appeal.  A general appeal to the congregation for helping a bride get married would only garner small donations.  However, Mr. Kahn’s popularity would bring in at least five times the amount.  

Answer

Should the cause of a tzedakah drive be made public, or should the recipients and purpose of the money remain a secret?

[a] The mitzvah of tzedakah is great indeed.  It is written that this mitzvah has the ability to grant life and death (Proverbs 10:2).  Maimonides calls it the most important positive mitzvah in the Torah (Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 10:1).  However, the importance of preserving a person’s dignity in the process of giving is paramount.  That is why the concept of the pushke (tzedakah box) was developed – so that neither the giver nor the receiver would know the identity of the other, thus preserving the dignity of the receiver.  Maimonides states that it is preferable to give less tzedakah than requested, but with a smile, than to give what is asked for by the poor person but with a dour face (Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 10:13-14).

[b] Although it is true that Mr. Kahn would receive far greater donations if his name were announced, he would suffer more shame.  His friends would now know of his financial plight.  That indignity is far worse than receiving less money.  Therefore, Mr. Kamen should not listen to his wife, and should omit Mr. Kahn’s name from his appeal.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 47-48

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

12.10.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A talk show host intentionally brings two groups onto his show in order to incite them.  One is a neo-Nazi fringe group and the other is a militant black group.  A fight naturally breaks out, and numerous people get injured.  They sue the talk show host for inciting this “riot.”  At the shabbat table, the Becker family discusses whether the host can be found guilty from a Jewish perspective.  On one hand, Judaism believes in free will, and each person is therefore a “free agent” to commit or not to commit any act.  Based on this argument, the talk show host is not guilty.  On the other hand, he intentionally brought these groups together to incite them to fight and improve ratings.  

Answer

Who is responsible for the violence that breaks out?

[a] It is true that from a Jewish perspective, each person above the age of bar or bat mitzvah is responsible for his or her own actions.  Maimonides teaches (Hilchot Kelayim 10:31) about a person who dresses another person in clothing that violates Jewish law. (Torah forbids Jews from wearing any fabric that mixes wool and linen.)  If the person being dressed is unaware of the nature of the sinful clothing and then the “clother” is guilty of the sin.  However, if the person being clothed was aware of the sinful clothing and did nothing to stop if, then he or she is indeed guilty.  Therefore, the rioters must indeed be responsible for their actions as well as any damage they caused.  They knew that violence was wrong.  But this does not necessarily exonerate the inciter (i.e. the “clother”) from being guilty as well.  Is the person who incites the sin also guilty?

[b] One of the commandments in the Torah is “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14).  All of the commentaries understand that this verse refers to more than an actual blind person or an actual stumbling block.  It is expanded to refer to any person who knowingly causes another person to “stumble in any act or into any sin, while the sinner is “blind” to the sin as it is being committed.

[c] The Talmud (Avoda Zara 6b) refers to a case of a Nazarite who has taken an oath not to drink wine.  If you offer him wine, and he drinks it, then you have violated the prohibition against placing a stumbling block before the blind.  Here, the Nazarite certainly is aware of the sin, but is “blinded” by his desire to drink wine, which you facilitate.  

[d] The precedent for determining guilt for both the inciter and the actual sinner can be found in the very first sin in the Torah.  The serpent was severely punished for inciting the woman to violate God’s word by eating the fruit.  Soon after, we learn that Eve’s claim “I was just following orders” (Genesis 3:13-16) was not a legitimate defense and Eve was also punished.  So, too, the rioters may not claim that it is not their fault since they were goaded to sin.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 49-50

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

12.3.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Ruthie is passing by a street when a cat with a collar (indicating it has an owner) follows her.  She wants to pick it up and return it to its owner, but immediately realizes that it will take a lot of time, effort and money to give back this cat.  After all, in addition to the time it will take to care for her, Ruthie will have to feed her and pay for ads to let people know where the cat is.  

Answer

The question is about the obligation to return lost objects found on the street which would occupy much time and some expense.  

[a] In most societies, no one expects or requires anyone to pick up such an object.  If one does so it is viewed as so extraordinary that the returner expects a reward.  In Judaism, though, the returning of a lost object is mandatory, and a person is guilty of a sin if he or she merely passes by a lost object without retrieving it.  The Torah emphasizes this when it says “You shall not watch your neighbor’s ox or his sheep go astray, and hide yourself from them; you shall in any case bring them again to your neighbor.  And if your neighbor is not near you, or if you do not know your neighbor, then you shall bring it to your own house, and it shall be with you until your neighbor seeks it, and you shall return it.  In like manner shall you do with a donkey; and so shall you do with a garment; and with every lost thing of your neighbor’s, which that has been lost and you have found, you may not hide yourself from this responsibility.” (Deuteronomy 22:1-3) 

Since the verse specifically speaks about the return of lost animals, Ruthie would have to return the cat, especially since the collar is an identifying sign for the owner.  If there is no identifying sign, including the location in which the animal was found, then the finder can keep it since we assume the owner gave up all hope of retrieving such an object or animal (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 259:2).

[b] What about Ruthie’s expenses?  Of course the finder can later charge the owner for expenses such as feeding the animal (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 265:1).  Similarly, should Ruthie need to take time off work to find the owner, these expenses can also be recovered (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 265:1).  If the expenses become greater than the worth of the object, then (and only then) would the finder not be obligated to retain the object and try to return it.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 47-48

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

11.26.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Susie’s good friend Jane accidentally finds out a secret about Susie’s fiance Judah: he has a debilitating medical condition, which will result in his death within two years.  Judah has not told Susie, his-bride-to-be, about his condition.

Answer

Should a person reveal important, confidential information to a friend about her, if the fiance himself did not reveal it?

[a] In general, a Jew may not reveal information that is told to him or her, even if the provider of the information did not request that it be kept secret (Yoma 4b).  However, if the information will potentially save a life, then a person is obligated to reveal such information, even if sworn to secrecy (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 426.1).  The values of trust and saving a life have to be weighed carefully here.

[b]  In the situation presented, which deeply affects the lives of the people involved, the Chofetz Chaim (Shemirat haLashon, 9:2, example 3, paragraph 7) states that the laws against speaking lashon hara (evil talebearing) do not apply.  Therefore, Jane should tell Susie about Judah’s debilitating condition, but only if four conditions are present: 1) the danger to the person (Judah) must be real and imminent.  If Judah’s disease would cause his death only thirty years later, then the information may not be revealed;  2) One may not exaggerate the information while disclosing it.  Thus, Jane cannot say that the disease will kill Judah within six months; 3) The motive for revealing the information must be pure, i.e. to help the receiver of the information.  It may not be undertaken for personal gain or for revenge against a person one dislikes; and 4) The information must greatly affect the relationship.  If the friend knows in advance that the couple is so much in love that they will surely marry anyway, it is forbidden to reveal such information.  

It should be noted that if the person can accomplish the same goal without having to break a confidence, then one may not reveal such information in that case.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 45-46

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

11.19.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

At the Seder table, after discussing the miracles of the Exodus, the Weiss family began talking about modern times.  Mrs. Weiss said that there are no miracles today, but her son Jonathan, said that miracles still exist.  As an example, he used the Six-Day War in 1967, in which Israel defeated seven Arab nations in six days.  His older sister, Sharon said it was a miracle when 39 scuds hit Israel during the Gulf War, and only one person died, and even the creation of the state of Israel itself was miraculous.  Mr. Weiss could not make up his mind whether these events are indeed considered miraculous, as his children believe, or whether miracles do not exist today as all, as his wife believes.

Answer

Do miracles exist today?

[a] If, by definition, a miracle is a supernatural event (one which defies the laws of nature), then this type of miracle indeed no longer exists.  The reasons given are: a) people today would not accept these events as miraculous from God due to a lower spiritual level (Berachot 20a) and b) there is no longer a Temple in Jerusalem, where many supernatural miracles occurred on a daily basis.  Soon after the Jews’ dispersion into the Diaspora, which followed the destruction of the first Temple (70 CE), a major event in Jewish history occurred, which shows us how the nature of miracles changed forever.

[b] The Purim story (the story of Mordechai and Esther, which occurred during that time period) was a series of events that certainly were not supernatural.  And yet, these events, which seem political and coincidental in nature, are called miracles.  The prayer recited by Jews to celebrate Purim is called Al Ha-Nissim (“For the miracles”).  Therefore, even though the events of the Purim story do not seem particularly miraculous, or even seem to be from God, they are labeled miracles.  They seem less miraculous even than the Scud missiles of the Gulf War that failed to kill Israelis.  This non-supernatural type became the form of miracles from that point onward in history.  This is also one reason that God’s name is not mentioned in the Book of Esther, making it the only book of the Bible not to contain direct references to God.  This demonstrates that although God was certainly there and was involved in the Miracle of Purim, God’s role was not obvious (as it is in supernatural miracles).  Based on this, Jonathan Weiss is correct that all of these modern events in Jewish history would be considered miraculous.  They are natural miracles like the story of Purim.

[c]  There is a third type of miracle in Judaism as well.  These are everyday events that occur thousands of times.  If any of these events (such as a person taking a single step) were to occur only once, everyone would agree that it is a miracle.  For example, if there were only one baby’s birth or one sunset each year, then everything and everyone would stop to witness these great miracles.  Judaism believes that the fact that these occur daily make them no less miraculous.  We thank God in the Modim prayer of the Amidah for “your miracles that are with us each day.”

It is interesting that in Judaism, of the three types of miracles mentioned, the supernatural is considered the least miraculous.  More miraculous is the natural miracle, while the everyday miracle is the most miraculous of all (see Nedarim 41a, Pesachim 118a).

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 42-44

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

11.12.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Fifteen-year-old David had been caught shoplifting.  When David’s parents’ friends mentioned to them that they had to take some responsibility for David’s actions, they retorted that as Jews, their responsibility ended with David when he became a bar mitzvah (Son of the Commandments.  At age 13, boys in the Jewish tradition become legally responsible for mitzvot (commandments) and for civil matters.  Although general society still recognizes a fifteen-year-old as a minor, Judaism says that David is legally responsible and is independent at the age of thirteen.  Being good Jews, the parents say that they no longer are responsible for David,  The father even recalls reciting the blessing absolving himself of David’s future sins.  

Answer

Is a parent responsible for the actions of a post bar/bat mitzvah child/?

[a] From the Jewish perspective, does a parent bear some responsibility for a post bat or bar mitzvah teenager?  It is certainly true that a child over the age of thirteen is recognized as an adult in Jewish law, and is responsible for his or her actions.  This teen now bears the responsibility and consequences for his or her judgments that lead to his or her actions.  This is made public when a parent recites the blessing at the bar or bat mitzvah ceremony.  “Blessed be the Eternal … Who exonerates me from the sins of this one (child).”  However, we will see that although the child is responsible, the relationship between a parent and child (and thus the parent’s responsibility for the child) is not severed when a child becomes a bat or bar mitzvah.

[b] Even after becoming a bar or bat mitzvah, the mitzvah to honor (and listen to) one’s parents continues throughout one’s life.  In addition, if a child continues to live in a parent’s home (the situation with most teenagers today), Jewish law continues to attach a legal responsibility by a parent for a child.  For example, a lost object found by such a child belongs to the parent and not the teen.  That act of a child living in the parents’ home gives the parents some responsibility.  (Talmud, Bava Metzia 12b and Shulchan Aruch, Chosen Mishpat 270:2).

[c]  The Talmud (Kiddushin 30a) also brings an argument about the optimum age at which a parent has maximum effect on a child.  One opinion is that this takes place between the ages of 16-22, while the other opinion holds that it is between 18-24 years old.  This clearly shows a belief that parents continue to have great influence upon post bar and bat mitzvah children.  In fact, according to Rashi’s commentary on that passage, a parent’s impact at these ages is even greater than before.

[d]  In yet another passage (Shabbat 54b), Judaism holds an adult responsible for all the sins that he or she could have prevented in his or her household but did not prevent. Therefore although David must certainly take responsibility for his act of shoplifting, his parents also continue to bear some responsibility as long as the teen lives in their home.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 40-41

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

11.5.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Bernie Schwartz has always been careful to honor his father and grant his requests, both as a good Jew and as a good son.  But recently, Bernie’s father was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and began requesting absurd things from his son.  One day he asked Bernie to stand on his head for twenty minutes.  The next day he asked him to paint the den, even though it had been painted less than six months earlier.

Should Bernie listen to his father and fulfill these strange requests?  Why or why not?

Answer

As Jews we want to honor the Torah’s commandments at all times.  Yet, there are outside and unexpected influences that make us reevaluate exactly how to perform mitzvot.  Consider the following about our case.

[a] Even for perfectly healthy parents, the Midrash (Tanhuma, Eikev 2) says that the mitzvah to honor one’s parents is called the “most difficult commandment in the Torah” to fulfill, and is a mitzvah that is even more important than honoring God (Jerusalem Talmud, Peah 3b).  Technically, the mitzvah regarding parents involves kavod (honor), i.e. , keeping a parent’s dignity by feeding, clothing and helping him or her exit and enter; and yirah (awe), which involves the acts of not sitting or standing in a parent’s place, not contradicting, and not siding publicly against a parent who is in an argument (Kiddushin 31b).  However, most authorities agree that a child is obligated to honor any reasonable request by a parent (Midrash Yalkut Shimoni, Mishle 23 and Shuchan Aruch, Yorah Deah 240:8).

[b] When does a request by a parent become unreasonable?  The Talmud (Kiddushin 31a) cites the case of Rabbi Assi.  His mother was senile, and first she requested that her son bring her jewels, which he did.  Then she requested that he find her a husband, which he tried to do.  But when his mother insisted that Rabbi Assi find her a husband as young and handsome as he was (a very unreasonable request), Rabbi Assi left the house and moved to Israel.  Thus, we see that even this rabbi did not comply with such an unreasonable request.  Maimonides (Hilchot Mamrim 6:10) codifies this idea, and later authorities (Shiurim Mitzuyanim Ba-Halacha 143:4, 10) support the view that irrational requests by parents may be ignored.  Therefore, Bernie Schwartz is not obligated to carry out the absurd requests of his father (although he may do so if he wishes).

[c] It should be noted that if a parent asks a child to violate any Torah law, it is forbidden for the child to comply with the request (Maimonides, Hilchot Mamrim 6:12).

Just as important, however, is the manner in which a child does or does not listen to a parent.  A child must always maintain a parent’s dignity and respect at all times (whether complying or not), even if the parent is no longer competent or fully functioning mentally (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 242:8,13).  The reason is explained in the Talmud (Berachot 8b):  A person who is senile is compared to a Holy Ark that is now empty (of a Torah).  Even though the ark no longer contains holiness, it still must be accorded respect because it once did contain holiness.  So, too, a person who no longer has a fully functioning mind must be accorded respect for what he or she possessed in the past.  Similarly, the Talmud continues, it is for this reason that the shattered first set of tablets of the Ten Commandments was placed in the original Holy Ark along with the second set of tablets.  This demonstrates that something which once had value, but no longer has intrinsic value, must still be accorded respect according to its previous holiness or value. 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 37-39

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

10.29.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

The Epsteins have spent part of their vacation staying at a posh hotel.  As the great vacation draws to a close, members of the family decide that they want souvenirs from their terrific vacation.  Fifteen-year-old Jonathan decides to pack a hotel towel, with the hotel’s logo, into his suitcase.  His mother decides to bring home the unused bottles of shampoo that are in the bathroom, and eight -year-old Esther takes the stationary and pens from the desk in their room.

Answer

Mr. Epstein is incensed and claims that all these acts are outright stealing.  Jonathan and the others argue that the cost of these momentos are already included in the exorbitant hotel prices, and, besides, everyone does it.  

Is it considered stealing to take objects from a hotel room?  In order to answer this question, we must first define the act of stealing.  What is it?  Most people will simply answer “taking something that does not belong to you.”  But this cannot be a complete definition.  If a child takes food from the refrigerator in his or her home (without asking his or her parents), based on this definition, we can say that this is stealing, since the food does not “belong” to the child.  And lest someone argue that anything which the parents own automatically belongs to the children, then it should be permitted for children to take $100 from their parents’ wallet without asking.  And, yet, almost everyone agrees that taking this money is stealing.  What, then, is the difference between taking food from the refrigerator (not stealing) and taking money from a parent’s wallet (stealing)?

[a] The concept of ye-ush, giving up on having the stolen item returned, or “minding” if it is taken, is the basis of determining if an object is stolen or not according to the Talmud (Sukkah 30a).  If a person is not sure whether the owner would mind (have ye-ush) if something were taken, then the Talmud would disallow taking the items.

[b] Consider what a group of people doing the same thing can do to your sense of morality: “Ten people join together to steal a beam, and are not ashamed in each other’s presence” (Kiddushin 80b). Does the fact that everyone in the family except the father is involved make a difference?

Now let’s get into our case, item by item, since we have now determined that, according to Jewish Law, ye-ush is our test for whether or not something is considered stolen or not.  Before you read our opinions, determine for yourselves: would the hotel management “mind” if you took a towel?  The shampoo? The pen and stationary?

Clearly, most hotels “mind” very much when guests take home the hotel’s towels.  In fact, many hotels SELL their towels in the gift shop.  Thus, taking hotel towels is indeed stealing (unless the owner or manager gives specific permission to take the towels).   

What about the unused shampoo?  Would the hotel “mind” if that is taken?  Numerous surveys show that most hotel management do not mind if the shampoo is taken, since this is included in the cost of the room.  Therefore, taking shampoo is not stealing.

What about the pens and stationary? Here, it is even clearer that the hotel gives away these objects, since they serve to advertise the hotel.  Some hotels even post a sign that the pens and stationary are complimentary.  Clearly, no hotel “minds” when these items are taken.  Therefore, Mr. Epstein is wrong to accuse everyone of stealing.  Jonathan is indeed stealing the hotel towels, but Mrs. Epstein and Esther are not stealing in taking the shampoo and stationary.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 31-33

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

10.22.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Mr. Polsky was walking on the street and saw a friend of his being mugged.  He knew of a Jewish law that states that one must save someone who is in danger.  But he thought that by trying to save this person’s life, he might be putting his own life in danger.

Answer

The questions are: should a person help a friend who is being attacked?  And does the potential danger outweigh the duty, if there is one, to help that friend? 

[a] It certainly is a mitzvah to save a person in danger of dying, as it says, “You shall not stand by the blood of your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:16 and Sanhedrin 73a).

[b] But there is also a mitzvah to preserve one’s own life, as it says “And you shall live by them (The Commandments)” (Leviticus 18:5).  The Talmud expands on this and explains “You shall live by them (the mitzvot) and not die by them” (Sanhedrin 74a).  Therefore, one may not sacrifice one’s life to save someone else.

The real dilemma comes into play, then, when there is definite danger to someone else and only possible danger to you.  Is the obligation to save the person or to keep yourself out of harm’s way? 

[c] The proofs from the stories in the Bible are inconclusive.  On the one hand, in the Book of Exodus, the midwives put themselves in possible danger to save Jewish babies in definitive danger (Exodus 1:16-17) when Pharaoh decrees that Jewish babies should be killed.  Similarly, Esther puts herself in possible danger to save the Jewish people from definite danger (Esther 4:8-5:1).

[d] On the other hand, God specifically tells Moses to wait until he is out of danger before returning to Egypt to save the Jewish people, who are in definite danger: “God said to Moses, ‘Go, return to Egypt, all the people who demand your life have died’” (Exodus 4:19).

[e] The Hagahot Maymaniyot, quoted by the Beth Yosef commentary on the Tur, a Jewish Law code (Choshen Mishpat 426) quotes the Jerusalem Talmud which says that in every case a person must try to save a person in danger because his danger is only a possibility while the danger of the person in distress is definite.

[f] However, the Beit Yosef is also the author of the Code of Jewish Law, the Shulchan Aruch, and never codifies this statement as a law which must be followed.  Thus, he rejects this opinion, as does Mishnah Berurah (Orach Hayyim 329), and says that one may not put him/herself in possible danger to save someone in definite danger.

[g] Based on the above, Rabbi David Ben Zimrah (Egypt, 16th century) concludes that if there is definite danger, one may not even try to save someone.  If it is possible danger, one may try if one wishes, but is not obligated.  If there is no danger, then one is obligated to save a person in danger.  Our only problem now is defining definite, possible, and no danger.  Even if a lifeguard is fully trained and experienced, there always is some danger in trying to save a drowning person.  Does this Halacha imply that the lifeguard should never try to save someone else?  It has been concluded that if the odds of putting oneself in danger are 1 in 10, then this is called a definite danger, and one may not even attempt the rescue.  If the odds are 1 in 100, then this is considered possible danger and one may try to save the person, but need not do so.  Less than 1 in 1000 odds, are not even called possible danger, and one would be obligated to save a person in danger.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 28-30

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

10.15.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Littletown is having a large problem.  Apparently, the sewage from a company that used to be located outside the town’s borders (and has since closed its doors), has been leaking into the entire town.  Cases of cancer and other diseases have become much more prevalent, and everyone is concerned.  Meetings have been called to involve the local and federal governments, and everyone is being asked to put in time to help deal with this issue.  Mr. and Mrs. Kayman, however, are both very busy with full time jobs and do not see the need to get involved.  They have, in the past, been part of the Temple leadership and the rabbi has specifically asked them to put in their time, effort and ideas for this town problem.  When their children ask them to get involved, they explain that their work and personal concerns take precedence over this problem, but the children do not accept their answer.

Answer

The question is whose needs take precedence in Judaism – the private needs of the individual or the needs of the community?

[a] Judaism certainly recognizes the rights and needs of the individual.  According to the Midrash (Bereshit Rabbah 42:13), the very name “Hebrew” (ivri, from the root ayin, vet, reish, meaning “pass over” or “cross the bounds”) originally referred to Abraham, because he stood up and challenged his community.  Mordechai, of the story of Purim, is called Yehudi – a Jew – according to some interpretations because he was an individualist (Midrash Esther Rabbah 4).  However, the Jews’ role as part of the Jewish community is also a very basic principle in Judaism.  

[b] According to the Talmud, (Sanhedrin 17b), a Jewish scholar may not live in a town unless an organized Jewish community exists.  Jews should pray as a community because God cannot reject the prayers of a Jewish community (Berachot 8a).  Every Jew, whether he or she wants to be or not, is part of the larger Jewish world community, as it says, “Kol Yisrael arevim zeh l’zeh” – “Every Jew is connected to every other Jew” (Sanhedrin 27b).

[c] One Talmudic passage shows both the importance of the individual and that of the community.  When the Talmud asks why only one human being was originally created, and not many people, several responses are given. One answer is that unlike coins, where each is an exact duplicate of the original mint, God made each person with features merely similar to those of the original human being.  Each person has different and unique traits.  This demonstrates that we are part of the community of human beings (we share similar features and ancestors), but we remain individuals.

[d] When a person is sitting shiva, it is forbidden for that person to learn Torah.  Torah learning is considered joyous.  However, if the community needs this person to teach Torah, he or she is permitted to do so, since the needs of the community override those of the individual (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 384:1).

Thus, it seems that the Kayman children are correct, and their parents should help with the community problems even if they have to sacrifice some of their own needs.  The Talmud (Berachot 49b) admonishes anyone who disassociates him/herself from the community “Al tifrosh min ha-tzibur.”  In fact, the Talmud (Bava Metzia 91a) speaks about community leaders mentioned at the beginning of the Book of Ruth, who were expected to help their community’s needs during a time of famine.  However, they abdicated their responsibility and moved to the non-Jewish country of Moav.  Shortly thereafter they died as a punishment for their actions.  Based on this, Maimonides (Hilchot Teshuvah 3:11) states that he who abandons his or her community in time of need, loses his or her entire share in the World to Come, even if no specific sin was committed.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 19-21

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

10.1.20


May or must a Jew give up their life rather than eat non-Kosher food at gunpoint?

Answer

[a] The Talmud (Sanhedrin 74a) says that for 610 of the 613 mitzvot (commandments), a Jew should violate the commandment and the Torah rather than die.  This is based on the verse “…and you shall live by (performing) them” (Leviticus 8:5), to which the Rabbis of the Talmud (Yoma 85b) add “and not die by observing them (the mitzvot).”

[b] The Talmud (Sanhedrin 74a) goes on to say that there are three exceptions in which a Jew must give up his or her life rather than commit the sin.  These sins are (1) murder, (2) sexual impropriety, and (3) idol worship.  Therefore, the answer to our question seems quite straightforward: one must eat the non-Kosher food, rather than give up one’s life.  However, there is an exception.  When the entire society is filled with widespread and systematic anti-Semitisim, a Jew may not violate even the simplest act or “minor” commandment – even at the penalty of death – since this act betrays the Jewish people and desecrates God’s name.

May a Jew give up their life rather than eat non-kosher food is much more complicated.  Although it seems that, based on the Talmud, a person does not have permission to decide what to do in such a case, there exist three different opinions among Jewish authorities.

[a] Maimonides (Hlichot Yesodai Torah 5:1) rules that it is always forbidden to give up one’s life in such a circumstance.  One who allows him/herself to be killed rather than eat the non-Kosher food is considered to be the same s a person who committed suicide, which is a sin in Judaism.

[b] Rabbi David ben Zimrah (Egypt, 1479-1573) disagrees and says, “If a person is willing to give up his or her life for Jewish principles, s/he is considered a tzaddik – a righteous person. That person is to be praised.”

[c] Rabbi Yehuda Rozanes (Turkey, 1658-1727), in his book Parshat Derachim, offers a compromise position.  He says that only an established Jewish leader may martyr him/herself when not mandated.  However, a lay person or any other Jew is forbidden to accept death rather than violate any of the other 610 mitzvot.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pg. 6

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

Yom Kippur


What was the story of Ketiah bar Shalom?  There was a Caesar who hated the Jews. He asked the dignitaries of his kingdom:  “If a wart [a reference to the Jews] develops on someone’s foot, should he cut it off and be healed or leave it and suffer?”

They responded:  “He should cut it off and be healed.”

Ketiah bar Shalom said to them:  “First of all, you will not be able to wipe them out….  Furthermore, you will be called the ruler of a severed kingdom [if you succeed].”

 

The Caesar said to Ketiah:  “You have spoken well.  However, whoever prevails against the king [in argument] is thrown into a chamber of dirt.”

 

Why does the king punish Ketiah?  Can we apply this aggada/rabbinic story to our lives?  How many times in our lives do we shut someone down or out because they have pointed out we have erred?  We often compensate with aggressive behavior toward the person to whom we confess. 

 

As we approach Yom Kippur we should use this time as an opportunity both to admit wrongs and to avoid not adding a layer of anger directed at the person who is trying to help us grow.

 

What is your Jewish story?


Does it begin with you or with a generation or two before you? Do you have a connection to a larger Jewish story?  If so, what is it?  Why might it be important for one to have a Jewish story that ties into something larger than oneself?  As you begin a new Jewish year and you take another step toward your future, think about your story and how it ties into the larger Jewish story.

4.30.20


It has been a crazy end of the year!  I hope you are all staying safe and being good to yourselves and your loved ones, and I look forward to seeing you in the fall.   

I am looking forward to next year.  We will once again be offering an opportunity to participate in a Jewish learning series, JTalk, which is a ten-week experiential, conversational seminar for students looking to deepen their understanding of Judaism on their own terms.

Come study with me and other students for ten weeks on Tuesday evenings from 5:00-6:30 PM at the Jewish Federation Building in Bloomfield Hills.  The Fellowship will run from Tuesday, September 29 – December 1, and will include dinner, text study, meeting new friends, and $300 upon successful completion of the program.  

Stay tuned for applications!  Have a great summer!

 

4.23.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Bennie, a twelve-year-old in Florida, had a kidney transplant.  His body begins to reject the kidney, so the doctors dramatically increase the dosage of the anti-rejection medicine.  The medicine makes the boy sleepy.  It blurs his vision.  It makes it hard for him to concentrate.  He can’t really read, watch television or play video games.  Even visiting with friends is hard, because his eyes become very light sensitive.  He and his mother decide he should go off the medicine and take his chances.  He says, “Living this way is not living.”  The doctors call it “suicide” and “parental abandonment of responsibility.”  Bennie and his mother argue that it is his life.  The doctors go to court.  The court orders the family to continue medical treatment.  Can a twelve-year-old (with his mother’s permission) make a decision to reject the medical treatment that will keep him alive?  Should he?

Answer

[a] When Rabbi Yehuda ha-Nasi was dying the rabbis ruled that everyone must fast and pray for God’s mercy.  They also made it a rule that anyone who said “The rabbi is already dead” would be put to death as a murderer.  Then the rabbi’s servant woman went onto the roof of his house and prayed, “The angels and people are at war.  The angels are praying for the rabbi to come and join them.  The people are praying for the rabbi to remain with them.  Prayers are fighting prayers.  God, may it be Your will that the human prayers defeat the angels’ wishes.”

Later, when the servant woman saw how much the rabbi was suffering, she prayed again.  This time she said, “May it be Your will, God, that the angels win.”  Rabbi suffered more and more but stayed alive.  The servant woman picked up a jar and threw it off the roof.  It hit the ground and made a big smashing sound.  The rabbis stopped praying for just an instant.  In that instant the soul of Rabbi Yehudah ha-Nasi departed for its eternal rest (Ketuvot 104a).

[b] Rabbinic thinking leans to the view that the patient should undergo a procedure if the choice exists.  Nevertheless, he may exercise the option to do nothing.  

A central factor to be considered is the track record of the treatment.  The less sure the doctors are of the possible cure, the greater is the patient’s prerogative to not have the procedure.  In those cases where the doctors are not confident of the outcome, one can choose to live whatever amount of time he has left and not take a chance on losing even that short time, or he can take a chance that he will lose everything – but might gain a lot.

Rav Moshe Feinstein has taught a number of times in his responsa that a patient has a right to refuse treatment and that a person is not required to undergo treatment that will cure his illness but force him a life of pain.  He teaches that the decision is really in the hands of the patient, who is entitled to know all the options and make his own decision.

Even against the patient’s express will, however, he must be provided food and oxygen.  However, we must act upon a request for a stopping of further medical treatment, even if this will bring a quicker death (Rabbi Alfred Cohen).

Jewish medical ethics would encourage Bennie to go back to his treatment but accept his decision to refuse the medication.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 70-72

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

4.17.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

On [the tv show] ER, a seventeen-year-old cystic fibrosis patient, a boy, is near the end of his life.  He wants to die in peace. He wants to have a DNR order placed. There is no question that he will die soon.  He wants to die peacefully. His mother (and his sister) can’t live with his decision. So when the doctor allows him to die peacefully, according to his wishes, they order him to restart his heart and insert a breathing tube.  By American law, the child is still a minor, and the doctor has to follow the mother’s wishes.

Answer

[a] Under Jewish law, a dying person can ask for a DNR (The death of Rabbi Judah, Ketubot 104a).

[b] Also, under Jewish law, the commandment “Honor your father and mother” applies at any age, so the question of whether a seventeen-year-old is an adult doesn’t matter.

In the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 241.25 says that you can disobey your mother over choices of schooling and marriage (major life issues).  When to die probably falls under this category. 

[c] Also, the Rashi commentary to Leviticus 19:2 makes it clear that you need not follow your parents’ wishes when they violate the Torah.  Based on the Seven Laws of Noah (Sanhedrin 56a) causing an animal to suffer tzar ba’alei hayyim (causing pain to animals) is a biblical prohibition.

The mother’s wishes here are probably wrong and need not be followed.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 118-119

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

4.2.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Max bought a brand new BB gun.  He and “the folks” had gone through all the rules about what he could shoot at and what he could not.  He had agreed that living things were out of bounds. No birds. No squirrels. No snakes – unless someone was in danger.  That left almost nothing. He spent a week safely knocking cans off a wall. Now he was bored. He went into the garage and found a really old set of dishes.  No one even remembered where they came from. He set up the dishes and had lots of fun breaking the plates safely. Mom came out and yelled at him. She agreed that he was following all the rules but added a new one: “You can’t break useful things.”  He said, “That is ridiculous. I should be able to break anything no one in the family wants anymore.” Mom argued, “Somebody might want them someday.” Max said, “They are ours – we can do with them what we want.”

Answer

[a] In the Torah it says: “You may not cut down fruit trees when you lay siege to a city.” (Deut. 20:19-20)

[b] In the Talmud that becomes a law called Ba’al Tashchit: “It is forbidden to destroy vessels or garments, or tear down buildings or clog up wells, or waste food in a destructive manner.” (Kiddushin 32a)

[c] The Shulchan Arukh makes this even clearer.  It says, “You cannot waste anything which other people will find useful.” (Laws of Body and Soul, 14)

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 116-117

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

3.26.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

In 1974 a big wind knocked down a bunch of power lines in Jerusalem.  The wire was live and carried a lot of current. If someone touched one of the lines, he or she would probably die.  On Saturday morning many Jerusalemites would be leaving their homes in order to go to shul or to soccer games. They would be visiting family and friends – all the things that people do on Shabbat.  At the power company a big argument commenced. Some people said that the power lines had to be fixed during Shabbat in order to keep people safe. Other people said that the power lines could not be fixed until after Shabbat.

Answer

[a] In the Talmud, Yoma 85b, we learn that the rabbis once kindled a fire on Shabbat to save Hillel’s life.  Hillel had been frozen on the roof all night. They taught, “Better to break one Shabbat so that he can live to observe many Shabbatot.”  The basic rule is then taught, “Pikuach nefesh” (saving a life) is a good enough reason for breaking Shabbat.

[b] When the power cable actually went down Rabbi Joshua Neuwirth argued, “Fix it right away – make sure everyone is safe.”

[c] Rabbi Pinha Epstein argued, “Have guards stand until the end of Shabbat, keeping people safe until then.  Then fix it.”

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 114-115

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

3.19.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Uncle Charlie is in the hospital.  He is old and pretty sick. Joe has been left to take care of his equally old dog Kelev.  Joe does a good job of walking and petting, feeding and playing with Kelev, but he gets sick too.  Everyone thinks he misses Uncle Charlie too much. Joe has a big problem. He doesn’t know what to do.  When Uncle Charlie asks about Kelev, should Joe tell the truth or should he lie? His father says, “You always have to tell the truth.”  His mother says, “Charlie isn’t strong enough to hear the truth right now.”

Answer

[a] The Talmud, Shabbat 128b, says that breaking Shabbat and lighting a lamp for a sick blind woman is allowed because knowing that those taking care of her can see might make her feel more comfortable.

[b] The Talmud also teaches us, Moed Katan 23b, that it is wrong to give a patient a sense of hopelessness.

[c] Rabbi J. David Bleich concludes his study of this question by teaching that telling the truth to a sick patient depends on the patient.  Sometimes the patient should be spared. Sometimes the patient will get worse if the truth is discovered.

The answer here is knowing Uncle Charlie and using good judgment.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 112-113

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

3.12.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Jessica has always wanted a cat.  Her parents have always said no. Both sides had very good reasons.  One day Jessica found a cat on the street. It had a collar – a kind-of-new flea collar- but no tags.  She brought it home and fed it. It decided to stay. Her parents said, “You may keep it only until we find the owner.”  Jessica put up signs everywhere. She took out an ad in the local newspaper. She asked everyone. No one knew anything about this cat.  A month went by. Her parents said, “Time is up. We’ve kept the cat you call Mindy as long as we can. Now we have to give her away.” Jessica said, “We promised to keep her until her owner was found.”  Her parents said, “We are never going to find the owner. Time is up.” 

Answer

This case is answered by a single Mishnah.  The Mishnah, Bava Metzia 2:7, says: If someone finds an animal that cannot work or pay for its food, that animal can be sold and the money given to the original owner if he or she is later found. 

The idea of the Mishnah is that one need not lose a significant amount of money (more than the value of the object) to return something.  From the standpoint of the issues of lost and found, Mindy can be sold or given away.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 110-111

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

3.5.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

In 1848 there was a big cholera epidemic in Vilna, Poland.  Lots of Jews were dying. Yom Kippur was approaching. Some Jews argued that no Jew should fast on this Yom Kippur because the lack of food might make people get sick faster.  They argued that this year, skipping the fast would save lives. Their argument was that they needed physical strength. Another group of Jews argued that fasting and repenting was the only way to save lives.  They said that God was the only thing that could keep them safe and heal them. They decided that they needed spiritual strength.

Answer

Rabbi Israel Salanter faced this real problem.  He had to consider a number of texts.

[a] Maimonides teaches that fasting on Yom Kippur is a major mitzvah:  “A positive mitzvah concerning Yom Kippur is that we are required to abstain from eating and drinking on that day.  This is taught in Leviticus 19:28, ‘You shall afflict yourself.” Our tradition explains that ‘afflict’ means ‘fasting.’  If a person fasts on Yom Kippur, s/he fulfills a positive mitzvah; if a person eats or drinks, he both breaks a positive mitzvah and violates a negative mitzvah, as it is taught in Leviticus 23:2 ‘One who will not fast on that day will be cut off.’” (Yom Kippur 1:40)

[b] However, he also teaches: “The Shabbat is overruled whenever danger to life is involved, just as we do with all other mitzvot.  Therefore, we may attend to the needs of a sick person who is in danger as prescribed by their physicians, and we may violate, on his behalf, even one hundred Shabbatot, so long as he stands in need and is in danger, or if the matter is in any doubt.

It is forbidden to delay in any way, violating the Shabbat in order to help the dangerously ill, as it says in Leviticus 18:5, ‘And he shall live by them.’  This means a person shall live by the mitzvot and should not die from observing them. You see the laws of Torah do not breathe vengeance, but rather mercy, loving kindness, and peace.”  (Shabbat 2;3)

[c] On the eve of Yom Kippur, Israel Salanter appeared on the bimah and publically ate – urging all of the Jewish community not to fast that year.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 106-107

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.27.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

This question was once asked of the Maharashal (Rabbi Shlomo Luria, Lublin, Poland, 1510-1573):  Should a blind person light a Hanukkiyah [Hanukkah menorah]? What makes this question hard is this:  the point of lighting a Hanukkiyah is seeing the flames and remembering the miracle. A blind person cannot see the flames.

Answer

[a] It is not a mitzvah for every person to light his or her own Hanukkah menorah.  The Talmud says (Shabbat 21b): “Each household is required to light a Hanukkiyah. Having each person in the family light his own a Hanukkah light is an enhancement of the mitzvah.”

[b]  Based on this, Maharashal wrote:  “If he is part of a family, he should join in lighting (with someone else handling the flame.)  If he lives with others who are not his family, he should contribute money to oil or candles but should not do the actual lighting.  If he lives alone, he should light his own Hanukkah lights with the help of someone else.”

[c] The mitzvah of wearing tzitzit is just as important.  About them the Torah makes it clear “That when you see them” (Numbers 15;39) is the reason we wear them  Still, a blind man is required to wear them. The same should be true of a Hanukkiyah.

  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 97-98

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.20.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

For the first time ever, Carol went shopping with her mother’s credit card.  She got to pick out the clothes she wanted. She came home with a lime-green plastic skirt, silver platform sandals, a yellow top, and an orange angora sweater. She went upstairs and got all dressed up – makeup and the works.  She put music on and paraded like a model down the stairs. She asked everyone what they thought. Mom put a smile on her face and said, “You must have worked very hard to put this outfit together. It is lovely, dear.” Dad said, “It is interesting.”  Carol ran upstairs crying. She shouted, “If you didn’t like it, you could have lied.” Mother turned to Dad and said, “You should have lied.” Dad answered, “I try to never lie.”

Answer

[a] In Judaism truth is really important.  EMET is the Hebrew word for truth. Resh Lakish said: “Tav is the end of the seal of the Holy One.”  Rabbi Hanina said: “The seal of the Holy One is EMET.’ Rabbi Samuel ben Nachman said: “The EMET stands for people who fulfilled the Torah from ALEF to TAV.”  ALEF is the first letter in the Hebrew Alef-Bet. TAV is the last letter. EMET is made up of ALEF, MEM, and TAV. MEM is the middle letter in the Hebrew Alef-Bet (Shabbat 55a).

[b] Yet there are models for lying.  At the school of Rabbi Ishmael it was taught: Great is the cause of peace, seeing that for its sake even the Holy One told a half-truth.  We are told that Sarah said, “How can I have a child with an old husband?” (Genesis 18:12). When God retold her words to Abraham, God said that Sarah said, “How can I have a child when I am so old?” (18:13).

[c] But this is the text that is most directly to the point.  In the Talmud, Ketubot 16a, Hillel and Shammai have the same argument.  They discuss telling a bride she is beautiful. Hillel says, “Every bride is beautiful.”  Shammai asks, “How can you tell a lame bride she is beautiful?” Hillel says, “Look at it this way.  If a man spends a lot of time and money picking out and buying something, it is precious to him. One says to him, ‘You have picked perfectly.’  So it is with a bride.” Hillel wins.  

Dad should say something believably nice about the outfit.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 95-96

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.13.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg (z”l) pioneered the use of “moral dilemmas” in values education. Here is his most famous case:

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer.  There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered.  The drug was expensive to make, and the druggist was charging ten times what it cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium and charged $4,000 for a small dose of the drug.  The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he was only able to raise about $2,000. Heinz asked the druggist to sell it to him cheaper or let him pay later.  The druggist said, “No, I discovered the drug, and I’m going to make money from it.” So, having tried every legal means, Heinz got desperate and considered breaking into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz steal the drug?

Answer

[a] Saving another person’s life is an obligation.  Anyone who can save someone’s life and does not do so transgresses: “You shall not stand by the blood of your neighbors.” (Leviticus 19:16).  Similarly, if one sees a neighbor drowning in the sea, accosted by robbers, or attacked by wild animals and can save the neighbor personally or can hire others to save the neighbor and does not act, he transgresses “You shall not stand by the blood of your brother” (Sanhedrin 74a; Maimonides, laws of Theft 1:14).

[b]  However, the cost of saving a life is not always simple.  If X was chasing another, Y, to kill him/her, and Y broke some things while s/he was fleeing, there are two cases:

          [1] If they belonged to X, the person fleeing need not pay, because his/her life is more valuable than the broken property.

          [2] But if they belong to someone else, then Y must pay, because s/he can’t save her/his own life at a neighbor’s expense.

          If Z was chasing X in order to save Y’s life and Z broke something along the way, it does not matter if it belonged to X or Y or another person; Z is not responsible for what is broken.  Because            if we do not make this rule, no one will try to save a neighbor from a pursuer (Sanhedrin 72a).

[c] Rabbi Mark Dratch: Based on Sanhedrin 74a, Heinz may steal the medicine to save his wife’s life, and he need not pay for it or be considered a criminal.  He is saving another’s life. 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 93-94

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

2.6.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Zelda and her mother love garage sales.  They are very good at finding real treasures among the junk.  One day they are hunting at a garage sale down the block. It is Dahlia and her mother’s garage sale.  Zelda and Dahlia are in the same class at school. Zelda and her mother find a vase on sale for seventy-five cents. Zelda’s mother knows that it is worth hundreds of dollars because it is a signed piece from an important porcelain designer.  The next day at school Zelda tells Dahlia in a nice, not a mean way, what a good buy the vase was. That afternoon Dahlia’s mother calls up Zelda’s mother and demands the vase back. She says to Zelda, “You cheated me and bought it way too cheaply.”  Zelda’s mother says, “I bought it at the price you asked.”  

What is fair and just here?

Answer

In Maimonides, The Laws of Acquisition, we learn:

[a] That both a buyer and seller must be honest in transactions.  Neither can cheat or defraud the other [12:1).

[b] Making more than a twenty percent profit on something is considered dishonest, and the laws of fraud say that the deal should be canceled or the difference (up to twenty percent) should be repaid (12:4).

[c] These rules of unfair profit apply only to necessities of life, things like food, clothing, etc.  When it comes to luxuries, a buyer and seller may charge and pay what they want (14:2). Porcelain vases are luxuries, so the deal is legal (if not fair).  Zelda’s mother can keep the vase (but Zelda may lose a friend).

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 91-92

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

1.30.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Sol Goldstein was a very famous Holocaust survivor who lived in Chicago.  He was the one who organized the 1978 protest against a Nazi march in Skokie.  He also made a large pledge to the Jewish United Fund; when he died $666,000 was still unpaid.  Now that his children have inherited his estate, they have refused to pay the remainder of the pledge.

The children argue that their father’s commitments are not theirs – charitable contributions are matters of the heart.  The children agree to give this amount to charity – but not the charity their father chose. The UJF has brought suit, claiming that a charitable pledge is to be regarded as a legally binding contract.

Answer

[a] A husband and wife had an agreement that if she died first, 20,000 dinars would go to their children and 10,000 dinars would go to him.  On her deathbed she changed her mind. She still wanted 20,000 dinars to go to the children and grandchildren, but now she wanted 10,000 to go to the synagogue.  The husband went to the rabbi and asked if she had the right to change the original agreement.

[b] Rabbi Betzalel wrote: “The heirs do not take title while the person making the promise is still alive.  The case is indisputable; a will may be changed. The synagogue is entitled to the 10,000 dinars.”

By rabbinic law the heirs of Sol Gordon must make good on his pledges.

[c] In a Chicago court it was also found that the heirs of Sol Gordon must make good on their father’s pledge because of the expectation created by the pledge.  People were hired, rents were paid, programs were begun based on an expectation of three years of funding.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 89-90

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

1.23.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

David was in college.  He rented a room from Mrs. Schwartz.  The two of them worked out a deal. David would schlep his laundry and her laundry to the laundromat and back.  Mrs. Schwartz would do all the laundry. David thought it was great, almost the deal that he and his father had during high school.  That afternoon David picked up a bag that had been left for him on the back porch. He only made a few stops along the way. The rain didn’t bother him that much.  And because the laundry was going to be washed, it didn’t matter if it got soaked. It didn’t matter except that Mrs. Schwartz had packed the colored things on top, and they bled down into her whites.  She tried bleaching out everything she could but some things were ruined. She said, “David should pay for the ruined clothes because he was careless.” David said, “She didn’t warn me that there was a need to be careful.  I am sorry, but it is not my fault.”  

Answer

[a] Rabbi Solomon ben Simon Duran once solved a similar case.  In his case a man transported wool goods on his donkeys. The dyed goods were on the first donkey, the white goods on the second donkey.  When they hit the river the dye spread onto the white goods and ruined them.  

Rabbi Duran, the Rashbash, ruled that the donkey driver was responsible because he was entrusted to get the goods to market.  When one is entrusted, one is responsible for all negligence (Bava Metzia 82b).

[b] Rabbi Meir said: “If a person moved a barrel for a neighbor from one place to another and in doing so broke it, whether he was paid or not he has to replace the barrel unless he takes an oath that the breakage was not a matter of negligence.”  Rabbi Judah ruled: “An unpaid person must swear; a paid person is responsible.”  

When the rain started David should have checked the bag to see what could be ruined.  He is responsible.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 87-88

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.16.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

During the Holocaust, Nazi doctors immersed subjects in near-freezing water to see how long the people lived.  They died. The experiment was repeated over and over. Hundreds of people were killed, the scientist was branded a murderer, but the work was meticulously detailed and was published.  Twenty-five years later, during the Vietnam war, U.S. pilots were shot down over the Indochina Sea. The Air Force needed to know how long to search for pilots and when to give up. To save money and save lives the search and rescue team commander unhesitantly reached for a book with data from the Nazi experiments.

Should this book be destroyed?  Can one use information gained by unjust means, even when of critical benefit?  Won’t this data encourage others to conduct similar gruesome experiments?

Answer

[a]  Cleopatra’s experimentation on the wombs of servants she murdered (Nidda 30b). A story is told that Cleopatra, the Queen of Alexandria, sentenced her handmaids to death by royal decree.  They were subjected to a test, and it was found that both male and female embryos were fully fashioned on the forty-first day.

Rashi (commentary): “They were impregnated and killed at various points in their pregnancies so that Cleopatra could understand the development inside the womb.”

[b]  Rabbi Ishmael’s students learning the number of bones in a human body from a woman put to death by the king (Bekhorot 45a).  Rabbi Judah quoted Samuel: “The disciples of Rabbi Ishmael once dissected the body of a prostitute who had been condemned to be burnt by the king.  They examined it and found two hundred and fifty-two joints and limbs.”

[c]  Rabbi Baruch Cohen investigated this question in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, Spring 1990.  He concluded that complete censorship of this data would be foolish when human lives can be saved.  But, quoting Robert J. Lifton, he adds, “this data should only be used when it also fully exposes the evil things the Nazis did.”

[d]  Lord Immanuel Jakobovits, former Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, also concludes: “Using this data in no way gives meaning to the deaths that created it – and it would be wrong to suggest that they died for a purpose.” 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 81-82

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

2.9.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Debbie is spending her summer vacation on rollerskates.  She is not at the rink. She is not practicing her dancing.  She is not doing double axels. Instead she skates over to cars and asks: “Do you want fries with that?”  She is a waitress at a newly created 1950s drive-in. One day in the parking lot she finds a gold coin purse with $280 in it.  She turns it in to Lost and Found. It stays there for a month. After a month she asks if anyone has claimed the purse. The owner tells her, “You can keep the purse if you want, but I am taking the money.”  Debbie says, “But I found it.” The owner says, “But you found it in my parking lot while I was paying you to say ‘Do you want fries with that?’” Because they both belong to the same synagogue, they go to the rabbi to solve the conflict. 

Answer

[a]  A suggestion was made that the found money should be given to tzedakah.  

While the money may be given to tzedakah, Jewish law does not require that it be given away.  In the Mishnah, Bava Metzia 2:2, we learn; “If you find one of the following things you must try to return them: Money in a purse, an empty purse, a pile of money.”

In the previous Mishnah, Bava Metzia 2.1, we learn: “The following found objects may just be kept: scattered money, small sheaves of grain in public areas, loaves of baker’s bread.”

Based on this text we learn that once we attempt to find the person who lost the purse and the money, it can be kept.  It need not be given to tzedakah. 

[b] In Mishnah 6 of the same chapter we learn that after a reasonable amount of time trying to find the owner, the finder can keep what is found.  Mishnah 4 talks about a find in a store. It says if the find is behind the counter, the store owner keeps it; if it is in front of the counter (like in the parking lot), the finder keeps the find.  

[c] In the Gemara, Bava Metzia 12a, we learn that if someone works for a wage for another person, she or he may keep what he or she finds on the job, unless collecting funds is part of the job.

The bottom line: Debbie can keep the money and the purse.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 79-80

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

1.2.20


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Everyone knew that Roger was a thief.  He had been caught many times. Judy’s video game was missing from her desk.  Everyone suspected Roger. Judy went over and asked Roger. He said, “No way!”  Even so, Aviva saw it in his desk. She recognized it from the Band-Aid that held the lid over the batteries shut.  The week that Judy had bought it she had dropped it, and Aviva had fixed it with a purple Band-Aid with flowers all over it.  They got into a big argument over what to do. Aviva wanted Judy to just steal her game back from Roger. Judy said, “Stealing is wrong – even from a thief.  I would go tell Morah Sarah, our teacher.” Sivan heard them talking and said, “Squealing would be wrong, too. The three of us should go to Roger and tell him that we know – and that he has to give it back.” 

Answer

[a] In the Torah it says: “You shall not steal” (Exodus 20.13).  In Leviticus we find the same commandment: “ You shall not steal, you shall not deal falsely, and you shall not lie to one another: You shall not swear falsely by My name, thereby desecrating the Name of your God – I am the Eternal. “ (Leviticus 19: 11-12)  

[b] The rabbis wanted to know why this commandment was repeated.  In the Sifra, a midrash on Leviticus, Ben BagBag explains that the Leviticus version of this mitzvah means, “ Do not even steal back from a thief that which s/he has stolen from you, so that you will not appear to be a thief yourself.”

Ben BagBag learned this from the rest of the verse, which is all about deceit.  It is Dealing Falsely even if it is not actually stealing. It is meant to keep society from becoming a mess, with people stealing and stealing back.  

[c] A little bit further on in Leviticus 19 it says: “You must not hate your brother or sister in your heart.  You must certainly rebuke your neighbor. (“Rebuke” is giving them negative feedback that could help them.) And not carry a sin because of them.” (Lev. 19:17)

The rabbis were interested in the arrangement of this verse, with three mitzvot jammed into one sentence. Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch explains the connection between (1) and (2):  “You shall not hate… in your heart. The verse speaks of your enemy as your brother. Even though he wronged you, think of him as a brother and do not fall prey to hatred.

The Sifra explained the connection between (2) and (3):”And do not bear a sin because of him.”  It is a mitzvah to rebuke someone who has wronged you – but if you do it the wrong way, you will be sinning.  Be careful not to embarrass the person.

In this case the rabbis want you to confront the thief and perform the mitzvah of tokhekhah (rebuke), or if that will not work, they want you to use the courts – in this case, the teachers.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 61-63

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

12.19.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Three twelve-year-old boys were seen shoplifting some candy from a local store near the synagogue just before Hebrew school.  The owner of the store, upset by the repeated robbery of his goods, walked into the synagogue and found the principal’s office.  Together they walked through the halls and found Simon, one of the boys he recognized. When confronted, Simon confessed to the crime, returned the candy that was still in his pocket and agreed to take whatever punishment would be dished out.  On the other hand, he refused to “squeal” on his two partners. The principal told Simon that revealing the names of the other two thieves was the right thing to do. Simon disagreed, saying that while he would take the punishment that he deserved, it was not honorable to get anyone else in trouble.

Answer

Does a thief have to turn in his partners in crime?

[a] Leviticus 19:16 teaches that you cannot let a neighbor be physically hurt: DO NOT STAND BY WHILE YOUR NEIGHBOR’S BLOOD IS SHED.

[b] In Deuteronomy 21:1-3 the same lesson is expanded to guarding your neighbor’s property  IF YOU SEE YOUR NEIGHBOR’S OX OR SHEEP LOST, YOU MUST NOT IGNORE IT…YOU MUST DO THE SAME THING FOR ANYTHING THAT IS YOUR NEIGHBOR’S – YOU MUST NOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT.

The Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b, makes this clear by saying: “If a person sees flood waters approaching someone else’s field, that person must make a barrier or a dam and try to stop them in order to prevent damage to the neighbor’s property.”

[c] Later legal sources (Mishnah Torah, Laws of Robbery, 1:13, Shulchan Aruch, Hoshen Mishpat 426:1, Mappah on Hoshen Mishpat 388:11, etc) expand this law to require the revealing of information when a neighbor will experience financial loss as well.  

Jewish law makes it clear that every witness to a crime – even one of the criminals – is obligated to come forward and testify. 

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 44-45

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

12.12.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

David has ADHD.  It was much worse when he was younger.  Then he could never sit still and never do anything for very long.  Everyone used to say, “Dave has ants in his pants” and stuff like that.  Now that he is fifteen, he has learned to control himself better. He has also gotten good at knowing when he needs to take his Ritalin and when he can get away with skipping it.  Once, when he was eight or nine, a counselor at day camp said to him sarcastically, “David, think ‘Sludge’ and just ooze somewhere slowly – just for once.” From that day on his nickname at camp was “Sludge.”  He never liked the name. He was hurt by the name, but he got used to it. All of a sudden, this week, Karen (a girl he really likes) remembered the name and started calling him “Sludge” again. Now a bunch of his old friends have picked it up.  None of them even remembers the story of how it started. For them it is an act of love – a pet name. For David it still hurts.

You are David’s best friend.  He shares his feelings with you.  What should you do?

Answer

[a] In the Torah it says: “You shall not curse the deaf, and you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind; you shall fear the Lord you God – I am the Eternal.”

Ramban, Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman, a Sefardic commentator, taught: “When you put a stumbling block before a blind person he can trip and fall and be hurt.  When you curse a deaf person how can she be hurt by words she cannot hear? The answer is easy: Even though she cannot hear the curse, she can still be lessened in the eyes of the others and therefore angered or embarrassed by them.”  If one may not insult a person who cannot hear, it is certainly wrong to hurt someone who is aware of what is being done to him.

According to the rabbis, saying anything that lessens the way other people think of a person is forbidden.  An insulting nickname is clearly a violation of this mitzvah.

[b]  There is a Bible story you probably did not learn in Hebrew school.  In Genesis 9:22 we learn that after the flood Noah gets drunk. His son Ham walks into his tent and then goes outside and tells his brothers about it.  The Chofetz Chaim, a Polish teacher who specialized in studying the use of words, taught: “Ham committed two sins. First, he failed to cover up his father and stop him from embarrassing himself.  More importantly, because he went outside and told others about Noah’s condition, Ham was cursed by God because he failed to protect his father’s dignity.”

[c] The Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, Chapter 63, teaches: “If a person has an unpleasant nickname, even if s/he has become used to it and is no longer embarrassed when it is used, another person should not call him/her by this nickname (if the intention is to embarrass him/her).  To do so would be ‘wronging with words.’”

This helps – but not completely.  The friend should clearly stop using the nickname but has to decide if there is a way of stopping others from using it without further embarrassing David.  Causing more embarrassment (by explaining the name) might well be worse.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 58-60

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

12.5.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

George Lane was buried in a Jewish cemetery in Philadelphia.  After the burial the local board of rabbis tried to have him dug up and moved elsewhere.  The problem was that after the burial the authorities learned that George was an active Messianic Jew who accepted Jesus and who continued that faith up to the moment he died.  Before the burial the family had told the cemetery that they were Jewish and had always been Jewish. There were no conversions in the family. They later said, “Our lifestyle is Jewish from beginning to end, but we know that Jesus, Yeshua, is the Messiah.  We are just amazed that they made such an issue of it.”

Should George Lane, who spent much of his life trying to get other Jews to accept Jesus as God, be considered a Jew?  Should he remain buried in a Jewish cemetery?

Answer

[a] In the Talmud it teaches: “Even though they sin, they are still called Israel” (Sanhedrin 44a).  This is understood to mean that no matter what sin a Jew commits (including conversion to another religion), he or she is always still considered to be a Jew.  This is also true of a Jew-by-choice. From the moment of conversion, he or she is now “stuck” being a Jew forever.

[b] An Israeli secular court ruled: “Anyone born of a Jewish mother who has not converted to another religion is to be considered a Jew for purposes of the Law of Return (Brother Daniel Case).

[c] The American Reform Movement has decided that “anyone born of a Jewish parent who has been raised in a consistent pattern of Jewish involvement is to be considered a Jew (CCAR).

By traditional understandings, George Lane is a Jew.

[d]  We are also taught in the Talmud: “You do not bury a righteous person next to an evil person” (Sanhedrin 47a).  Commentaries define an evil person as a (a) murderer, (b) sex offender, or (c) apostate (a Jew who tries to convert Jews to other religions).

NOTE:

The commentaries on Gittin 61a make it clear that Christians may not be buried in a Jewish cemetery.  When Jews and non-Jews share a communal cemetery, a wall must be built between a Jew and a non-Jew. In a Conservative responsum, Rabbi Ben Zion Bergman argues with Moshe Feinstein (Orthodox) that the non-Jewish spouse of a Jew can be buried in a Jewish cemetery.  Feinstein says no, even ruling that Conservative converts should be treated as non-Jews. Bergman, while not authorizing the burial of non-Jewish family members by Conservative rabbis, says that a Conservative Jew need not object to burial by Reform rabbis. Bergman argues, “It is wrong to consider a person who supported the Jewish community and raised Jewish children to be evil.”

If George Lane had not already been buried, his burial in a Jewish cemetery would be forbidden under traditional Jewish law because he would be considered an apostate, and that would define him as evil.   However, Jewish law also (a) forbids the embarrassment of a living person and (b) demands that the bodies of the dead be treated with respect. In this case, the final rabbinic decision was to build a wall one brick high around the grave of George Lane to inform the family that this was not a precedent for the burial of additional Messianic Jews.  They also forbid the use of Christian symbols on the headstone.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 53-55

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

11.28.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

In Dante’s Peak (whether you saw it or not) there is a great ethical dilemma.  Grandma lives up on the mountain. She is warned about the volcano erupting and refuses to come down.  The adults, knowing the danger, are really frustrated but know that it is too late to go get her. The kids cry and complain, but the adults explain the situation. Then, while the adults are busy doing other necessary things, the twelve-year-old boy and the ten-year-old girl steal Mom’s truck and head up the mountain toward the erupting volcano to save Grandma.

Answer

Dante’s Peak suggests the question, “Can two kids try to outrun the lava in order to rescue their grandmother?

[a] Jewish law draws a distinction between safek sakaneh (possible danger) and vadai sakaneh (certain danger).  Maimonides teaches: “One may risk safek sakaneh in order to save another person, but not vadai sakaneh (Kesef Mishneh).

[b] This idea is rooted in Leviticus 18:5: “You shall keep My laws and My rules, you shall act on them, You shall live by them.”  The idea is that no mitzvah is worth dying for (except the three: not murdering, not sexually assaulting and not committing public adultery).

[c] The problem in the film is that the kids believe that the rescue is possible, the mother and the other adults that it is impossible, Normally the adults would win because of the commandment of Honor your Father and Mother.  However, Rashi on Leviticus 19:2 makes it clear that you need not obey your parents when they ask you to violate the Torah. (Not saving a life when possible would be a Torah violation.) So it all boils down to how sure the kids are that the life is savable.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 51-52

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

11/21/19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Aunt Bertha had a hard year.  She had to borrow money from almost everyone in the family.  She owed maybe $10,000 to various family members. All of a sudden her business picked up, she began to make money again and she began to repay her debt.  Then all of a sudden she sent Debbie a check for $250 for her twelfth birthday (where usually family members got $25). Debbie was concerned. She knew about Aunt Bertha’s financial troubles.  She called Aunt Bertha to ask if the check had been made out for the right amount. Bertha told her, “I am having the best year, my dear, and I wanted to do something nice for you.” Debbie was concerned Bertha still owed thousands of dollars to members of the family.  She asked her father if she should keep the money for the sake of shalom bayit (good feelings and peace in the family) or return it and ask her to just give $25 a year until she could pay everyone back.

Answer

Aunt Bertha owed a lot of money to members of the family and still gave Debbie a too-expensive birthday gift.  Should it be returned?

[a] In the Talmud (Bava Batra 74a) Rabbi Papa and Rabbi Huna ben Joshua have an argument.  Rabbi Papa believes that the repayment of a loan is a mitzvah. Rabbi Huna believed that it is just a legal obligation.  While most opinions agrees with Rabbi Huna, the bottom line is that (1) anyone who does not pay back a loan is considered wicked, and (2) when no period is stated in the loan, one should begin repaying it after thirty days.

[b] Encouraging Aunt Bertha to pay back her loans as quickly as possible is the right thing to do.

[c] However, the Torah is also concerned with human dignity.  In the Midrash we are told: “Everytime you embarrass another person, you make God less.  Everytime you make another person feel smaller, you make God smaller in the world, because people are created in God’s image” (Genesis Rabbah 24.7).

Therefore, to try to follow both commands Debbie must find a way of refusing the overly large gift without making Aunt Bertha feel bad.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 48-49

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

11.7.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

It was a very tricky question.  In honor of Deborah’s bat mitzvah, her grandmother Ruth wanted to donate a new Torah cover she had sewn to the congregation.  It was really beautiful. The problem was that Grandmother Ruth, who was born a Jew, converted to Chriatianity to marry her second husband Frank, long after Deborah’s mother Pam was already an adult.  The congregation had to decide two things: (1) Is it okay to dress the Torah in a gift given by a non-Jew? (2) Is there a difference between a gift given by a non-Jew and a gift given by a Jew who is now actively practicing another religion?

Answer

Sometime around 1460 Rabbi Yisrael Brunna solved a similar case in Prague.  He teaches two lessons:

[a] The Talmud says that the Temple in Jerusalem (Nazir 62a) accepted pledges and free-will offerings from non-Jews.  Our synagogues should do the same.

[b] The Talmud states that we do not accept gifts to the Temple from Jews who have converted to another religion. (Eruvin 69b).

[c] While Rabbi Brunna uses this passage to reject the gift from the Christian grandmother, that  may not be there only reading.

In a similar Reform responsa Walter Jacobs points out that the gifts from the Temple mentioned in Eruvin were connected to idolatry. Here we may see Christians not as pagans, but as ethical monotheists.  He writes: “Such gifts are acceptable as long as they are used in accordance with the desires of the congregation.”

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 39-40

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

10.31.19


 Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

It is Sunday afternoon and Bob is working on a new plastic model kit of one of the star cruisers from Star Wars.  In the middle of the work he runs out of glue. He tears his room apart and finds that this was his last tube. He gets on his bike and rides to Geoff’s house.  Geoff has a whole box of tubes. Geoff says to Bob, “Because I like you, I’ll do you a favor. I’ll sell you a $1.79 tube for $5. Otherwise, you can wait until the model shop opens again on Monday.”  Bob says, “It’s robbery, but I’ll pay for it.” He takes the tube and finishes the model. Later, his older brother tells him it was robbery. The two of them go and demand that Geoff return $3. Geoff says, “You knew what I was doing.  You agreed. A deal is a deal.”

Answer

Geoff overcharged Bob for a tube of glue he really wanted.  Now Bob wants Geoff to refund the overcharge.

[a] In the Talmud there is a category called ona’ah moneh that covers overcharging.  There are two basic rules: (1) You cannot charge more than twenty percent of the “regular” price of something without telling the buyer about the overcharge.  (2) You can never charge more than twenty percent over the usual price of basic necessities (bread, eggs, milk, grain, etc.) (Bava Metzia 49b).

So normally Geoff would be able to keep the profit, because he made the price difference clear to Bob.

[b] Bava Kamma 115a tells the story of a guy who was escaping from Roman soldiers and so agreed to pay a ferry pilot three times the normal price to take him over the river in order to escape.  Later the rabbis made the ferry pilot return the excess fare (because he was taking advantage of the situation).  

[c] Rabbi Joel Sirkes (1561-1640) applied that text to the case of a businessman who intentionally paid too much for goods in order to complete a shipment.  Later he, too, took the matter to court and got everything past the twenty percent extra profit back – even though he had agreed to the price at the time.

He got his money back, and so should Bob.

 Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 37-38

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

10.24.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

It was a scam – but it was for a good purpose.  It happened at a synagogue meeting. Sara was the chairperson.  The purpose was to raise money for a new school building. The idea was to get everyone to fill out a pledge on a card.  To get the ball rolling, Dana, Sidney and Marcia, a few of the synagogue’s Leaders, stood up and announced their personal pledges.  They were large and impressive. Then the pledge cards and pencils were passed out. Later that night, when David, the synagogue treasurer, was going over the cards, he noticed that the actual pledges by Dana, Sidney and Marcia were less than half of what they had announced publicly.  He went to Sara and asked, “What should we do?” Sara said, “Nothing. That was the plan, to announce large pledges to ‘get the ball rolling’ – to encourage the others in the congregation to give freely.” David, said, “A false pledge is unethical – we should go to the congregation amd tell them the truth.”  Sara said, “Cool your jets – it was all in the name of Jewish education.”

Answer

Can you lie in order to raise more money for a good cause? 

[a] In the Talmud, Sukkot 29a, we find:  “God causes people to lose their wealth because of four acts: (1) keeping bills which have been paid (so they can be collected again): (2) lending money with interest; (3) having the power to protest [against wrongdoing] and remaining silent; and (4) people who publicly declare their intention to give a specified sum for charity and do not give that sum.”

The Talmud says that “God will punish such acts, even if they are done for a good purpose.”

[b] The Maharsha, Rabbi Shmuel ha-Levi Eidels (1555-1631), was the rabbi of Chelm (for real, as well as of Lublin and Ostraha).  He was also a Talmudic commentator. He explained that this ruling in Sukkot is not just about people who make large pledges so that they will look important, but also about active members of the community who make large pledges they have no intention of paying, but who do do to motivate others to give.

[c] Rabbi Yitzhak Yaacov Weiss, a twentieth-century rabbi who served as a Beit Din judge in Grosswardein, Romania, Manchester, England, and Jerusalem, solved a case almost like this one.  It is in his book Minhat Yitzchak (no. 3:97), where he says, “This has been a custom since time immemorial, and our sages have always frowned upon it, including making it among the four failings for which severe punishment is exacted.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 35-36

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

10.17.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Jody is one of those kids who walks down the street phone booth by phone booth.  At every phone booth she stops and checks for change. Every now and then she picks up an odd dime or quarter this way.  One day she walks by a phone, finds more than two dollars in change and yells for joy. She starts to scoop put the money.  All of a sudden a woman with a camera around her neck screams from the other side of the street, “Stop, that’s my money!” Jody says, “No way.  It was sitting right here in a public phone and I found it. Your name wasn’t on it.” The woman said, “I was on the phone and saw the blue-breasted robin I had been hunting for.  I hung up with my mother and went to take a picture. Now I am on my way back to get the change.” Jody said, “If that’s the case, tell me how much money there is.” The woman said, “I don’t know.  I put eight dollars in quarters and started to talk. I don’t know how much change the phone gave me, but it’s mine.” The argument went on for a while.

Who should get the money?

Answer

The Mishnah gives us very clear ground rules for when we can keep something we find and when we need to try and return it to the person who lost it.

[a] In Bava Metzia 2:1 we are told: “One may just keep (without trying to return) the following loss objects: (1) scattered fruit, (2) scattered money, (3) small sheaves of grain in public areas, (4) cake of figs, (5) loaves of baker’s bread, (6) strings of fish, (7) raw wool shearings, (8) bundles of flax, (9) strips of purple wool.  So says Rabbi Meir.”

[b]  In Bava Metzia 2:2 we are told; “One must try to return the following lost objects: (1) fruit in a container, (2) an empty container, (3) money in a purse, (4) an empty purse, (5) a pile of fruit, (6) a pile of money, (7) three coins in a stack, (8) small sheaves of grain on private property, (9) homemade loaves of bread, (10) processed wool shearings, (11) jars of oil or wine.

Had the woman known the amount of the change, it would have been like “three coins in a pile.”  Because she didn’t, it is like “scattered coins.’

[c} In Bava Metzia 2:1 we are given the basic principle.  “Rabbi Judah says: ‘Everything unusual must be advertised.’”  Based on the Mishnah, because the coins could not be identified, Jody may keep the money.  Though that may not be the fairest thing, it is the most practical solution. However, if the woman can describe anything about the coins, Jody must give them to her.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 33-34

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

10.10.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Danny is eight.  His best friend, Robbie, is also eight.  They do everything together. Their fathers used to be best friends, too.  The problem started when Danny’s father borrowed a lawn mower from Robbie’s father.  The next time Robbie’s father went to use the lawn mower for his lawn it was broken. He blamed Danny’s dad.  Danny’s dad said, “It worked fine when I returned it.” The lawn mower was the start of a big fight. Things got worse and worse.  It made it harder and harder for Danny and Robbie to hang out together. Then one day Danny’s father said to him, “I don’t want you playing with Robbie anymore – and I want you to listen to me, because I am your father.”  Danny asked his rabbi the following question: “I know that the Torah says ‘Honor your father and mother,’ but do I have to honor him when he’s being stupid?”

Answer

Can Robbie’s and Danny’s fathers stop them from being best friends?

[a] One of the 613 mitzvot is Leviticus 19:17: “Do not hate your brother/sister in your heart.”

Some commentators explain that brother/sister means another Jew; others say that it means any other person.  Therefore, Danny’s father’s attitude and behavior are against the Torah.  

[b]  Rabbi Asher Ben Yechiel, who was known as the Rosh, lived in Toledo, Spain, in the early 1300s actually had to solve a case like this.  He started with Rashi’s comment on Leviticus 19:2. The verse says: (1) “Every person must “fear” his/her mother and father, (2) and all of you shall keep my Shabbatot, (3) I am the Eternal, Your God.”

RASHI: “Why are all three parts of the verse packed into one sentence?  To teach this lesson. That (1) you must ‘obey’ your parents unless they tell you (2) that you must violate the Shabbat or break any other Torah commandment, because (3) I am the Eternal, and I am God to them and God to you.  Parental authority is absolute unless they tell you to go against the Torah. God is the final word.”

[c] The Rosh said, “By giving such an order the father was acting in an unJewish manner.  This being so, the son need not obey him.”

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 27-28

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

10.4.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Deborah’s Hebrew school teacher made a big deal out of teaching the class that the big mitzvah of Hanukkah is to “advertise the miracle.”  She said that the real idea was to let everyone see your hanukkiyah and to tell the story of hanukkah to as many people as possible. Deborah told this to her parents, and she and her father spend the next week working in the garage making a huge oil-burning hanukkiyah.  When Hanukkah came they put it on the front lawn. The hanukkiyah was so large that lights six, seven and eight stuck out into the street. On the last night of hanukkah, Zvi was walking past Deborah’s house to a Hanukkah party, carrying a whole bunch of balloons. At just the wrong moment the wind picked up and blew the balloons into light eighth, and they exploded and up in flames.  The wind took the burning ribbon and plastic and blew it into Fido’s doghouse, which burned down. Of course, there was a big fight over who should rebuild the doghouse – Deborah of Zvi.

Who is responsible for paying for Fido’s doghouse?  Is this negligence or an act of God?

Answer

[a} In the Mishna  of Bava Kamma 6:6 we find:

“If a camel was loaded with flax and was walking on a public street, and some of the flax stuck into a shop and caught fire on the storekeeper’s lamp, and in turn the building caught fire, the camel owner would be responsible.  If the lamp was outside the store, then the store owner would be responsible. If the lamp was outside the store, then the store owner must pay. But if the lamp was a hanukkiyah, the camel owner must pay.”

Therefore Zvi is responsible for what his flaming balloons did, even though the hanikkiya was sticking out into the street.  If it had been any other kind of fire, Deborah’s family would have to pay.

[b] The Talmud made an exception for hanukkiyot because of the rule: “The mitzvah of Hanukkah is to advertise the miracle” (Shabbat 21b).  

There are two notions: (a) That on Hanukkah one should have an expectation of public hanukkiyot and therefore be careful.  And (b) that rather than make people fearful of showing off their hanukkiyot and doing Hanukkah in a big way, hanukkiyot are given a liability exception.  That is a unique and special Hanukkah law.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 25-26

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

9.26.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

The movie The War with Kevin Costner and Elijah Wood echoes a famous Talmudic case.  In the movie the Costner character is in Vietnam and carries a wounded friend for miles to save his life.  When he is rescued by the helicopter he finds out that there is room for only one on this helicopter (it cannot lift any more weight).  And he finds out this is the last helicopter. He must choose between saving himself and saving his very badly wounded and fairly-certain-to-die friend.  (In the Talmud, we have a case where two men are in the desert and only once has a canteen. If they share, both will die.)

Answer

[b] In the Talmud, Bava Metzia 62a, we find the case:

“Two people are traveling on a journey far from civilization.  One of them has a pitcher of water. If they share the water, they will both die, but if only one drinks, he can reach civilization.  What should they do?”

“The Son of Patura taught: It is better that both drink and die, rather than that one should behold his companion’s death.”

Rabbi Akiba won the argument by quoting Leviticus 25:36 where it says:

“If your brother/sister becomes poor and near you – his hand falters- you shall hold onto him … so that s/he can live with you.

Rabbi Akiba emphasized the words “with you.”  He said that they established a principle that we don’t reject one life to save another.  Therefore, you don’t share the water when both of you will die-you drink it yourself.

[c] Sifra (a commentary on the book of Leviticus) on Leviticus 25:36 says: “You do not judge ‘whose blood is redder.’  You save yourself.”

Talmudically, Costner does the right thing-despite the guilty feelings-when he gets on the helicopter and saves himself.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 7-8

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

9.19.19


Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Fred had hundreds and hundreds of shot glasses. Everytime he went on a trip he bought a shot glass.  Soon his house was filled with them. After a while he put them in boxes. Then he moved to a smaller apartment with no storage space.  Fred didn’t know what to do with the glasses. He decided to leave them in his friend Barney’s garage until he figured out what to do with them.  He knocked on Barney’s door. There was no answer. Fred put them on a shelf in Barney’s unlocked garage anyway. A week later, fifteen-and-a -half-year-old Elroy, working on his learner’s permit, drives the car too far into the garage, hits the shelf and knocks the boxes onto the floor and onto the car.  Fred wants Barney to pay to replace the broken glasses. Barney wants Fred to pay to repair the flat tire the broken glass caused.

Answer

Fred leaves his “junk” in Barney’s garage without telling anyone.  Elroy, Fred’s son, destroys them by accident. Who is responsible?

This case is straight out of the Mishnah.  In Bava Metzia 5.2 we find:

“If a potter leaves his pots in the courtyard of another and the owner’s cattle breaks them,

[a] If s/he had no permission to leave them, then (1) the owner of cattle has no obligation to pay for them, and (2) the potter must pay if the pots injured the cattle.

[b] If s/he had permission to leave them, then (1) the owner of the cattle must pay for them, and (2) the potter has no obligation to pay if the cattle are injured.

Based directly on this mishnah, Fred must pay for the tire and is not repaid for the glasses.

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 17-18

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

 

9.12.19


This year my blog will consist of excerpts from Joel Grishaver’s book series “You Be the Judge,” which presents different ethical issues and Jewish sources and responses to these issues.

Case

The Atlas family owned a baseball card store and was awarded a free trip to the Super Bowl because of the number of cards they sold.  They left a cousin to run the store.  A Nolan Ryan rookie card is worth about $200.  The cousin who was working in the card shop was a rookie, too, and knew little about card values.  She misread the catalog (missing the asterisk that said “all prices times ten”) when she quoted the kid $20.  The kid was a baseball card shark.  He knew a good deal when he heard one – even though he had just meant to “check out” the current value.  He biked home. Stole $20 from his mother’s purse and then grabbed the card.  The kid was also a regular.  When the owner checked the day’s sales and saw that this kid had bought that card for that price, he called him up and demanded that the deal be undone.  The kid said, “A deal is a deal.”  The Atlas kid and the “shark” went to Hebrew school together.  After the fight in the playground, the teacher took them to the principal, who told the rabbi, who called in the family for a conference.  The rabbi held a Beit Din, a Jewish Court.

Answer

In Jewish law there is a principal known as “a sale made in error.”  It is based in this Talmudic story:

Once there was a famine in a town named Nehardea.  All the people had to sell their homes in order to afford to buy food to stay alive.   When the wheat finally arrived and the famine ended, Rabbi Nahman made a ruling.  He said, “Torah teaches that the houses must be returned to their original owners.”

Rabbi Nahman’s ruling needs explanation.  The lack of food made the price of food rise.  People sold their homes in desperation.  What the people who sold their homes (the ones Rabbi Nahman made the purchasers return) didn’t know was that the ship bringing food was already in the harbor, waiting for low tide to dock.  The word had not yet gone out.  But as soon as it did, the price of food would drop and everyone would be able to afford it without selling their homes.  These sales were made without full information.  They were based on an error in understanding.  In Jewish law, any deal made with errors of understanding on either side can always be taken back.

And so the law follows Rabbi Nahman, ruling, “A person who sells a plot of land because s/he needed money, and after the sale learns that the money is not needed, can take the sale back (Ketubot 97a).

That Talmudic text was taught to the two involved families, and they followed its recommendation.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 7-8

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

9.5.19


Tzedakah (which is generally translated as charity, but this is an incomplete translation) is a major concept in Judaism.  But is it just something we do, or is it supposed to be something we do in order to reorient how we walk through and participate in life?  Rabbi Jonathan Sacks offers great insight into the concept of tzedek, righteousness which is the root for the word tzedakah.

“One way of understanding tzedek is to contrast it with two other political theories: capitalism and socialism.  Capitalism aims at equality of opportunity, socialism at equality of outcome. The Judaic vision aims at a society in which there is equal access to dignity and hope.  Unlike socialism it believes in the free market, private property and minimum government intervention. Unlike capitalism it believes that the free market, without periodic redistributions, creates inequalities that are ultimately unsustainable because they deprive some individuals of independence and hope.  Tzedek is built on the idea that there is a distinction between possession and ownership. Judaism… affirms the concept of private property, possession, for the reason that John Locke did in the seventeenth century. It is the best defense of the individual against the state…A society without private property leaves citizens at the mercy of rulers.  Capitalism leads to democracy. Large-scale communism leaves inadequate space for individual rights.  

So Jewish law protects possession but distinguishes it from ownership.  All things, ultimately belong to God and therefore what I have I hold in trust… There is no ultimate ownership in Judaism.  What I possess belongs to God, and I am merely its legal guardian. Hence Judaism’s environmental legislation: We may not needlessly destroy even the things that are ours.  Like Adam in Eden, we are placed in the world, “to serve and protect” it, handing it on intact or enhanced to the next generation. Hence also tzedek legislation: what I give to others in need is not charity but justice, not giving away what is rightfully mine, but rather honoring the condition under which I hold it in trust.”

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, A Letter in the Scroll, pg.128

8.29.19


Welcome or welcome back!  I hope you had a great summer.  Judaism has always viewed education in general, and Jewish education in particular, as essential and integral to one’s continued growth and development.  It is not only concerned with the acquisition of knowledge, but with one’s love of Jewish texts, ideas and study. As we begin the school year, I bring the wise words about the importance of education from Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks.

“The word Torah means teaching.  God reveals Himself to mankind not in the storm, the wind, the sun, the rain, but in the voice that teaches, the words that instruct.  The covenant is contained in a text comprehensible not only to kings and their attendant priests, but to every member of the nation, so that each becomes party to its terms and each must give his or her consent before the covenant is binding.  The heroes of Israel – Abraham, Moses, the prophets, scribes, and sages – are not kings, emperors or warriors but educators; and not just guardians of esoteric wisdom but teachers of the people, meaning everyone. The central institutions of the Jewish people – the family, the Temple, the Sabbath, festival rituals, and later the synagogue – all became educational in character, contexts of learning.

Above all, the key experience of Judaism, from Mosaic times to today, is studying the Torah.  This is more than a spiritual and intellectual activity, though it is both. For us, scholarship, study, regular engagement with Judaism’s texts, is a political event of the highest magnitude.  Every Jew is an equal citizen of the republic of faith because every Jew has access to its constitutional document, the Torah, and Is literate in its provisions. As Josephus was able to write with a sense of wonder nineteen hundred years ago, “Should any one of our nation be asked about our laws, he will repeat them as readily as his own name.  The result of our thorough education in our laws from the very dawn of intelligence is that they are, as it were, engraved upon our souls.” A free society – that precarious balance between the conflicting principles of liberty and order – exists not through the rule of law alone, but through a system of education that allows every individual to internalize the law and thus become its master, not its slave.  Liberty is not just a society of laws but a society of lawyers, citizens articulate in their own law, each a guardian of justice. No other society has seen things this way. No other faith has made education its supreme religious experience.” 

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, A Letter in the Scroll, pg.135

 

Summer19


Passover is behind us, finals are behind you and summer is ahead of us.  I hope it has been a successful and growth-filled school year.

Looking forward to next year, we will be offering an opportunity to participate in a Jewish learning series, JTalk, which is a ten-week experiential, conversational seminar for students looking to deepen their understanding of Judaism on their own terms.

Come study with me and other students for ten weeks on Wednesday evenings from 5:00-6:30pm at the Jewish Federation Building, in Bloomfield Hills.  The Fellowship will run from September 18 – December 4, and will include dinner, text study, meeting new friends, and $500 upon successful completion of the program.  

Stay tuned for applications!  Have a great summer!

4.18.19


What makes the Jewish covenant?

A covenant is not held together by power but by an internalized sense of identity, kinship and loyalty.  This can never be taken for granted. Hence the centrality in Judaism of education, the festivals, prayer and the reading of the Torah.  In education we pass on our ideals from one generation to the next. In festivals we transmit our history and memories. In communal prayer we remind ourselves that what we seek, we seek together.  When we read the Torah, our covenantal constitution, we reaffirm our existence as a community under the sovereignty of God. I know of no more majestic vision of what it might be to build a society of justice and compassion. (Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, A Letter in the Scroll, pg.128)

If you create it, we will come together!

4.11.19


Why do we celebrate holidays that commemorate things that happened in the past? Rabbi Nathan Lopes Cardozo addresses this issue in his book Crisis, Covenant and Creativity:

Since our Tradition derives from events that took place in the past, there is a strong urge to place the emphasis in Judaism on the past.  And yet, to do so would be to misconstrue the very essence of our religion. However significant the past may be, its value lies primarily in its ability to inform the future.  To stay genuine, the epic Jewish experience must be re-lived, now and in the future, giving birth to exciting elements that continue to create wonder and anticipation.

Observant Jews, therefore, never memorialize their great history.  Rather, they celebrate the events of their people’s distant past as if they took place in the present day.  During Pesach, the Jew sits at the Seder table and tells the story of the exodus from Egypt in such a way that he re-experiences it.  He is obligated to create and atmosphere in which he and his family feel as though they themselves were slaves in Egypt, and who are now able to enjoy freedom.  The famous Chassidic saying that Pesach is not so much about how the Jews got out of Egypt, but how Egypt and its mentality gets out of the Jews, beautifully illustrates this point.  Halachically, Pesach has to be experienced in a way that transcends history, and thereby illuminates the present. (Crisis, Covenant and Creativity, pgs. 140-141)

What are you going to do to accomplish this at your seder?

 

4.4.19


Nothing to Jews is merely natural – not marriage, not children, not social structures, not the possession by a people of its land.  Everything that could be seen as the unchanging, inevitable way of things, endorsed by nature or by nature’s gods, is perpetually questioned in Judaism.  If it is wrong, it must be changed. If it is right, it must be sustained by a conscious moral decision, an act of the free human will. (Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, A Letter in the Scroll, pg.111)

Status quo does not exist in Judaism!  What have you Jewishly questioned lately?

3.28.19


This is one of my favorite texts.  Please note that Baal was the name of the supreme god worshiped in ancient Canaan.

But the Lord was not in the earthquake.

After the earthquake came a fire.

But the Lord was not in the fire.

After the fire came a still, small voice.

When Elijah heard it, he pulled his cloak over his face and went out and stood at the mouth of the cave. (I Kings 19:11-13)

 

God tells Elijah that what makes Him different from Baal is not that Baal is a power and God is a greater power.  God is not a power at all. He is not in the wind, the earthquake and the fire. When God reveals Himself, it is not as a force but as a voice, the voice that speaks to man.  And not as an ordinary voice, but as a “still, small voice” – the Hebrew literally means, “the sound of a slender silence” – meaning, the voice that we can hear only if we listen.  God does not impose His presence on humanity. Only if we reach out to Him do we find Him reaching out to us.  (Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, A Letter in the Scroll, pg.88)

Are you listening?

3.14.19


According to Rabbi Jonathan Sacks:

Judaism has a more challenging view of the human individual than any other faith I know.  Where Christianity sees man as in need of being saved, and Islam calls on him to submit to the will of God.  Judaism advances the daring idea that man and God are partners in the work of creation. Faith is the call to human responsibility. (A Letter in the Scroll, pg.100)

Are you ready for the challenge?

3.7.19


According to Rabbi Jonathan Sacks: “More than The Bible is interested in the home God made for man, it is concerned with the home man makes for God. (Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, A Letter in the Scroll, pg.74)

How do we as Jews go about making a home for God?  How does this idea play out in your life?

2.28.19


What is a Jewish view of morality?  

For Judaism morality is something else.  It is covenantal, the result of a partnership – a marriage – between humanity and God. A covenant (like a marriage) is a mutual obligation that is neither a fact of nature, nor a private or subjective state, but a bond created by a declaration – the word given, the word received, the word honored in loyalty and trust.

The reason that morality is covenantal is that only in and through such a bond do free agents redeem their solitude, creating between them a relationship that honors the freedom and integrity of each while at the same time enabling them to achieve together what neither could achieve alone – the good that exists only in virtue of being shared.  A covenant is what turns love into law, and law into love. At the heart of Judaism – its most audacious and least understood idea – is that between heaven and earth, between an infinite power and finite human beings, there can be, and is, such a relationship. (Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, A Letter in the Scroll, pg.59)

How do Rabbi Sacks’ words impact your idea of morality?

2.21.19


A soul may wait for a millennium to descend to earth, and then live a whole lifetime for the one moment when he will be able to do another a favor. (Ba’al Shem Tov)

If we only get one moment, do you think you have had yours yet?  How would you know if you had?

2.14.19


Can the belief in God be proven?  Does it have to be proven? How would one go about proving the belief in God?

Faith in the existence of God is not a product of intellectual proofs (including compelling stories of survival of the soul) but a consequence of living in relationship to God. (Rabbi Elie Kaplan Spitz, Does the Soul Survive, pg.171)

Do you have faith in the existence of God?

2.7.19


What roles do belief and action play in Judaism?  Is one more important than the other? Rabbi Menachem Kellner has a lot to say about this.  

The upshot of all of this is that Judaism is a religion which places a great deal of emphasis on correct behavior.  But Judaism is not simply a system of observances per se (a ‘religion of pots and pans’, as some of its detractors like to say).  One observes the commandments of the Torah, ideally, because of one’s relationship with God, out of love, with no thought of reward and punishment.  The commandments are not an end in themselves, in other words, but an expression of the Jew’s belief, emunah. In God. Trusting in God, and knowing what to do to give that trust concrete expression, the Jew has no need of subtle theological formulations and distinctions.  In a works-oriented religion like Judaism, emphasis on ‘belief in’ makes more sense than an emphasis on ‘belief that’: Judaism has thus always been more concerned with knowing that to do than with knowing what to think. (Menachem Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything?, pgs.45-46)

Deed over creed!  Does what I do impact what I believe?

1.31.19


In this week’s Torah portion, we read about the revelation at Mount Sinai.  What is a purpose of revelation? How does it operate in relation to scientific reasoning?  

Scientific reasoning, while tremendously important, also has a downside….   [S]cientific inquiry depends on laws that necessarily exclude the possibility for exceptions.  Nature’s general constancy is what allows for scientific inquiry, and for its results to be so powerful.  But, revelation is revelation only insofar as it demonstrates an existence beyond the consistent order of things.  For revelation to serve its purpose (i.e., to make a big impression on those who experience it), it must be extraordinary and preferably unprecedented.  And so it is the “nature” of revelation to elude scientific inquiry. The moment it can be repeated or understood, the miracle loses much of its significance. (Jewish Law as Rebellion by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, 157)

After reading Rabbi Cardozo’s understanding of revelation, how often do you experience something extraordinary and unprecedented?  How often do you experience revelation?

1.24.19


In this week’s Torah portion, we read about the revelation at Mount Sinai.  What is a purpose of revelation? How does it operate in relation to scientific reasoning?  

Scientific reasoning, while tremendously important, also has a downside….   [S]cientific inquiry depends on laws that necessarily exclude the possibility for exceptions.  Nature’s general constancy is what allows for scientific inquiry, and for its results to be so powerful.  But, revelation is revelation only insofar as it demonstrates an existence beyond the consistent order of things.  For revelation to serve its purpose (i.e., to make a big impression on those who experience it), it must be extraordinary and preferably unprecedented.  And so it is the “nature” of revelation to elude scientific inquiry. The moment it can be repeated or understood, the miracle loses much of its significance. (Jewish Law as Rebellion by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, 157)

After reading Rabbi Cardozo’s understanding of revelation, how often do you experience something extraordinary and unprecedented?  How often do you experience revelation?

1.17.19


My faith has provided me with a foundation, an order, and indeed a purpose, and has so much to do with the way I navigate through each day, both personally and professionally, in ways both large and small.

Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, October 26 2011, from the text of address delivered to students at Brigham Young University, October, 26, 2011.

For Senator Lieberman, his Judaism is part of his everyday life.  It is not just present in prayer, holidays, and life cycle events.  

What role does Judaism play in your life?

1/3/19


When God told Moses to go back to Egypt and tell Pharoah to let the Jews go, Moses replied “I am not a man of words.”  What did he mean by this? Why was he so hesitant to speak to Pharoah?

There is a midrash that teaches us that Moses had a speech impediment and it was therefore a physical ailment.  Rabbi Nathan Lopes Cardozo presents us with a different idea.

It is possible that Moses’ refusal to speak was not born out of a physical speech impediment, but rather from his lack of a clear identity from which he could form a coherent position.  Just because a person recognizes that he is a Jew doesn’t mean that he understands the content of his identity. And such was Moses’ situation, so that he doubted his ability to effectively complete the mission that God gave him.  How can I stand in front of Pharaoh and argue that he would let the Israelites go, if I do not yet fully realize what an Israelite is? No doubt Pharaoh will realize that I am not really, fully one of them. I may belong to their tribe but I have not yet become one of them in spirit, and this will make my argument weak.  My authenticity is not yet well established! A man cannot fight unless he knows what he is fighting for! After all, it is not the physical liberty of the Jews that You, God, most desire. Primarily what You want is to liberate the Israelites spiritually, and so how can I confront Pharaoh when it is not clear to me what that means? (Crisis, Covenant and Creativity by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, pg. 99-100)

Jewish identity is much more than skin deep.  You may be born Jewish or convert into Judaism, but to Jewish identity is something one needs to develop through doing and becoming.

12.20.18


What is holiness?  In the words of Rabbi Nathan Lopes Cardozo:

Holiness is that which a person experiences when he lets God into his thoughts, feelings, and actions: when the sum total of his existence encounters its creator. What we sense from this encounter is something of an internal transformation that brings on a certain feeling of elation and elevation. (Crisis, Covenant and Creativity by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, pg.17)

Holiness can be found all around us.   Holiness can be found wherever we choose to let it in.

 

12.13.18


Last week I shared a quote from Rabbi Nathan Lopes Cardozo that addressed the issue of what was given at Sinai.  While ideally there should have been as many texts given as there were Jews who received it, only one was given.

Rabbi Cardozo attributed this to the need for unity among Jews and shaping the Jewish people.  Being that we are people of deed rather than creed, Rabbi Cardozo expanded upon this idea with regard to the mitzvot.  

It could even been argued that not all Jews were in need of the same mitzvot.  It was only for the sake of comradeship and for the common destiny of the Jewish people and their mission to the world that they all had to commit themselves to all of the mitzvot.  (Jewish Law as Rebellion by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, pg. 69)

This idea reminds me of another Cardozo quote: The deed shows man who he really is and not what he would like to be.  Here his own self is exposed: what man does not dare to think, he shows in his deeds. The “real” heart of man is revealed in his deeds.  Man may have lofty ideas but behave like a criminal.(Crisis, Covenant and Creativity by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, pg. 156)

We are what we do.

12.7.18


Quite frequently the question of what happened at Sinai arises. What was given?  What did people hear? What are the implications of being given one text? Rabbi Nathan Lopes Cardozo addresses these issues in his book Jewish Law as Rebellion.

… one could argue that ideally no written text should have been given at Sinai, since no two people are able to read the same text in an identical way.  The meaning of the text is dependent to a large extent on the reader, and is therefore not a fixed reality. The fact that a text was even given at Sinai is itself a compromise.  Even if a text should have been given, a priori, it should have been in as many versions as there are Jews since Sinai. This did not happen; only one text was revealed. This was due to the fact that there was a need for unity and affiliation among Jews, sharing the experience of a divine text in a bond of togetherness, shaping a Chosen People that would carry the word of God to the world.  There was a need for a grundnorm (fundamental norm) through which Jews would be able to discuss the word of God and share it wherever they go. Above all, a fixed text was necessary to facilitate discussion, not agreement. In this way it would stay alive, infinitely enhancing new possible interpretations and unique insights. (Jewish Law as Rebellion by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, pg. 68)

Whatever was given, it is ours as individuals to interact with, struggle with and make our own.  The idea that one text was given in order to facilitate discussion and not agreement is so beautiful and Jewish.  It is all about the discussion.

11.29.18


Last week I shared a text from Peter Schotten, which describes the difference between religiosity and spirituality.  He said spirituality “knows nothing about God and postulates nothing about ethical obligations.” Here is another definition of spirituality:

How does a spiritual journey begin?  I believe that whenever we make a decision whose goal extends beyond pure self-interest, we may be said to act in a spiritual way.  When we set on a course of action that is designed to benefit someone else or something other than oneself, we take a step on a spiritual path. (Rabbi Dr. Peter Rosenzweig, Introspection, Teshuva, Personality & Courage: A Map, pg.25)

One topic, two Jews.  Oh, the possibilities.

 

11.20.18


Traditionally understood, religiosity is about belief and action, about faith in God, and about acting in accordance with God’s guidance of our fellow human beings.  By contrast, spirituality is all about feeling. It knows nothing about God and postulates nothing about ethical obligations. The locus of the feeling can be located in the experiences and emotions of the affected person.  God, if God matters at all, constitutes a mere afterthought.  (Peter Schotten, Religious Belief, American Democracy, and our Inescapable Culture: Some preliminary Observations, Conversations, Autumn 2012)

Quite often I hear, “I am a spiritual person, but am not religious.”  I have always felt this was a justification for someone not wanting to observe mitzvot, for someone trying to find a way of justifying why they won’t commit to a set of guidelines that is supposed to bring holiness into the world through a person’s behavior.  Given the distinction posited above, it could be challenging to have one without the other.

11.15.18


What is the purpose of rebellion?  Could rebellion be good? Rabbi Cardoza feels rebellion is essential to Judaism.

One of the great tasks of Jewish education is to deliberately create an atmosphere of rebellion among its students. Rebellion, after all, is the great emancipator. To paraphrase English writer Charles Caleb Colton (1780-1832): We owe almost all our knowledge and achievements not to those who agreed but to those who differed. It was this quality that brought Judaism into existence. Avraham was the first great rebel, destroying idols, and he was followed by his children, by Moshe, and by the Jewish people.

What has been entirely forgotten is that the Torah was the first rebellious text to appear in world history. Its purpose was to protest. It set in motion a rebellious movement of universal proportions second to none. The text includes all the heresies of the past, present and future. It calls idol worship an abomination, immorality a scandal, and the worship of man a catastrophe. It protests against complacency, imitation, and negation of the spirit. It calls for radical thinking and radical action, without compromise, even if it means standing alone and being condemned or ridiculed. (Needed Redemptive Halakha, by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, Journal of the Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals, “Conversations”, September 2015)

What an inspiring and powerful way to view Judaism and the Torah.  The world is in need of Jewish rebels.

11.9.18


The human being’s quest for security will obstruct his search for meaning and purpose, while his lack of security will impel his moral powers to unfold.  It is clearly this fact that underlies the ongoing repetition of the commandment to look after the stranger “because you were strangers in Egypt.” (Jewish Law as Rebellion by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, p. 45)

 

The terrorist attack last week will be forever imparted on who we are as Jews.  We have been propelled into a situation we did not invite nor want. We are faced with what happens now.  We need to figure out where we, as a community and as individual Jews, grow from here.

11.1.18


This has been a very difficult week for us as Jews and as Americans.  The outpouring of support through the many vigils has been heartfelt. The real test of who we are will be seen in the coming weeks and months, as our lives return to “normal.”  What we do now that the attack is longer a headline and part of the news cycle will be telling. I hope the words of Rabbi Jonathan Sacks inspire and hearten us to live in the most Godly and purposeful way.

Jewish faith is not about believing the world to be other than it is.  It is not about ignoring the evil, the darkness and the pain. It is about courage, endurance and the capacity to hold fast to ideals even when they are ignored by others.  It is the ability to see the world for what it is and yet still believe that it could be different. It is about not giving up, not letting go. Faith is what the Song of Songs calls “the love which is stronger than death.”  (Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, A Letter in the Scroll, pg.191)

10.26.18


Religious Jews seem to know something that few people have understood.  For them, freedom can be earned only by great discipline. One needs to conquer it and work hard to maintain it every moment of one’s life.  Freedom is the will to be responsible. It is a mental state, not just a physical condition. Its primary requirement is to live for something that is worth dying for.  A life without a mission is not worth being born into. It is only through dignity that one becomes free, and “the dignity of a person stands in proportion to his/her obligations.” (Heschel, God in Search of Man, 216) (Jewish Law as Rebellion by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, 327)

What is your definition of freedom?  Many people see freedom as the ability to do what one wants  Judaism has a different understanding. It sees freedom not as freedom from something or someone, but rather freedom to become what I as an individual and as part of a people can become.  As Jews we were redeemed from Egypt so that we could become a holy nation, so we could become partners with God in bringing Godliness to the world.

10.18.18


More from Rabbi Cardozo on the role of religion:

Religion’s main task is to disturb. It should ensure, on a very pragmatic level, that we do not take anything for granted in our day-to-day lives.  It is through challenges and complications that we are constantly surprised. These give birth to wonder, which then reminds us of God’s presence. It is not philosophical contemplation that brings man closer to God.  God is not an intellectual issue, but the ultimate reality of life. Only in deed, in the down-to-earth and heart-rending existence of daily life, which asks for sweat and blood, does one escape superficiality and enter awareness and attentiveness. (Jewish Law as Rebellion by Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo, pg. 319)

Some people have trouble finding God. It turns out they are looking for God in words. As Jews we meet God in our deeds.  We can find God wherever we choose to let God in. It is up to us, to go and do it.

10.11.18


Now that the Jewish holidays are over, we go back to our regular lives.  How can we take what we were inundated with over the Jewish holiday period and integrate it into our everyday lives?  In Jewish Law as Rebellion Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo writes:

Religion is a protest against taking life for granted.  There are no insignificant phenomena or deeds in this world, and it is through Judaism’s demands and far-reaching interference in our daily life that we are made aware of God as our steadfast Companion. (320)

10.4.18


On Simchat Torah, we finished reading the Torah and then immediately began reading the Torah. What is it about this book that it plays such a prominent role in our lives?  In Jewish Law as Rebellion, Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo writes:

I believe that the Torah is min haShamayim (of divine origin) and that its every word is holy.  But I do not believe that the Torah is (always) historically true (sometimes it seems like divine fiction), or that it is uninfluenced by external sources.  Nor do I believe that all its laws are morally acceptable. They are not.

What I believe is that the Torah is often morally, deeply, and deliberately “flawed,” and furthermore, that God Himself intentionally made it flawed…

Why would God make the Torah flawed?  I believe this “flaw” is actually our end of the covenant.  This is our opportunity to interact with the text and have the text interact with us.  This is our opportunity to enable the text to come alive and breathe life into it, so it brings holiness to our lives and the lives of the people with whom we live.  This “flaw” is God calling upon us to live up to our responsibility to be Godly in everything we do.

9.27.18


We hear so much about “going with the flow”, but what does this really do for us and our growth?  In Crisis, Covenant and Creativity, Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo writes:

When I was growing up, people used to say that if you want to be creative all you have to do was “let go.”  It was assumed that the way to unleash creativity was to shed all limitations and “go with the flow.” But reality proves otherwise.  Letting go only makes us less focused and more confused. The range of options overwhelms us. The truth about creativity is just the opposite.  It is born not out of the chaos of unconventionality, but rather from the devotion of discipline. True creativity is, as Abraham Joshua Heschel once said, “an emotion controlled by an idea.”  It is the ultimate triumph of form over undeveloped matter. (28)

Tolerance


There is a lot of talk about tolerance and respect.  Both are essential in creating community. What does tolerance mean with regard to holding onto our own convictions?  In his book Crisis, Covenant and Creativity, Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo writes:

Let us be clear about one thing: apathy has nothing to do with tolerance.  We cannot achieve tolerance by relinquishing our every conviction. Tolerance, rather, speaks of the case in which we have convictions, but nonetheless are able to tolerate those with conviction different from our own.  In fact, the stronger our convictions, the more opportunity we have to be tolerant when faced by those with whom we disagree. But if we just don’t believe in anything, what is there to be tolerant about? (37-38)

This is where respect plays a major role.  How we speak with and about people with whom we disagree speaks volumes about who we are and how we create community.  We do not have to like everything or anything another community member says or believes, but we do need to try and understand it.  There is a difference between liking something and understanding it. I believe a mensch is someone who disagrees with a person but can still see the legitimacy in a piece of their opinion or argument.  

 

9.13.18


The ten days between Rosh haShanna and Yom Kippur are referred to as the Ten days of Repentance. They are a time for us to reflect on the past year and an opportunity to think about how we would like to grow in the upcoming year. I hope this passage from Rabbi Nathan Lopes Cardozo’s book, Crisis, Covenant and Creativity is gives you some guidance in this pursuit.

Man’s heart is drawn after his actions.  What he does will ultimately be what he is.  In the realm of spiritual growth, action takes precedence because it alone is the medium of personal transformation.  But not all actions produce the same effect. Halacha is the musical score that molds our actions into a symphony of the divine.  We may start by borrowing notes that perhaps we would not ourselves have written, but when we play them, with compassion, the sounds they make will soon resonate within us.  And at the moment when we start to hear the music of our own souls issue forth, there can be no doubt that its Composer was also our Creator. (pg.34)

9.6.18


“Jewish continuity and survival depends upon Jews recognizing that their identities spring from thousands of years of carrying out a divine mission.  Neither the Holocaust nor the State of Israel will provide them with a solid identity. If we want to survive, and if we believe that it matters whether or not there are Jews in the world, then we must look back into our traditions, re-evaluate them and come to understand ourselves as essentially Jewish selves” (Crisis, Covenant and Creativity,102, Rabbi Dr. Nathan Lopes Cardozo).
This quote comes from one of my favorite Jewish thinkers.  Rabbi Cardozo heads a Think Tank focused on finding new Halachic and philosophical approaches to dealing with the crisis of religion and identity amongst Jews and the Jewish State of Israel. Rabbi Cardozo is known for his original and often controversial insights into Judaism. I will be bringing some of his thoughts to you over the year.  I hope you find them insightful and I hope they provide you with an opportunity to think about your Judaism in a novel way.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss this quote or anything else with you. Please stop by or email me at mfaudem@gmail.com.

4.23.18


“Love your fellow man as yourself, I am the Almighty” (Leviticus 19:18).  The Talmud (Shabbat 31a) relates that a non-Jew came to Hillel and said to him, “Convert me on condition that you will teach me the entire Torah while I stand on one foot.”  Hillel accepted the condition and told him, “What you dislike, do not do to your friend. This is the entire Torah.” Since Hillel was referring to the commandment of love your neighbor, why didn’t he just mention the words in this verse?  

Rabbi Yeruchem Levoitz explained that this is to teach us an important principle.  From the words “love your fellow man” one might think that as long as one feels the emotion of love towards others, one fulfills the commandment.  But the truth is that just feeling love alone is not sufficient. Rather this love must motivate us to do positive things for others and to refrain from any actions or words that could cause someone any pain or suffering.  The Torah definitely requires us to feel deep love for others in our hearts. But even more than that, our behavior towards others must manifest this love. Therefore, Hillel explained to this man that a basic Torah principle is that the same commandment which requires us to have a profoundly positive feeling for others, also requires us to behave in an elevated manner in our daily encounters with them (Daat Torah: Vayikra, p. 175).  Constantly be on the lookout for acts of kindness you can do for other people.  When you look for them, you will constantly find things to do and words to say. Similarly, be very careful not to do anything that will harm others or cause them any pain or suffering.  This is a lifelong challenge, and it is a cornerstone of the Torah.

4.16.18


Moses and Aaron are instructed regarding the diagnosis of tzaraat, which is usually translated as leprosy.  It is an ailment, which has the ability of affecting human skin, clothing.  If infected, the human being or garment is declared ritually impure. Rashes, patches and discolorations of the affected individual or object are examined by a priest who determines the existence of the affliction.  

God instructs Moshe in the purification process for a leper who has been declared clean.  Two clean birds are to be brought to the priest. One is sacrificed, and the other bird is set free.  After a week, the person to be purified shave all of their hair and immerse in water. They then bring a guilt offering and a sin offering.

Rashi offers a rationale for the two birds.  Since tzaraat comes in retribution for lashon hara, which is, in effect, babbling words, the Torah requires for the metzora’s purification birds which babble and twitter continually.  But why two birds? Wouldn’t one have served the purpose? And why was one bird slaughtered and the other kept alive to be sent away “towards the fields”?  The power of speech is a double-edged sword.

When used properly it is a beneficial instrument for studying, teaching and creating community and meaning. Used improperly, in the form of slander and lying, speech can be deadly.  Our Sages explain that the sacrifices are designed to make the donor mindful of the fact that the sacrificed animal is taking his place, in reality he deserved to suffer the fate of the sacrifice.  Had there been only the slaughtered bird, the metzora would then have inferred that all forms of speech are evil and deadly.  He may not have uttered another word for the rest of his life. The live bird that is sent away toward the fields shows him that the power of speech can be a source of life and strength.  Indeed, the pair of birds epitomizes the saying that “Death and life are in the power of the tongue” (Mishlei 18:21). (Shlomo Ganzfried, author of the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch)

4.9.18


Parashat Shemini begins on the last day of the ordination ceremony of Aaron and his sons as priests. Aaron’s sons, Nadav and Avihu, offer an alien fire to God . A fire comes from God, and both sons die immediately. Moses tells Aaron that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu demonstrate the responsibility of priests to do only what God has specifically commanded them. Moses calls on Aaron’s nephews to remove the bodies, and cautions relatives and the rest of the congregation not to mourn the deaths.

God commands Aaron and his sons not to drink intoxicants when they enter the Tent of Meeting, for them to be able to carry out their duties. God speaks to Moses and Aaron regarding the laws of kashrut. They are told that the Israelites are permitted to eat any mammal which has both a split hooves and chews its cud. The Israelites are permitted to eat any fish which has both fins and scales. A list of forbidden birds is given. Four-legged insects are forbidden unless they have a pair of jointed legs with which they can leap. The parasha ends with an affirmation of the special relationship between God and the people of Israel.

Some commentators explain that out of their joy of serving God, Nadav and Avihu brought an additional sacrifice.  If this were so, death seems an extreme, and even unjust, punishment. Hertz explains that they were punished according to their elevated status and that this was a warning to future priestly generations not to innovate their own sacrifices.

Passover.18


The Background to the Passover Holiday from Teaching Jewish Holidays:

Leviticus 23:5-8 contains the biblical injunctions to celebrate the festival of Pesach: “in the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month, as twilight, there shall be a passover offering to the Lord, and on the fifteenth day of the month is the Lord’s Feast of Unleavened Bread.  You shall eat unleavened for seven days. The first day shall be for you a sacred occasion: you shall not work at your occupations. Seven days you shall make offerings by fire to Adonai. The seventh day shall be a sacred occasion: you shall not work at your occupations.”

Efforts to probe the origins of the Jewish holidays are in no way intended to denigrate the importance or the meaning of the festivals. Rather, they help to demonstrate the genius of the Jewish people who drew from their environment, transforming what might have begun as a pagan idea or practice into something with universal and timeless significance.

According to such scholars as Hayyim Schauss and Theodor Gaster, the modern festival of Pesach is a combination of a shepherd’s festival and an agricultural festival.  Leviticus 23 reinforces this idea.

It is possible that a Pesach festival had its earliest stirrings among semi-nomads who thousands of years ago wandered the desert and the semi-arid environs around Palestine.  Nisan was the month when sheep most often gave birth. These nomads came to observe a festival at the time of the full moon. Just before nightfall, a sheep or goat was sacrificed. The animal was then roasted, and the family ate a hasty meal so that all of the animal would be eaten before daybreak.  No bones of this sacrificial animal could be broken. Tent posts were daubed with the blood of the slain animal as an antidote to plagues, misfortune, and illness.

Perhaps the Feast of Unleavened Bread was a six or seven day festival marking the beginning of the spring harvest and the offering of the first sheaf of the newly cut barley to the priest as a sacrifice to God.  The elimination of chametz may have originally been precautionary so as not to infect the new incoming crop.  Or, it may have been a way of propitiating the priests and God so as to assume health and bounty.

As Judaism moved away from being agriculturally based, new interpretations and new customs were added to the Pesach ritual so that Jews living all over the world and in all ages could meaningfully celebrate Pesach.  The prototype Haggadah finds its way into the Mishnah as Tractate Pesachim.  By the end of the Talmudic period, its form and much of its content were as they are today.  It must have been widely accepted, because the Haggadah was included in the very first prayer book of Rav Amram in the eighth century, as well as in the prayer book of Saadia Gaon in Babylonia (tenth century).  Somewhere around the twelfth century, it began to be copied as a separate book. It attracted many commentaries, and became the favorite subject of Jewish artists who found the subject liberating.

3.19.18


Parashat Tzav begins by repeating the procedure for the sacrifices discussed in last week’s Parasha.  This time the Torah directs its words to Aaron and his sons, giving details regarding the portions of the sacrifices they receive.  

God commands Moses to prepare Aaron, his sons, and the Tabernacle for the priesthood.  This includes washing Aaron and his sons, dressing them in their ritual garments, and anointing both Aaron and the Tabernacle with oil. Moses explains that this ceremony will last seven days, and all that has been done and sacrificed that day has to be repeated on each of the following days.

The book Teaching Torah gives a beautiful insight into the role of the priests and the priestly offering.  The priests, especially the High Priest, were role models for the Israelites. The High Priest had to be sinless in order to carry out his duties.  But, since no individual is sinless, the High Priest brought a daily sacrifice atoning for any sins he may have committed.

So what do we learn from this?  If the High Priest can bring a sacrifice, admitting that he needed to repent for any sins and asking for forgiveness, his action may motivate others to do so as well.  The High Priest brought and offered his sacrifices publicly, without feeling ashamed. This was a message to the Israelites that they also should bringing sacrifices of atonement and not feel ashamed for their need for repentance.

Judaism is not a religion which demands perfection.  Its creators knew that human beings were not perfect people and could never be perfect people.  Therefore, it sets up rituals and prayers that respond to the realistic nature, both positive and negative, of daily human life.  

Judaism is a religion that demands continuous growth and development of the human being.  The observances of Mitzvot are the vehicle through which we as Jews develop and grow intellectually, spiritually, and ritually.  Whether it is lighting Shabbat candles, giving Tzedakah, or observing Kashrut, all are important and all should be viewed as the stepping stone to the next level of knowledge and observance.

 

3.12.18


With this week’s Torah portion, we begin reading the book of Leviticus.  Parashat VaYikra opens with God instructing Moses to describe the five types of sacrifices to the Israelites.  They were: a burnt offering (olah); the meal offering (minchah); the sacrifice of wellbeing (zevach shelamim); the sin offering (chatat); and the guilt offering (asham).

While the first three types of sacrifices were voluntary and not brought for atonement, the last two sacrifices, the chatat and the asham were both obligatory for guilty parties.  The offering to be brought was determined by the economic status of the person who committed the transgression.  The penalty for robbery was also to restore the stolen item, plus an additional one-fifth of its value.

The bringing of sacrifices did not, in and of itself, appease God for one’s wrongdoing; rather it served merely as a symbol and expression of one’s desire to repent and, in that, to change one’s behavior. The essential element in repentance is the attitude of the individual.  With the destruction of the Temple, the sacrifices were discontinued. The Sages then prescribed other practices to substitute for the sacrifices. The most important were prayer, Torah study, and tzedakah. Just as prayer, study, and tzedakah require whole-hearted commitment and discipline, so repentance requires a whole-hearted commitment to change one’s ways.

3.5.18


In this week’s Torah portion, Moses assembles the Israelites and reminds them of the commandment to observe Shabbat as a day of rest.  He also instructs them not to kindle light on Shabbat. Moses then reviews God’s instructions concerning the building of the Tabernacle and calls upon the people to bring gifts to be used in its construction. When Moses sees that the work is complete, he blesses the people of Israel.  Then God tells Moses to erect the Tabernacle on the first day of the first month and to place in it all of its specially crafted furnishings.  Moses then anoints Aaron and his four sons to be priests as God commanded him.

When Moses has finished the work, the cloud of God covers the Tabernacle and the presence of God fills it.  When the cloud is lifted from the Tabernacle, it is a signal to the Israelites to break camp and begin travel.  Throughout the journeys of the Israelites, a cloud of the Lord is present by day and a fire by night.

The placement of the prohibition of work on Shabbat immediately before the description of the building of the Tabernacle led the Rabbis to understand “work” – “milacha” to mean any activity that was needed for the construction of the Tabernacle.  The Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2) lists thirty-nine main categories of work – “avot” and there are many other kinds of work which are outgrowths of these main thirty-nine that are also forbidden. These latter are called toledot – offspring.  For example: sowing is in the avot category, therefore, watering plants is considered in the toledot class.  

2.27.18


Classical Judaism teaches not only belief in a supernatural being, but also in a belief that that being takes an interest in the affairs of the world.  The God of Israel redeemed the Israelites from Egypt, revealed Godself on Mount Sinai, performed miracles for them and established a covenant with them.  According to the Torah, God is interested and is involved in the affairs of humankind.  Does this involvement extend to individuals or to just to a collective people?  Is there a correlation between God providence and our behavior?  If there is a correlation, what is the nature of that correlation?

Many Biblical texts portray a correlation between the Israelites following the Torah and its commandments and God’s involvement in their lives.  If the Israelites follow the Torah and the commandments, then all will go well.  If not, they will be punished.  There are then other texts which are baffled by what appears in this world to be grave injustice.  People who behave inappropriately and are violent, who have no interest in God or in following God’s commandments, seem to prosper.  In other words, there seems to be an inconsistency between the idea of if you follow God’s word then good will follow and if you do not, then punishment will follow.

Maimonides, in his Guide to the Perplexed states:  “Divine Providence is connected with Divine intellectual influence, and the same beings which are benefited by the latter so as to become intellectual, and to comprehend things comprehensible to rational beings, are also under the control of Divine Providence, which examines all their deeds in order to reward or punish them… the method of which our mind is incapable of understanding.”

Maimonides believes that everything that happens to us is decided by and is the workings of God.  Sometimes the why and how we get rewarded and punished is beyond our understanding.  This answer works for some and not others, which is true with many concepts in Judaism.  I am not sure if the important question is why do bad things happen or who is responsible for them, but rather, how do we respond to the good and bad things that happen. One cannot know for certain why something good or bad happened to them, nor can they always be in control of these happenings, but we can have more input into how we respond to them.

2.19.18


In this portion, Moses is further told to instruct the Israelites to bring olive oil for lighting the lamps of the Tabernacle.  The lamps, which are to be the responsibility of the priests (Aaron and his sons), are to burn from evening to morning for all time.  Moses is told to ordain Aaron and his sons as priests.

Tetzaveh begins with the commandment to the Israelites to kindle the Tabernacle lights regularly.  The Hebrew phrase ner tamid used in this instruction has been transposed over time to refer not to an act to be performed perpetually, but to an object to be perpetually present.  Thus, the eternal light in our synagogues is there to maintain some sense of the original command found here regarding the light in the Tabernacle.  This command was later observed in the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem.

2.12.18


In this Torah portion, God instructs Moses to accept gifts from the Israelites, which are to be used in constructing the tabernacle.  Acceptable gifts include precious metals and stones, tanned skins, blue, purple, and crimson yarns and linen, and special oils and spices.

God tells Moses the blueprints according to which the Tabernacle and its contents are to be built.  The first object to be constructed is the Ark, which should be built of acacia wood, overlaid both inside and out with gold.  The tablets of the Law (which God will give Moses) are to be kept in the Ark.  Two gold cherubim (winged angelic beings described in biblical tradition as attending on God)are to be placed facing each other over the cover of the Ark.  The Ark is to be housed in the innermost chamber of the Tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies.

There is a prohibition to remove the poles of the Ark.  The commentator Kli Yakar regards the permanent attachment of the poles to the Ark as symbolic of the unbreakable links between Israel and Torah.  Rabbi Hirsch regards the prohibition to remove the poles as symbolic of the mobility of the Torah.  He states: “The poles of the Ark symbolize, the mission of the Ark and what it housed – to be carried beyond its place to wherever circumstances demanded.”  The commandment: “the poles shall not be removed” embodied the eternal message that the Torah is not restricted to the particular country where the Temple is situated.

The combination of the Kli Yakar’s idea that there must be a eternal connection between the people of Israel and Torah, and Rabbi Hirsch’s idea that the Torah is independent of place is only one more vehicle for reinforcing the importance of, and ability to make Torah a daily part of our lives.

2.5.18


This week’s parasha opens with the people of Israel gathered around Mount Sinai.  Moses presents a large number of God’s rules to them; hence the name of this parasha – mishpatim (rules).  The slavery of the Israelites in Egypt is recalled by Moses  to remind the people not to treat strangers, widows and orphans unfairly.  Moses repeats all of the rules to the people and then writes them down.  Offerings are made to seal the covenant with God and the people accept the law saying, “All the things God has commanded we will do.”  

When the Israelites are gathered around the mountain God begin by telling Moses:  “And these are the ordinances that you shall place before them”.  What do the words “that you shall place before them” mean?  Rashi states that Moses was commanded to teach not only the rules, but their underlying principles and reasoning, so that the people would understand them fully and be able to apply them properly.  The rules must be “placed before them”, in their fullness, like a table that is set and ready for a meal.  

 

From this we learn how we are obligated to teach others.  It is not sufficient to merely repeat a lesson two or three times. Rather, a teacher must relate the ideas to the student with their complete explanation, so that a student will not only know the information, but that they will take it to heart as well.

1.29.18


Yitro, Moses’ father-in-law brings Moses’ wife and two children to Moses, who is in the desert.  After observing how Moses settles disputes among the Israelites, he advises Moses to choose judges and delegate the easier cases to them.  Moses follows Yitro’s advice and Yitro returns to his own land.  

“And Yitro, the priest of Midian, the father-in-law of Moses, heard all that God did for Moses and for Israel His people.”  (Exodus 18:1)  Rashi cites the Talmud (Zevachim 116a):  What did Yitro hear to make him come and join the Jewish People?  The miracle of the crossing of the Red Sea and the war with Amalek.  What was unique about what Yitro heard, didn’t all the other surrounding nations hear about these occurrences as well?  The answer is that the others heard and they remained the same.  Yitro, however, didn’t merely hear, he took action.  Others were moved and inspired for a few moments but stayed where they were.  Yitro picked himself up and changed his life. (Ohr Yohail, vol.2 Vayakhail, p. 139)

Everyone has moments of inspiration.  The difference between a great person and an ordinary person is that the great person acts upon his/her inspirations.  When you obtain an important awareness, let it move you to actual changes in your life.

 

1.22.18


During their travels in the wilderness, the Israelites complain about the lack of water and food.  When the Israelites reach Marah, known for its bitter waters, God instructs Moses to throw a piece of wood into the water, and the water becomes sweet and suitable for drinking.  Shortly after this, God addresses the peoples’ complaints regarding their lack of food, by providing the Israelites with quail in the evening and manna in the morning.  On Friday, the Israelites are instructed to gather a double portion of manna, the first one for Friday and the second for Shabbat.  

“And the children of Israel came to Marah.  And they were not able to drink the water at Marah for they were bitter” (Ex. 15:23).  The Kotzker Rebbe explained the words “for they were bitter” as referring to the people themselves, not the water.  When someone is bitter himself, everything tastes bitter.  This concept holds true in many areas on life.  If a person feels bitter, nothing in life appears positive.  Anyone looking for faults and defects will always be able to find them.  A bitter person makes himself miserable and those in his environment suffer with him. While he thinks that he has valid reasons for considering things to be bitter, the source of the problem is not out there but within himself.  By sweetening one’s own outlook one will live in a much sweeter world.

1.15.18


This week’s parasha is the first to contain a comprehensive list of mitzvot.  The previous parshiyot, portions, have been mainly narrative, with an occasional mitzvah or moral lesson woven into the fabric of the story.  In her book Studies in the Book of Exodus, Nechama Leibowitz asks why is the Jewish way of life made up of so many positive and negative mitzvot?  To answer the question Nechama Leibowitz quotes the author of Sefer HaHinuch, a book that lists the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot in order of their occurrence in the Torah.  “…Know that man is influenced by his actions and his intellectual and emotional life is conditioned by the things he does, good or bad.”  According to the author of Sefer HaHinuch, it is actions that shape character.  Mitzvot are designed for every age group, every point in life, at all times and all places.  The spiritual impact of mitzvot was meant to be irresistible and all encompassing, constantly enabling us to do good and therefore be good.   We just have to open ourselves up and allow mitzvot to be a part of our daily lives.  

1.8.18


In this week’s parasha we read: God spoke to Moses and said to him: “I am the Lord.  I appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as El Shaddai, but (by) My name the Lord was I not known to them.”  This passage has puzzled many commentators as it claims that this is the first time this name of God is used, when in fact it was used on two previous occasions (the first when God appeared to Abraham, and the second when Jacob was about to leave the Holy Land).

How could it be maintained that God had not appeared to the Patriarchs by this name?  Rashi and Rambam (both Biblical commentators) say that this passage does not imply that God had not been revealed before to the Patriarchs by this name, but rather this particular aspect of God was being revealed for the first time, and that this particular attribute of God had not been evident until then.

Rashi says that the aspect of God revealed to us is that of a promise-keeper, while Rambam states that the attribute of God revealed to us is God working through open miracles rather than through ordinary events.  What is important to note here is the recognition that we perceive God through God’s manifestations in the world, through God’s deeds.  We have new opportunities to see different aspects and attributes of God each and every day.  We just have to permit ourselves to see them.

1.2.18


The Book of Exodus begins by recounting that the descendants of Jacob flourished and multiplied in Egypt.  A new Pharaoh arises who did not know Joseph and perceives the numerous Israelites as a potential threat.  The Egyptians enslave the Israelites, and make life miserable for them.  

A couple from the house of Levi bears a son and hides him for three months.  When the infant can no longer be hidden, his sister, Miriam, sets him afloat in the Nile River.  Pharaoh’s daughter finds the infant, rescues him, and names him Moses.  When Moses is grown, he kills an Egyptian taskmaster who was beating a Hebrew slave.  Due to this incident, he is forced to flee Egypt and ends up in Midian.  There he becomes a shepherd, a husband and a father.

One day, while Moses is tending his sheep, God appears to him in a burning bush.  God instructs Moses to lead the Israelites out of Egypt and into the land of Canaan.  Moses gives God a number of reasons why he should not be the one to redeem the Israelites, and God answers all of Moses’ objections.  Moses finally pleads with God to choose someone else.  It is at this point that God is angered.

One of the reasons Moses gives God for why he is inadequate for redeeming the Israelites from Egypt is, he is  “slow of speech”.  Rabbi Shlomo Riskin uses Moses’ reason that he is “slow of speech”, as a vehicle for examining the question where does God’s influence end and human activity begin.

Moses appears to be telling God that a man who cannot speak eloquently cannot possibly hope to convince the Egyptians to free the Israelites.  God responds “Who has made man’s mouth, or who makes man dumb, or deaf, or seeing, or blind?  Is not the Lord?”  Basically, if God can create the vehicle, God can certainly create the necessary accessories.

God’s response does not sit well with Moses and he pleads with God “send I pray you, by the hand of whomever you will send (but not by me).”  Moses is so convinced of God’s powers that he comes to the conclusion that it does not matter who God sends, because God can put the right words into anyone’s mouth.  Just let it be someone else.  The instrument is not important as long as God is with that person.

Rabbi Riskin writes that it is precisely this attitude that angers God.  Moses has all the faith in the world, maybe too much faith.  Just because God is in ultimate control of speech is not reason enough to justify removing all responsibility from human actors in the drama of the Jewish people.

God will certainly help, but God does not choose to act alone. It is true that we thank God for God’s help, but ultimately it is human beings who must speak the message and do the actions.

12.25.17


Jacob lives for 17 years in Egypt before feeling that his death is imminent.  He makes Joseph swear that Joseph will bury him in Canaan.  Prior to his death, Jacob adopts and blesses Joseph’s sons, Manasseh and Ephraim.  In the blessing, he elevates the younger Ephraim over Manasseh explaining to Joseph that Ephraim would father a larger people than Manasseh.

On his deathbed, Jacob summons his sons, and describes the character and tells the future of each one.  Jacob tells his sons to bury him in the Cave of Machpelah, where his ancestors are buried.

Following his death, Jacob is embalmed.  A great Egyptian procession accompanies Joseph and his brothers to Canaan.  When they reach Goren ha-Atad, a seven day mourning period is observed.  Joseph and his brothers return to Egypt after the burial.  The brothers are concerned, that with the death of their father, Joseph will seek revenge for having sold him.  But he tells them he will not seek revenge, as it was God’s plan that he come to Egypt.  

The book of Genesis closes with Joseph’s death at 110 years.  On his deathbed, he speaks to his brothers, requesting that his bones be taken back to the land of Israel.

In his deathbed blessing, Jacob does not leave material objects to his sons.  Rather, he does a character analysis and gives a future picture of the tribes.  In some ways, this may be a form of an ethical will.  Ethical wills are a well-established part of Jewish ethical literature.  Short and practical, such wills usually took the form of a great teacher’s deathbed advice to their students.  However, ethical wills also exist in which parents leave moral instructions for their children.

Ethical wills are very important to leave for children, but what makes a greater impact is how we live our lives while we are living.  “Do as I do” should be our motto, and we need to conduct ourselves with this motto in mind.

12.18.17


Jacob is told that Joseph is alive and is taken to see him in Egypt.  God calls to Jacob one night during the journey and tells Jacob that he will prosper in Egypt and that Joseph will be present at Jacob’s deathbed.

Jacob and Joseph have a tearful reunion.  The family continues to work as shepherds in Egypt in the region of Goshen.  The famine continues in Egypt and Joseph sells grain to the people.  Eventually, the people sell all they own to Pharaoh in order to purchase grain.  By the end of the famine, Pharaoh owns all of the land in Egypt save the land of the priests.  At the end of the famine, Joseph gives seeds to the people and directs then to repay Pharaoh with one-fifth of their harvest.

Joseph chooses to settle his family in Goshen, an area in northeastern Egypt (see Jewish History Atlas by Gilbert, p. 2).  The Egyptians worshipped sheep and thus had an aversion to shepherds.  Joseph was therefore able to justify the need for physical distance between his family and the Egyptian population centers.  The Netziv explained Joseph’s motive differently.  Joseph did not want the household of Jacob assimilating into Egyptian culture.  He wanted to preserve them as a group so they could become a nation.  Although the details are a bit different today, the issue of how to preserve the Jewish nation has been ongoing since Biblical times.

12.11.17


One night Pharaoh dreams two dreams which no one in his court can interpret.  The cupbearer remembers Joseph and brings him to Pharaoh.  Joseph tells Pharaoh that both dreams relay the same message.  There will be seven years of plenty and seven years of famine.  Joseph does not stop there.  He offers Pharaoh a plan for how to avoid disaster during the years of famine.  Pharaoh is impressed by Joseph and appoints him head of food collection and distribution.  

During the years of famine Jacob sends his sons, except for Benjamin, down to Egypt to buy grain.  The brothers appear before Joseph and he recognizes them.  Hiding his identity, Joseph accuses the brothers of being spies and decides to test them.  Joseph challenges the brothers to return with their youngest brother Benjamin.  

The brothers return with Benjamin, and Joseph continues his test.  After filling their order of grain, Joseph has his goblet placed in Benjamin’s bag.  Joseph then sends his men after his brothers and accuses them of theft.  When the goblet is found in Benjamin’s bag, Joseph declares that Benjamin must remain in Egypt as his slave, and that the other brothers are free to go.

How could Pharaoh have trusted Joseph to such a degree that he appointed him to be the main administrator of the plans to save Egypt from the shortages of the forthcoming famine?  True, Joseph was understanding and wise, but how could Pharaoh trust someone who was just released from prison and was previously a slave?

Rabbi Chayim Shmuelevitz, replied that Pharaoh saw Joseph’s extreme honesty in something he said before he related the interpretation of the dream.  Joseph began by saying to Pharaoh that he had no power to interpret dreams on his own.  It was entirely a gift from God.  Joseph did not want to take credit, even for a moment.  This total honesty in one minor point showed that Joseph could be completely trusted.  It is incredible to think about how many times “little” things go a long way toward establishing our credibility and have a big impact or make an impression on who we are and how we are perceived.

12.4.17


Throughout the next four Torah portions we read about Joseph and his life.  Joseph was Jacob’s favorite son; the other brothers felt this favoritism and they were jealous.  Joseph dreams two dreams which foreshadow his supremacy over his family.  He relates these dreams to the family, which does little to help the already strained relations between Joseph and his brothers.  

Jacob and his sons were shepherds.  Jacob sends Joseph to check on his brothers and their sheep.  Upon seeing Joseph, the brothers plot to kill him.  Reuben convinces the brothers not to kill Joseph, but rather to throw him into a pit, from which Reuben plans to later rescue him.  Plans have a way of changing, and without Reuben’s knowledge, the brothers decide to sell Joseph to some merchants.  Before Joseph is sold, the brothers take his famous coat of many colors.  The coat is then dipped in goat’s blood and presented to Jacob as proof of Joseph’s having been killed by a wild animal.   The merchants sell Joseph to Potiphar, who is an Egyptian noble.

Potiphar entrusts Joseph with the entire house.  Life looks good for Joseph until Potiphar’s wife who could not get Joseph to succumb to her, accuses him of rape.  Joseph is jailed, and there he meets Pharaoh’s cupbearer and baker.  While in prison, they both have dreams, which Joseph interprets.  Joseph correctly foretells that the cupbearer will return to his service in the palace, and the baker will be put to death.  Joseph asks the cupbearer to remember him, but he is forgotten.

“And Joseph was brought down to Egypt (39:10).”  Anyone viewing the scene of Joseph being brought down to Egypt as a slave would have considered it a major tragedy.  His brothers sold him into slavery and he was being taken far away from his father and his homeland.  But the reality was that this was the first step toward his being appointed the second in command of Egypt.  He would eventually be in charge of the national economy of Egypt and would be the mastermind behind the complex program to prepare for the years of famine during the years of plenty.

Later on, when Jacob went down to Egypt, anyone viewing the scene would have considered it a very positive one.  Jacob was going to be reunited with his favorite son after so many years of separation. His son was a powerful leader and he would be treated with the honors of royalty.  But what was the total picture.  This was the first step in the exile of the Children of Israel.  Their enslavement in Egypt was beginning at this very moment, although the entire process would take some time until it was finally felt.

No human being has the ability to know what the final consequences of any situation will actually be.  Therefore, when a situation seems to be extremely negative, do not despair.  This could lead to wonderful things for you.  Conversely, when things seem to be going extremely well, do not become complacent or arrogant.  One can never tell what the future has in store.

11.27.17


On his journey back to Canaan, Jacob passes through the territory controlled by Esau.  Jacob seeks reconciliation with his brother, and sends gifts ahead, hoping to fend off a hostile confrontation.  Jacob divides his family into two camps and sends them over the river to safety.  Jacob spends the night on the other side of the river – alone.

During the night, a “man” comes to Jacob and wrestles with him until dawn.  When the “man” realizes that he will not prevail, he wrenches Jacob’s thigh, but Jacob will not release him.  Jacob demands a blessing from the “man.” The “man” gives Jacob a new name – Israel, which means, “one who struggles with God.”

Although the text states that Jacob wrestled with a man that night, all the commentators agree that it was no ordinary human being.  Rambam and Ramban differ as to the exact nature of the struggle.  Was it an actual event in the real world sense, or was it an internal struggle?  Of more importance, what did the struggle accomplish?

The event tested and changed Jacob.  It tested his strength; he prevailed, showing the strength that would be required for future events (The Anchor Bible by Speiser, p. 257).  Through this event, we learn what it takes to remake one’s own character – the ability to hold on.  Jacob refuses to let go and he wrestles the stranger throughout the night.  Only in the morning does Jacob agree to let go, and then only after receiving a new name, a renewed identity.

The struggle of Jacob and the mysterious man leaves its mark on Jacob, who limps away with a wounded thigh.  Our struggles in life, with others and with ourselves, leave scars.  But they also produce growth and change.  Jacob is no longer the wily, shrewd person he once was.  Instead, through the process of introspection, remorse, and a commitment to confront his own failings, Jacob is able to remake himself.

11.20.17


While fleeing to Haran, Jacob rests one night.  In a dream, Jacob sees angels ascending and descending a ladder.  God comes to Jacob and repeats the same blessing given to Abraham and Isaac, and promises to protect and return him to Canaan.  Jacob vows that God will be his God if God fulfills the promises.

In Genesis 28:12 we read, “And Jacob had a dream and in his dream there was a ladder standing on the ground and its top reached the heavens”. The Chofetz Chaim cited the idea expressed by many commentators that the ladder Jacob saw in his dream symbolizes the situation of every person in this world.  There are two actions a person performs on a ladder.  Either he goes up from the bottom to the top, or he goes down from the top to the bottom.  Each day in a person’s life he faces new challenges.  If he has the willpower and self-discipline to overcome those challenges, he goes up in his spiritual level.  If, however, a person fails to exercise the necessary self-control, he lowers himself.  This is our daily task, to climb higher each day.

There is no standing in one place.  When challenges arise, you will either behave in an elevated manner and grow from the experience or you will fail.  Learn to appreciate the daily challenges that face you.  Every difficulty is a means of elevating yourself.  Every time you overcome a negative impulse you grow as a person.  When a person climbs a ladder, he feels his progress with each step.  So too with your daily victories over your negative impulses – feel your progress and you will have the motivation to continue climbing.

11.13.17


Rebecca is barren, so Isaac prays to God on her behalf.  God responds to Isaac’s prayers and Rebecca conceives twins.  The twins struggle with each other within the womb, and this struggle will continue once they are born.  The firstborn Esau, is red and hairy.  He is a hunter and is favored by Isaac.  The younger son, Jacob, is a quiet individual whom Rebecca favors.

One day, while Jacob is cooking stew Esau comes in starving and demands some.  As payment, Jacob insists that Esau sell him his birthright.  Esau agrees to the stated price and has some dinner.

Esau takes two wives from among the Hittites.  Isaac and Rebecca are not happy with this.  Isaac grows old, and the time for blessing his sons is near.  Isaac instructs Esau to hunt and prepare a meal for him after which Isaac will bless him.  Rebecca overhears the conversation, and recalls God having told her that her older son would serve her younger son (Genesis 25:23).  She needed to take action, so Rebecca convinces Jacob to deceive his father.  With Rebecca’s help, Jacob does so and receives Esau’s blessing for himself.  Rebecca, fearing that Esau will take revenge against Jacob, tells Jacob to flee to Haran, to her brother Laban.  In order to have Isaac approve of Jacob’s journey, Rebecca convinces Isaac that Jacob should be sent to Laban to find a bride from among her family.

In Genesis 25:20 we read: “And Isaac was forty years old when he took Rebecca, the daughter of Betual the Aromite, from Padan Arom, the sister of Laban the Aromite, for himself for a wife.”  Rashi raises the question that the information in this verse about Rebecca’s background seems superfluous.  The Torah had already stated that Rebecca was the daughter of Betual, the sister of Lavan, and was from Padam Aram.  The answer, says Rashi, is that this restatement is in praise of Rebecca.  She was the daughter of an evil person, the sister of an evil person and lived in a community of evil people.  Nevertheless, she did not learn from their evil behavior.

Many people try to excuse their faults by blaming others as the cause of their behavior.  “It’s not my fault I have this bad trait, I learned it from my mother and father.”  “I’m not to blame for this bad habit since all my brothers and sisters do it also.” We see from Rebecca that regardless of the faulty behavior of those in our surroundings, we have the ability to be more elevated.  Of course, it takes courage and a lot of effort to be different.  The righteous person might be considered a nonconformist and even rebellious by those in his environment whose standard of values are below their level.  But a basic Torah principle is that we are responsible for our own actions. Pointing to others in your environment who are worse than us is not a valid justification for not behaving properly.

If you ever find yourself saying, “It’s not my fault I did this.  It’s because of the way I was raised,” change your focus to “I’ll make a special effort to improve in this area to overcome the tendency to follow in the footsteps of others.”  Blaming others for your faults and saying that you cannot do anything to change them will be a guarantee that they will remain with you.

I will address the complicated issue of Rebecca and Jacob “stealing” Esau’s firstborn blessing at another time.  It, like life, is more complicated than it looks.

11/6/17


This week’s Parasha, opens with the death of Sarah. Sarah lived 127 years, and was buried in the Cave of Machpelah, which Abraham bought from the Hittites. Abraham decides that a wife should be found for his son Isaac, and directs his servant Eliezer to search for this wife. Abraham cautions Eliezer not to take a Canaanite woman for Isaac, so Eliezer travels to Abraham’s birthplace.

Upon his arrival, Rebecca, Abraham’s niece, comes to the well at which Eliezer and his entourage is resting. Through her words and actions, her kindness and generosity, Eliezer knows that she is “the one” for Isaac. Eliezer is welcomed into Rebecca’s father’s house, and it is agreed that Rebecca will go to Canaan to become Isaac’s wife. Isaac was meditating in the field when he first saw Rebecca.

Our rabbis tell us that Isaac was not merely meditating and communing with nature, but was engaging in prayer, for he had instituted that tradition of the Minchah afternoon prayer service (Talmud Brachot 25a). The afternoon prayer service is the shortest of the three daily prayer services. Often popularly called “that pause that refreshes,” it is a service during the middle of the day that affords the worshipper an additional opportunity to cultivate genuine appreciation of the true blessings of life.

Prayer is an opportunity for us to connect with God. In order to connect, I have to open myself up. This is also true in terms of interpersonal relationships. In order for me to connect with another person, I have to open myself up to them, be open to their world and how they see it.

Our relationship with God shapes our relationship with other human beings. A genuine conversation between two people is like prayer. In prayer, I am looking for the presence of God. I am listening and speaking, opening myself up to something other than what I am seeing, to something bigger than myself, to becoming something bigger than myself. The same can be said in terms of a conversation between two people. How appropriate that Isaac was seen praying when he first met Rebecca, the woman with whom he would share his life and become bigger than who he was on his own.

10.30.17


As this week’s Torah portion begins, God appears to Abraham as he is sitting in his tent doorway.  During the visit from God, Abraham looks up and sees three visitors approaching him.  He welcomes them with a great show of hospitality.   According to tradition, the visitors are the angels, Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael.  In the middle of their stay, one of the angels predicts that Sarah will finally give birth to a son, whom they will name Isaac.

After the visitors leave, God informs Abraham that the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah will be destroyed.  A discussion ensues in which Abraham bargains for the citizens of these cities.

God tests Abraham and commands him to offer his son Isaac as a sacrifice.  Abraham obeys, and as he is about to lower the knife to slay his son, an angel calls out to stop him.  Due to Abraham’s obedience God repeats his promise to make him a great nation.

Abraham is tested by God, being asked to sacrifice his beloved son Isaac.  The Torah does not state precisely why God is testing Abraham.  Is it to test Abraham’s faith that God will not go back on God’s promise?  Or is it to test Abraham’s unquestioning obedience to the divine will, his faithfulness rather than his faith?

Maimonides writes that God tested Abraham precisely because God knew that he would pass the test.  Abraham’s faith would therefore become a beacon to the nations.  The philosopher Franz Rosenzweig sees in the test a temptation by God.  According to his view, God purposely conceals God’s true purpose, giving Abraham an opportunity to ground his faith in trust and freedom.  Others say that the test was for Isaac, to see if he has faith and faithfulness as well as the extent of his ability to be the next leader.  Yet others say that Abraham actually failed the test and that is why neither God and Abraham and Abraham nor Isaac ever speak again.

10/23/17


In the Torah portion of Lech Lecha, God tells Abram to leave his home and go to a land, which God will show him.  God promises Abram that a special land will be set aside for him and his descendants, and that Abram will be the father of a great nation.  When blessing Abram, God states: “And I will bless those that bless you, and those that curse you I will curse!”

The two parts of this verse present a contrast.  In the first part, the predicate is followed by the object, whereas in the second part the object precedes the predicate. The commentator, the Kli Yakar, noting this contrast, offers an illuminating insight.  Good intentions, though not yet carried out, are rewarded by God as accomplished deeds.  Evil intentions, on the other hand, are punishable only when they have been put into effect.

Therefore, the Torah states, “I will bless them” at the beginning of the verse in order to indicate that they will be blessed from the moment they intend to bless you; even though they have not actually done so yet.  The opposite is true of “those that curse you.”  Here bad intentions do not count as deeds.  Therefore, “I will curse” follows “and those that curse you.”

This idea of rewarding for a thought and not punishing until the act takes place is a great motivator for us to not only be the best we can, but it is also a beautiful reminder for us to give others with whom we interact the same opportunity to be the best they can be as well as the benefit of the doubt.

10.16.17


Parashat Noach (Gen. 6:9-11:32)

This week’s parasha is Noah and describes the widely known story of the ark, the flood and those who were saved.  The parasha describes Noah as “a righteous man; he was blameless in his age; Noah walked with God” (Genesis 6:9).  The rest of humanity was known to be corrupt and evil.  God is distraught over the decision to create human beings and decides to start anew.

God commands Noah to build an ark and to bring seven pairs of all of the clean animals and one pair of all of the unclean animals found on earth. God also commands Noah to bring along his wife, his three sons (Shem, Ham and Japheth), and their wives.  Noah follows God’s command without hesitation.

God could have saved Noah in many ways.  Why did God burden Noah with the construction of an ark?  Rashi states that the construction of the ark was designed to arouse curiosity among the people.  Upon seeing the ark in its various stages of construction, the people would be prompted to ask Noah, “Why are you building an ark?” to which Noah would reply, “Due to the corrupt manner in which people relate to each other, God has chosen to destroy the earth, with a flood,” – providing the people with an opportunity to repent.

I think we can look at the length of time it took to build the ark not as an opportunity for the people walking by the ark to ask about it and repent, but rather as an opportunity for Noah to reach beyond himself.  I think God was testing Noah and his leadership abilities.  God wanted to see if Noah would question God about destroying humanity.  Would he demand to know how God could do this or would he just be concerned about his own welfare and the welfare of his family.

Noah was not quite there, but his descendant Abram would have the guts and courage to call out God on God.  Tune in next week for a continuation of the story.

Shmini Atzeret/Simchat Torah.17


With this last set of holidays, Shmini Atzeret and Simchat Torah, we not only finish the holiday season we also finish reading the Torah.  In the same service that we conclude reading the last words of Deuteronomy, we immediately begin reading the book of Genesis.  There is no “end” to reading the Torah.  We are never finished reading and studying the Torah and its lessons.  We re-read and re-study the same stories every year.  

One could ask, “Isn’t there some point where we have studied the story of creation, or Noah’s Ark, or the story of the Offering of Isaac enough times?” The answer is, no, there is always something we can learn.  Every year we are different, and therefore we have the opportunity to see something new in the same story we read and studied last year.  This is true in life as well.  We may be doing the same thing we were doing last year, but hopefully we have grown in the past year. So although things look the same, we are not.  How we interact with life around us, depends on us and how we push and enable our developed selves to interact with our existing stories.

Succot 17


During the process of gathering the harvest (around the month of Tishrei in the land of Israel) farmers must leave their homes, their gathered produce, and their material wealth to dwell in the sukkah. In doing so, it is hoped that they remember the time when they had nothing and were entirely dependent on God for their sustenance – the time that their ancestors lived in sukkot in the wilderness and ate manna from heaven; their entire survival directly dependent upon God’s providence. But after they were settled in the land and it started to yield fruit in abundance as a result of their hard work, the danger of their forgetting that God is the source of all blessing and success became a likelihood. There was a probable chance for them to become haughty and say to themselves, “My own power and the might of my own hand have won this wealth for me” [Deut. 8: 17].

Even though most of us are no longer farmers, we are still instructed to leave our homes and to enter temporary booths, in order to put our material possessions into proper perspective.  The hope is that we give thanks to God in recognition of the fact that God is the source of all blessings, not just when we have no natural source of sustenance, but even when it appears that we have everything we need without God’s assistance. According to this view, Sukkot is not about remembering miracles in the past; rather, it is meant to remind us of our source of well being in the present. By reliving the sukkah of our humble origins, we gain perspective about our good lives in the here and now. Excessive pride and arrogance are inappropriate reactions to our material wealth considering that we once had nothing and survived only by the grace of God. We should realize that just as God was responsible for our survival in the desert, God is responsible for the good life in our land as well.

V’Zot HaBracha


V’zot HaBracha is the final parasha of the Torah.  It contains Moses’ last words, which are blessings to each of the tribes.  There is also a closing blessing for all of the tribes, in which Moses reminds the tribes of the abundance they are to enjoy and the goodness which God has bestowed upon them.  Moses then ascends Mount Nebo and God shows him the land of Israel.  Moses dies at the age of 120.  His burial place is unknown.  Upon hearing of his death, the Israelites observe a 30 day period of mourning.  

Joshua assumes the leadership position of the Israelites and is faced with the task of entering and conquering the land of Israel.  The parasha, and thus the Torah, closes with the statement that there would never again be a prophet like Moses.

“And this is the blessing, with which Moses, the man of God, blessed the children of Israel before his death” (Deut.  33:1).  Why is Moses called “the man of God”?  The commentator Ibn Ezra states that this title was given to Moses to stress the prophetic origin and force of the words uttered in the parasha; that they did not merely proceed from Moses’ own mouth, but were endowed with Divine authority.  Other commentators take the opposite view, that these words were Moses’ own words, bidding farewell to his people, in contradistinction to the rest of his utterances in the Torah, which were God’s words.

There is a beautiful midrash, an interpretative story, that explains the verse in a way that is appropriate for each of us.  It states that when God came to Moses and told him that the hour of his death was approaching, Moses replied: “Please wait until I bless Israel.  All my life they have had no pleasant experiences with me, for I constantly rebuked them and admonished them to fear God and fulfill the commandments.  I do not wish to leave this world before I have blessed them.”  Anyone can find fault with others.  True greatness is to see the good points of others.

What a great message for each of us to remember every day of our lives.  Have an easy fast.

 

9/18/17


Parashat Ha’Azinu is comprised of a poem warning the People of Israel of their impending rebellion against God. Moses calls upon the heaven and earth to witness his words.

The second verse of chapter 32 reads: “May my teaching drop like rain, may my utterance flow like the dew; like the storm winds upon vegetation and like raindrops upon blades of grass.” I have read two interpretations of this verse, and I would like to share them with you.

The first interpretation comes from the medieval commentator Rashi. He states that the rain in this verse refers to the words of Torah. Moses asked that the Torah penetrate the People of Israel like life-giving rain and like dew. Storm winds give strength and life to vegetation, and similarly, the struggle to master Torah gives us, its students, life and purpose. Moses wanted the words of Torah to penetrate the people and make it fruitful, like the rain and dew.

The second interpretation comes from Rabbi Bunim of Parshisco. Rabbi Bunim understands this verse very differently. Whereas Rashi understood the rain to be the words of Torah, Rabbi Bunim understands the rain to indicate words of admonition. He states that when rain falls on trees and plants, growth is not immediately noticeable. It takes time for the rain to have a visible effect. This is also true with admonition. Very often we will try to help a person improve themself, but we will not see a change in that person. Rabbi Bunim says that we must keep trying because persistence and a smile go a long way.

I believe that both of these interpretations provide us with much to think about as we begin this new Jewish year.

9/11/17


 

This week’s parasha, Nitzavim-VaYelech, is a double portion (this is done so we can complete the reading of the entire Torah in one Jewish year). Moses continues his farewell to the people, and states that the covenant is not only with them, but with all of the people of Israel, past, present and future.

Moses foretells of the people’s rebellion against God after his death, and describes to them the evil that will befall them because of this rebellion. After a time, the people will repent and God will restore them to the Land of Israel. Moses tells the people that they have a choice between life and death, and charges them to choose life, by choosing to obey God and God’s commandments.

Moses continues and explains that he is no longer able to be an active leader. He appoints Joshua as the next leader of the People of Israel. God instructs Moses to write down a poem that will serve as a witness warning the people against their upcoming rebellion. The parasha closes with Moses preparing to deliver the poem to the People of Israel.

“For this commandment that I command you today – it is not hidden from you and it is not distant. It is not in heaven, [for you ] to say, ‘Who can ascend to the heaven for us and take it for us, so that we can listen and perform it?’ …Rather, the matter is very near to you- in your mouth and your heart – to perform it.” Deuteronomy 30:11-14 tells us that the law which we must know and observe is not beyond reach. Everyone is capable of studying and understanding it.

There is a midrash (interpretative story) on this verse. A fool went to the synagogue and asked how one might begin to learn the law. The Rabbis answered that study begins with the Torah, then the Prophets, followed by the Writings. After you have studied the whole Tanach (Torah, Prophets and Writings), one learns, Mishnah, Talmud and Halacha (Jewish Law). The fool thinks, how can I do all of this, and turns to leave. The wise person learns one chapter each day until one completes the task (Deuteronomy Rabbah 8:3).

The hardest part of a journey is taking the first step. With the Jewish New Year approaching, what a wonderful time to take that first step in making Judaism a more permanent part of our lives.

Ki Tavo 17


In this week’s Torah portion, entitled Ki Tavo, which translates into “when you enter the land,” Moses instructs the Israelites regarding the law of bikurim, the bringing of the first fruits.  Moses states that when the Israelites enter the Land of Israel and settle it, they are to bring the first fruits as sacrifices of thanksgiving to God.  As part of the ceremony, the priest recites a history of the Israelites – Abraham and Jacob’s wanderings, the slavery in Egypt, and the possession of the Land of Israel.

The first fruits are brought after the Israelites have settled the land and actually have fruits to offer.  Moses is telling the Israelites about a ceremony that will take place in the future.  When these words are spoken, the Israelites are on the other side of the Jordan River, hoping and waiting to take the next step in building the land and taking the next step in becoming a people that live in their own land.  Moses also provides the wording for the ceremony.  The wording for the ceremony describes the history of the Israelites.  The  history and experiences that have lead them to this miraculous opportunity to be able to offer the first fruits that were grown and harvested in the land of Israel to God.

This ceremony, that will take place in the future, celebrates that the Israelites are living in and cultivating the land of Israel at that time and for generations to come  The language of the ceremony places the Israelites past and path at its center.  This is an essential step in going forward for the Israelites as they take their next step in settling the land and continuing to become a people.  This is also true with us as individual people, as a Jewish community and as Americans.   In order to know where we are going, we need to know from where we have come. Then we have to let that become part of how we move forward.

8/30/17


This week’s Torah portion is Ki Tetze and continues a repetition of the mitzvot by which Israel is commanded to live. It contains 74 mitzvot.  Jewish teachers have continually looked for an underlying rationale for the observance of the mitzvot. A commentary entitled Devarim Rabbah 6:3 gives us an insight. “Rabbi Pinchas ben Hama said: Wherever you go and whatever you do, pious deeds will accompany you. When you build a new house, ‘make a parapet for your roof’ (Deuteronomy 22:8). When you make a door, ‘write [the commandments] upon your doorposts’ (Deuteronomy 6:9). When you put on new clothing, don’t ‘wear cloth that combines wool and linen’ (Deuteronomy 19:27). When you cut your hair, don’t’ ‘round the corners of you head’ (Leviticus 19:27). When you plough your field, do not, ‘plow with an ox and an ass together’ (Deuteronomy 22:20). When you reap your harvest, and have forgotten a sheaf, don’t pick it up. Leave it for the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow (Deuteronomy 24:19).”

The mitzvot are commandments and are commanded in order to imbue each common, mundane, human action with a sense of holiness. The mitzvot give us an opportunity to see and to seek out holiness in the everyday. It is our mission to take advantage of the opportunities presented to us.

4/17/17


In “The Jewish Way,” Rabbi Yitz Greenberg teaches that the Exodus from Egypt teaches not just about social justice in the past and present, but of the redemption of the world in the future. “The overwhelming majority of earth’s human beings have always lived in poverty and under oppression, their lives punctuated by sickness and suffering…Most of the nameless and faceless billions know the world as indifferent or hostile. Statistically speaking, human life is of little value. The downtrodden and the poor accept their fate as destined; the powerful and the successful accept good fortune as their due. Power, rather than justice, seems always to rule.

Jewish religion affirms otherwise: Judaism insists that history and the social-economic-political reality in which people live will eventually be perfected; much of what passes for the norm of human existence is really a deviation from the ultimate reality.

How do we know this? From an actual event in history – the Exodus…The freeing of the slaves testified that human beings are meant to be free…No, the Exodus did not destroy evil in the world. What it did was set up an alternative conception of life. Were it not for the Exodus, humans would have reconciled themselves to the evils that exist in the world. The Exodus establishes the dream of perfection and thereby creates the tension that must exist until reality is redeemed.”

4/10/17


The story of the Jewish people’s exodus from Egyptian slavery has served the Jewish people, on a national and individual level, as an inspiration in the midst of oppression. The drama of the Exodus has given hope for a brighter future. For some, the Exodus is not seen as a one time event, but rather as God’s intervention in the world and in God’s promise that God will be with the Jewish people.

In “The Role of Non-establishment Groups”, journalist Walter Ruby exhibits this idea when he wrote “virtually no one,… dared predict in 1985-88, that the seemingly impregnable citadel of repression that was the Soviet Union would self-destruct so quickly, or that more than 500,000 Jews would be able to leave the USSR in three years beginning in late 1989.

The only person I remember who made such a prediction was Avital Sharansky, who told me during an interview in New York during a very bleak moment in 1984 … that not only would Anatoly soon be granted his freedom, but that hundreds of thousands more Soviet Jews would be coming on aliyah in the near future.

I asked Avital what was her basis for being so optimistic at a moment when U.S.-Soviet relations had hit a low point. She responded with evident seriousness that her study of Judaism had convinced her that the God of Israel had already preordained a great modern Exodus of Soviet Jewry to rival the biblical Exodus from Egypt. I recall feeling in awe of Avital’s evident deep faith in Jewish redemption in the face of an implacable situation that appeared to be turning more ominous, but concluding sadly that she was engaged in willful self-delusion. I fact, Avital Sharansky’s unworldly vision proved prophetic.”

4/3/17


The redemption of the Jewish people from Egyptian slavery was and continues to be a defining moment in Jewish history. In Genesis 15:13-14, in the context of the covenant with Abraham and the Jewish people, God foretells the suffering that Israel would endure as slaves in a foreign land. This can suggest that this experience is of significance to the very reason and mission of the Jewish people.

In Deuteronomy 24:17-22 we read: “You shall not subvert the rights of the stranger or the fatherless; you shall not take a widow’s garment in pawn. Remember that you were a slave in Egypt and that the Lord your God redeemed you from there; therefore do I enjoin you to observe this commandment. When you reap the harvest in your field and overlook a sheaf in the field, do not turn back to get it; it shall go to the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow – in order that the Lord your God may bless you in all your undertakings. When you beat down the fruit of your olive trees, do not go over them again; that shall go to the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow. When you gather the grapes of your vineyard, do not pick it over again; that shall go to the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow. Always remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt; therefore do I enjoin you to observe this commandment.”

In society, we tend to view gifts to the less fortunate than us as charity. Charity is understood as what we give out of the goodness of our hearts, when we feel moved to give. The Torah takes a different view on charity. We call it tzedakah, which has its root in the word righteous, and justice. We are told that assistance to those less fortunate than us is in fact a matter of law. We are required to act in a way that reflects sensitivity for those who are vulnerable. God has gifted something to us, money, a harvest, etc., and we are obligated to give some of that to the needy. The imposition of this demand is that we were slaves in Egypt and that we were redeemed from there. We were a persecuted group who suffered at the hands of others, and we were redeemed from there in order to do right in the world.

I have heard people say about Passover, “We were slaves, God redeemed us (let’s eat).” But that is not the story. There should not be a “period” after “us.” Rather there should be a comma. The real message of Passover is, “We were slaves, God redeemed us, so that we could become a holy nation.” The challenge is to live the second half of that sentence in our everyday lives.

3/27/17


Judaism is a religion that attaches meaning and purpose to life. The mitzvot are intended to enhance and enrich us and the lives we live. With Judaism’s focus on life, what does that mean about Judaism’s perspective on death? Is death the cessation of life or is it the beginning of a new type of existence? Does how we behave in this life have any connection to what happens to us after we die?

While there are a clear Biblical references to burial and mourning practices, there are few Biblical references to what happens after one dies. There are references to sheol – which is described as a destination for all dead, but the Bible’s silence on the topic could suggest its belief in finality to life once one takes his/her final breath.

By the time of the rabbinic period, 3rd century B.C.E – 6th century C.E., we see the belief in an afterlife was a central theme. What the nature of the afterlife was varied, from it being a place where the soul of only the righteous ascended to a place where everybody ascends, even the wicked, after their souls have been purged over the course of a year.

Rabbi Peter Schweitzer states that “We live on after our death in the God works that we have done in the good name we have made for ourselves… we gain a kind of immortality through our deeds and our accomplishments, the institutions that we build, the charities that we endow, the families we nurture, and the lasting memories that endure in the minds of those who will survive us.”

2/06/17


The Exodus from Egypt is a significant event in Jewish history.  It is where we began the transformation from people to a nation.  The Egyptian experience provides much of the basis for social justice and morality.  We are told not to subvert the rights of strangers and orphans, we are prohibited from taking a widow’s garment as a guarantee for a loan and if we overlook a sheaf in the field we are not permitted to retrieve it.

The collective memory of the Exodus from Egypt has served the Jewish people as an inspiration in the midst of oppression.  The Exodus has given perpetual hope for a brighter future.  Throughout history, Jews have continuously prayed to God and asked to be redeemed again.

In 1963, Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel delivered the opening address at the National Conference on Religion and Race in Chicago. “At the first conference on religion and race, the main participants were Pharaoh and Moses.  Moses’ first words were:  ‘Thus says the Lord, the God of Israel, let My people go that they may celebrate a feast to Me.’  While Pharaoh retorted:’Who is the Lord that I should heed his voice and Let Israel go?  I do not know the Lord, and moreover I will not let Israel go.’  The outcome of that summit meeting has not come to an end.  Pharaoh is not ready to capitulate.  The exodus began, but is far from having been completed.  In fact, it was easier for the children of Israel to cross the Red Sea than for a Negro to cross certain university campuses.”

For Rabbi Heschel, the Bible’s tale of the Exodus served as the foundation for his belief that human beings are meant to be free and equal.  That message can be quite complicated to actually live out, but is a message we need to struggle with to live out everyday.

2/06/17


If the Torah is an eternal document, how do we reconcile issues or topics that were written about in the Torah that do not seem to be in step with our modern day thinking? Women’s roles in society, slavery, or polygamy are a few of those possible topics.

Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits, in “Jewish Women in Time and Torah” offers a thoughtful suggestion. He writes: “If one considers the status of women as it emerges from these laws, mores, and opinions, one cannot help wondering: Is this Judaism? Is this Torah? How is all of this to be reconciled with Torah values and ideals? What happened to ‘And thou shalt love your fellow as yourself’ and to “Righteousness, righteousness, thou shalt pursue’?… Undoubtedly, the basic views and values that originally determined the status of women in Jewish society were not derived from the Torah, even though many of them were later given midrashic justification. They were Torah-tolerated because they could not be abolished with an act of Torah legislation. They had to be tolerated, but certain changes and differences were present which indicated that an entirely different system of values and teachings also existed…we have discovered the developing status of women as it passed through two different levels: the Torah-tolerated one and the Torah-guided and Torah-instructed one. On the first and lowest level, in the early man-built and man-maintained society, woman is not recognized as possessing her own personality. At this stage she is merely an impersonal adjunct to the male. It is the Torah-teaching that recognizes her in her own personal existence and establishes her human dignity in a world in which she has her own vitally important place because of her own life-related nature.”

Read more…

1/30/17


What does it mean to be the Chosen People?  Does the idea of chosenness imply entitlement or responsibility?

For contemporary western-minded people we are uncomfortable with the idea of chosenness, as it goes against values of equality.  If God created all human beings, why would God single out one group of people?  For what purpose?

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks writes,  “ The Hebrew Bible speaks of a God who not only loves, but who loves precisely those who are otherwise unloved – the younger rather than the older, the weak, not the strong; the few, not the many.  From this flow all acts of chosenness in the Bible: Abel, not Cain; Abraham, not a nation; Isaac, not Ishmael; Jacob, not Esau; Israel the slaves, rather than Egypt the masters.  To be sure, no one is rejected.  Divine choice does not mean that God is with this person, not that; with one nation, not another…There is nothing exclusive about patriarchal covenant:  “Through you shall all the families be blessed.”  But there is nonetheless an insistence on the integrity of diversity, the dignity of difference; the preciousness to God of those whom the world ignore or mistreats,  God sets His image on the only creature for whom difference is a source of identity, namely man.  And to exemplify this truth, He chooses Israel, the people who are called on to be different, to show that for God, difference matters.”

Read more…

1/23/17


What could the purpose or purposes be for keeping kosher?  Do we need a reason, or is because God said so enough?  If we do not need a reason, but would still like one, what could a reason be for keeping kosher?

One could say kashrut is about healthy eating.  In addressing the aspect of keeping kosher that states which animals are permitted or forbidden to be eaten, there are those who say the animals permitted or prohibited are better or are harmful to your body and how it functions.  Others state that the animals permitted and prohibited for us to eat are categorized by whether or not they prey on animals.  We are only permitted to eat those animals that do not eat other animals.  This can absolutely be seen as an oxymoron, we are determining the permissibility of animals we can eat based on the fact that they do not eat other animals.

There are yet others who would say kashrut for them is all about the idea of training oneself to make choices with the very thing that we need to sustain ourselves.  They would say it does not matter what is permitted and what is forbidden, something needed to be in and out.  Kashrut is about us differentiating ourselves from animals by making conscious decisions with regard to the very thing that we need to survive – food.  By making choices with regards to food, we create a structure in our lives that sets us up to acknowledge we have to control and can be in control of how we live.  We have choices as to how to live and we need to aspire to make thoughtful choices with each step every day of our lives.  That first step begins with food and then branches out to all of the other aspects of our lives.  Conscious, thoughtful decisions – that is what Judaism expects from us.

1/16/17


What role does Halacha, Jewish law, play in deciding ritual practice?  Does Jewish practice have to be dictated by Jewish law? Can I decide what and how I want to observe Jewish ritual?  What role does community pressure play on one’s observance?

 

There are pros and cons to each of these approaches.  One could observe Jewish ritual by following Halacha to the “t”, but it could be without heart.  One could observe based on purely personal feeling toward that ritual, but then where is the commitment that goes beyond whim.
The more difficult approach is following the structure that pushes us beyond relying on our personal feelings, stretches us and at the same time forces us to make sure that Jewish practice and Judaism in general are not a “dead hand without a heart and soul.”  How this balance works is an eternal Jewish challenge.

1/10/17


Do the origins of the Torah have any impact on how I observe? If so, what role does it play?  Is it all or nothing?  Why do we think in black and white?  Will I ever be able to prove the origins of the Torah?  If I could, would that change how I practice?  Do I only practice how I practice because I feel beholden to one vision or another that someone else has presented?

If I believe the Torah was written by God, then the authority of Biblical law is God and Biblical law can only be changed by God.  If I believe the Torah was written by humans, than I will probably believe the authority of Biblical law is humans and Biblical law can be changed by humans.

For instance, driving on shabbat is prohibited in the Torah because it violates the biblical commandment of lighting a fire, among other prohibitions.  If I believe the Torah was written by God, that prohibition can only be changed by God.  If I believe the Torah was written by humans, then I can say that the Torah was written by humans at a specific time period for a specific situation.  Continuing down that path, I could make the argument that since humans wrote the Torah to respond to their time period, it is our job today to make sure that Jewish law responds to our time period and that driving on shabbat to engage in shabbat experiences of services, family or friends is permissible and may even be encouraged.

There is an argument that could be made that once the floodgates open and humans are left as the authority for deciding or changing Biblical law, we will decide what is subjectively best for us and all of Judaism will wash away.  What if it is something in the middle? God and us working together to figure out how to bring the most holiness, respect and dignity to the world. That would be a lot of work, but I do believe that is what Judaism is about, the brit, the covenant, between us and God.

1/03/17


How do we make decisions and what makes for a Jewish decision?  In Deuteronomy we read “Do what is right and good in the sight of the Lord…”  How does one figure out “what is right and good in the sight of the Lord?”

Is following halacha (Jewish Law) the definition of this?  Is halacha enough?  What about subjective human elements such as reason, emotion and intuition?  Do they play a role?  How do these interact or what is the interplay between them and halacha?

If one does not use halacha, but rather uses Jewish values such as brit (covenant), respect for human dignity, tikkun olam to guide in making a decision, does that make it a Jewish decision?

When faced with making a decision, a person will consider various factors and values which might be taken into consideration.  As Jews, one of those values is Judaism.  The difference between secular ethics and Jewish ethics is that secular ethics bases itself solely on individual subjective human criteria.  Jewish ethics incorporates cumulative wisdom and experience of Jewish texts, traditions, values and customs.  How we as individual Jews may use this cumulative wisdom may differ, but just using it makes our decisions Jewish.